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The following brief news items might be of interest to our readers: 
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Hungarian Foreign Minister Kalman 
Kanya, Hitler, and Peace in Europe, 
August - September, 1938* 
Endre B. Gastony 
Kalman Kanya was the "grand old man" of Hungarian foreign 
affairs between 1933 and 1945. As an Austro-Hungarian diplomatic 
official, his career commenced as early as 1893, at as diverse 
locations as Constantinople, Kiev, Vienna, and Mexico City. At the 
end of the First World War, Kanya returned to his native Hungary, 
where he had a major share in establishing the independent 
Hungarian diplomatic service. During a long span of political 
activity, he played a role, for example, in blocking King Karoly's 
return to the Hungarian throne in 1921 and participated in 
formulating the terms of the intended Hungarian armistice with 
Stalin in 1944. He reached the height of his career as foreign 
minister during 1933-1938, a position he fulfilled with vigor, despite 
his sixty-three years of age at the time of his appointment. During 
1919-1925, Kanya served as deputy foreign minister and was the 
Hungarian representative in Berlin from 1925 until 1933.1 
Kanya was blessed with a well developed intellect, which was 
tempered with a healthy spirit of realism. He was also a man of 
determination and courage, yet a sense of caution seldom deserted 
him. As foreign minister, he employed his talents for maintaining 
his small and truncated Hungary's security, during the over-
lapping eras of French-Little Entente dominance and Germany's 
ascendancy under Hitler. As his most ambitious undertaking, he 
attempted to build a multilateral grand alliance consisting of 
Hungary, Germany, Italy, Austria, and perhaps Poland, with which 
he intended to strengthen Hungary's security and thereby to 
advance the cause of Hungarian irredentism also, hoping in the 
process to reverse the territorial decisions of the Treaty of Trianon. 
Though his grand alliance proved to be beyond the realm of the 
possible, Kanya continued on a course of measured Hungai ian-
German friendship, though far from unreservedly so, and he 
persisted in efforts toward territorial revisionism. It is in these 
regards that Kanya became the crucial Hungarian figure in the 
events that transpired during August-September, 1938, between 
Hungary and the Little Entente at Bled, and almost simultaneously, 
between Hungary and Germany in Kiel and Berlin. 
Both sets of these events were closely associated with the Czecho-
slovak crisis of 1938, culminating in the four-power Munich 
Conference. During the tumultuous weeks of August and Septem-
ber, Hitler attempted to lure Hungary into participating in a 
military attack on Czechoslovakia, possibly a quite disastrous move 
for the country. Hungary's revisionist aspirations thereby would 
have had a chance of being attained in the North, but Kanya realized 
that much more was at stake, because a German-Czechoslovak-
Hungarian clash could easily escalate into a wider war. Kanya's and 
Hitler's intentions and wills clashed in the process. In the end, the 
Hungarian government refused to take part in such a risky 
undertaking. It is possible to say that the Hungarian "no" to Hitler 
had a determining role in bringing about the Munich solution — 
which kept the peace and averted war in 1938. This basically 
fortunate turn of events for both Hungary and Europe is attribut-
able, to no small measure, to the diplomatic skill and political caution 
of Foreign Minister Kalman Kanya. 
* * * 
During 1938, Kanya and his colleagues witnessed from Budapest 
a curious transitionary period in European political relations. The 
international structure created after the First World War was still 
largely intact. To a fairly high degree, European peace and stability 
continued to rest on the domination of the continent by France and 
her allies: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania, more 
or less augmented since the mid-1930s by the Soviet Union. Britain 
usually supported this continental constellation.2 
But the French-British-Little Entente hegemony in Europe was 
placed under an increasingly bold challenge by a resurgent Ger-
many under the leadership of Hitler. As the most dramatic 
manifestation of this tendency, during March, 1938, Hitler occu-
pied and annexed neighboring Austria. Western Europe reacted 
only with mild protests. As far as Hungary was concerned, this 
successful modification of the status quo was a promising sign, but 
hardly an unqualified one. In the spring of 1938, a powerful 
Germany had appeared on the doorsteps of Hungary, the whole 
Danube basin, and the Balkans. The western half of Czechoslovakia 
was surrounded by German territory on three sides. For better or 
for worse, the natural weight of Germany would become once again 
a very significant factor in the life of East Central Europe.3 
In making his strategic territorial gains, Hitler very ably exploited 
the irrational spirit of nationalism widely influential in the 1930's. 
By making his demands usually in the name of national self-
determination, he sounded a generally accepted moral justification. 
The incorporation of Germanic Austria into the Third Reich 
seemed to substantiate his claim. This is how Kanya perceived the 
situation, as he reported to the foreign affairs committee of the 
Hungarian parliament after the Anschluss: Hitler was interested only 
in "Blut und Boden." But in reality, the Fuehrer envisioned the 
establishment of German supremacy over the continent, with a 
possible acquiescence on the part of the British Empire. The next 
step was intended to be the forceful creation of an Eastern 
Lebensraum, stretching to the Urals and Volga. Various degrees of 
domination and exploitation were held in store for the peoples of 
this vast region, including the Hungarians. The "superior" German 
Volk would forge a great territorial empire over the "inferior" 
masses of the "East." Rivaling in size and importance the United 
States, Germany would thus become a world power, capable of 
participating in global politics at least as an equal of either the British 
Empire or the United States.4 
Though quite familiar with expansionistic geopolitical theories 
emanating from the NSDAP, Kanya was hardly in a position to 
discern fully how seriously these views were held by Hitler. Kanya 
was traditional European diplomat who considered Hitler as a 
similarly traditional politician, with whom it would be possible to 
deal according to generally accepted principles and procedures. 
Kanya believed, moreover, that Hungary and Germany were tied 
together by the force of past association, by comradship-in-arms, 
and by the similar fates suffered in the First World War and in the 
subsequent peace settlement. It was only later that Kanya — and the 
world — would comprehend that Hitler was, in reality, a dangerous 
adventurer.3 
Hungary's international position in the interwar era was quite 
precarious. It is true that Hungary was a member of the tripartite 
Rome Pact since its founding in 1934, along with Italy and Austria, 
but the Rome Pact was only a consultative political agreement, 
accompanied with certain bilateral economic arrangements. It did 
not contain any military clauses, as the fate of Austria in 1938 clearly 
indicated. In any case, the Rome-Berlin Axis of 1936 overshadowed 
the significance of the Rome agreements for Italy. It is not that 
Kanya had not made an effort to improve Hungary's international 
situation by other steps. From 1933 until late 1936, he had diligently 
worked for the creation of a large multilateral alliance consisting of 
Hungary, Austria, Italy, Germany, and perhaps even Poland. 
Actually, he had intended to enlarge and strengthen the Rome Pacts 
in this fashion. After some encouraging advances, his "grand 
design" had failed to materialize. Hungary's prospective allies had 
not seen their interests sufficiently served by such an alliance, which, 
in essence, would have been a recreated version of the pre-war 
Triple Alliance. Hitler had been particularly disinterested in a 
scheme that had run on a collision course with his vision of a 
German-dominated "new Europe."6 
Another option for increasing Hungary's security was the possi-
bility of her making up with her neighbors: Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia, and Romania. In principle, the pragmatic Kanya was 
not averse to this eventuality, but serious territorial disputes stood in 
the way. Initially, Kanya and most Hungarian politicians had 
demanded the return of all the lost territories of the fallen Great 
Hungary. Eventually, the Hungarian ruling oligarchy, as well as the 
public, probably would have been sufficiently satisfied with the 
return of the mainly Hungarian (Magyar) inhabited regions alone. 
But the beneficiaries of the Treaty of Trianon, banded together in 
the Little Entente alliance, had not been really willing to hand back 
any significant territory. In response, Kanya had torpedoed, time 
after time, such efforts toward Danubian international cooperation 
in the mid-1930's, as the proposed Danubian Pact or the so-called 
Danubian Confederation. Stubborn Hungarian irredentism and 
Little Entente intransigence left Danubian Europe in a state of 
disunity and vulnerability/ 
Subsequent to this cluster of events, Kanya had formulated and 
initiated a so-called policy of free hand from late 1936 on. As an able 
politician, Kanya had placed his policy in a positive light: Hungary 
would not chose sides in Europe until she became certain which side 
would become supreme.8 Astute observers fully realized the practi-
cal wisdom of that position, for after all, Hungary's national security 
and perhaps even her survival were at stake. However, it should not 
be forgotten that Hungary's unaligned position had not been 
entirely a matter of free choice. It had been more a product of 
necessity, in light of the failure of Kanya's planned alliance and in 
view of the country's irreconcilable differences with the Little 
Entente. Kanya's policy, nevertheless, offered certain advantages. 
Kanya could now attempt to turn to either side — to Germany and 
Italy or to Britain, France, and the Little Entente. Should Germany's 
resurgence elevate her to the position of the arbiter of East Central 
Europe, Hungary would readily attempt to exploit that opportunity 
in pursuit of her self-interest. The same stood for Britain, should 
she decide to pay significant attention to Danubian Europe. 
The facts of geography and Hungarian irredentist yearnings 
imposed on Kanya's policy numerous constraints. Far away Britain, 
even if concerned and willing, had a great deal of difficulty in 
exerting significant influence in East Central Europe. France's 
alliances with the Little Entente made a pro-Hungarian French 
policy unlikely. Similarly, Britain could support Hungarian revi-
sionism only at the risk of alienating the Little Entente. Yet, most 
likely, only with the active cooperation of the Little Entente could 
Britain have any significant political power in Danubian Europe, 
unless extraordinary conditions surfaced.9 While Britain's and 
France's options were fairly limited in the region, neighboring 
Germany's opportunities and advantages, as friend or foe, were 
significantly more numerous: familiarity with the region, geo-
graphic proximity, similarities in political and social development, 
economic compatibility, not to mention the fact that Germany had 
consciously remained uncommitted to any one of the small states of 
the area.10 It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that even 
while attempting to implement an independent foreign policy, 
Kanya's and his colleagues' steps would lead to Berlin and Rome 
significantly more often than to London and Paris during 1936-
1938. Still, in dealing with Berlin and Rome, Kanya jealously 
guarded Hungarian sovereignty and he demanded that Hungary be 
treated according to the principle of equality. On the other hand, in 
dealing with British and French diplomats, Kanya kept the lines of 
communication open, often speaking with surprising candor. He 
continued his diplomatic exchanges with the Soviet Union on the 
"correct" level. In other words, during 1936-1938, Kanya was 
careful not to burn his bridges toward London, Paris, and Moscow. 
Hungary, unlike Germany and Italy, continued to remain a member 
of the League of Nations and, for the time being, she would notjoin 
the Anti-Comintern Pact.11 
A common distaste for the existence of Czechoslovakia, which 
contained large minorities of Germans and Hungarians, served as a 
strong incentive for cooperation between Budapest and Berlin. 
Hitler viewed Czechoslovakia as an artificial creation. Because of the 
long history of Germanic domination over the Czechs, he con-
sidered Bohemia and Moravia as the rightful possessions of the 
Third Reich. Besides, he desired a short border, in place of the 
extensive German-Czechoslovak frontier. During his famous con-
ference of November 5, 1937, he expressed his intention of dealing 
with Czechoslovakia and Austria soon. The situation became more 
acute after the so-called May Crisis. During May 20-21 1938, the 
Czechoslovak army partially mobilized on the German and Hungar-
ian frontiers. Reports of German troop movements, it appears, had 
been interpreted in Prague as an impending attack. Britain and 
France, in turn, firmly expressed their support to Czechoslovakia. 
Whether or not a German attack was intended, none came. In the 
eyes of the world, the Fuehrer, much to his chagrin, appeared to 
have backed down. From this time on, he was even more determined 
to smash the Czechs militarily. On May 30, he signed "Fall Gruen", 
the plan for the liquidation of Czechoslovakia. The participation of 
Hungary and Poland was expected, particularly if the war remained 
a local one.12 
Hungary's approach to Czechoslovakia was somewhat similar to 
Germany's. Hungary hoped for the return, based on historical 
grounds, of the former Upper Hungary, that is Slovakia and 
Ruthenia. Budapest disregarded the fact that the Slovaks, the great 
majority of the population, wanted to remain in Czechoslovakia. On 
the other hand, a significant Hungarian minority, living in the 
southern strip of the region, did wish to return to Hungary. Other 
factors entered as well. Czechoslovakia was the leader of the Little 
Entente. She was tied by military alliances to France and to the Soviet 
Union. Prague was, in Budapest's view, active in disseminating 
anti-Hungarian propaganda in the West. The mobilization of the 
Czechoslovak troops on the Hungarian frontier in the May Crisis 
fur ther aggravated relations between Budapest and Prague.13 
Hungarian and German designs on Czechoslovakia, consequent-
ly, coincided quite naturally. When Prime Minister Kalman Daranyi 
and Kanya visited Germany during November 22-25, 1937, Hitler 
frankly explained his intention of destroying Czechoslovakia and 
suggested that Hungary could then recover Slovakia. The Hungar-
ians were gratified, though Kanya stressed to Hitler that "Hungary 
had no intentions whatever of achieving her revisionist aims by force 
of arms and thereby unleashing a European war." But, at the same 
time, Kanya expressed willingness to make a final settlement with 
Yugoslavia, in return for that country's neutrality in a German-
Hungarian local conflict with Czechoslovakia. Simultaneously, 
Kanya quite likely also sought Germany's guarantee of Yugoslav 
neutrality. Hitler and Goering were happy to see an end to 
Hungarian revisionist effort in all directions and they promised to 
intercede in Belgrade. Thereby Hungarian and German foreign 
policy goals reached a high degree of congruity, though Hitler was 
rather reluctant to go as far as guaranteeing the Hungarian-
Yugoslav frontier.14 
As the November meetings in part illustrate, Kanya envisioned 
the recovery of former Upper Hungary in the case of the following 
eventualities: 1. Czechoslovakia would disintegrate into its compo-
nents because of internal antagonisms and/or as consequence of 
Hitler's pressure; 2. Czechoslovakia would be defeated in a local war 
by the combined armies of Germany, Hungary, and Poland, with the 
political support of Italy, should international conditions permit a 
local war; and finally, with the means of peaceful international 
diplomacy, including the possibility of great power conference. 
Kanya was willing to employ any of the methods of traditional power 
politics for achieving results, as long as the consequences would not 
be self-defeating, as for example a Little Entente attack or a major 
European war.13 
Consequently, during the first months of 19S8, Kanya made 
serious efforts for reaching understandings or creating alliances 
with Czechoslovakia's neighbors and/or enemies — Poland, Italy, 
and Germany. Kanya and Horthy visited Warsaw during early 
February, but not much was accomplished because Kanya and 
Foreign Minister Jozef Beck did not relate well to each other. 
Eventually, Kanya clarified his position to Beck in a letter on 
March 2: "We are determined to take part in every anti-Czech action 
which might appear necessary, therefore it would be desirable to 
begin discussions about details, including those of a military nature, 
as soon as possible."16 These contacts materialized to some degree, 
for example in regard to intelligence gathering. In April, Kanya 
indicated that Hungary aspired to the whole of Upper Hungary, a 
claim Beck eventually accepted. Beck and Kanya agreed in May that 
they would make the same demands for the Polish and Hungarian 
minorities that Germany would demand for the Sudetens. In this 
way, the two sides reached a general understanding about proceed-
ing against Czechoslovakia jointly, but a specific alliance was not 
agreed upon.17 
A similar statement can be made about Kanya's efforts toward 
Italy. Hungarian-Italian diplomatic exchanges were mainly cen-
tered around the neutrality of Yugoslavia in case of a Hungarian-
Czechoslovak clash. During mid-May, Kanya sought a bilateral 
agreement with Rome, in place of the defunct Rome Pact, including 
assurances of Italian support to Hungary in case of Yugoslav attack. 
But Mussolini and Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano were 
unwilling to make a formal written commitment.18 Kanya pressed 
on, nevertheless. On July 18, he and Prime Minister Bela Imredy 
held discussions with Mussolini and Ciano in Rome. Here the 
Hungarian Foreign Minister conjured up the ingenious proposal of 
resuscitating the Rome Pact by substituting Yugoslavia in place of 
the fallen Austria. The issue was still Yugoslav neutrality, of course. 
Though Kanya admitted that Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan 
Stojadinovic appeared to be ready for a conditional neutrality 
toward Hungary, it was difficult to know how Stojadinovic would 
actually behave in case of a Danubian war, emphasized Kanya. In 
order to assure Yugoslavia's "absolute" neutrality, Kanya requested 
a preferably written Italian-Hungarian agreement in the form of a 
military guarantee against Yugoslavia. But Mussolini and Ciano 
were still unwilling to provide a written guarantee, though the Duce 
most likely made a verbal assurance to that effect. If that represent-
ed a degree of assurance for Hungary, Kanya and Imredy must have 
been very much cautioned by Mussolini's rather offhand subsequent 
reference to a possible wider war, involving not only Italy, Hungary, 
and Yugoslavia, but France as well.19 
It is in the light of Kanya's alliance making efforts toward Poland 
and Italy — though more or less fruitless — that the upcoming 
Hungarian visit to Germany should be viewed. Kanya was an active 
creator of policy, not simply someone passively reacting to unfold-
ing events around him. It should also be realized that his intended 
alliances were not designed simply for their possible military 
applicability, but more so, in Kanya's mind, they were considered as 
providing a political deterrent, in order to allow Hungary to 
accomplish her goals toward Czechoslovakia with only a local war, 
should that be necessary.20 That Kanya placed a high value on 
alliances can be shown by one of his own pronouncements. Austria 
had fallen, he explained to the foreign policy committee of the 
Hungarian parliament on March 23, 1938, because she had pos-
sessed no military alliances. Consequently, she had been "forced to 
rely exclusively on her own armed strength for the defense of her 
independence."21 
Naturally, Hungary's options toward Czechoslovakia would be 
determined not only by German, Italian, Yugoslav, and Polish 
attitudes, but also by the stance of France and Britain. But during 
the months prior to the Hungarian visit to Germany, signals 
emanating f rom London and Paris were mixed. British Prime 
Minister Neville Chamberlain and his French counterpart, Edouard 
Daladier, o f ten seemed eager to appease Hitler by limited conces-
sions, only to follow with strong pronouncements about their 
willingness to resist aggression militarily if necessary. The Anschluss 
was greeted by the West with only token expressions of displeasure. 
On the other hand, Paris and London responded to the May Crisis 
with strong representations to Berlin. Yet the negotiating mission of 
Lord Runciman, commencing with the end of July, seemed to point, 
once again, in the direction of a negotiated settlement in the 
Czechoslovak crisis. Kanya, observing what appeared to be rather 
constant Western vacillation, could not rule out the possibility of 
either a peaceful or a military response by the West to Hitler. Nor 
could, indeed, anyone else, including, most likely, the two Western 
prime ministers themselves.22 
H; * * 
These tendencies acquired concrete form during the Hungarian 
state visit to Germany. The delegation — consisting of Horthy, 
Imredy, their wives, Kanya, Minister of Defense Jeno Ratz and a 
sizable number diplomatic and military officials — left Budapest by 
a special train in the late hours of August 20, 1938. From the 
beginning, it was evident that the German government was placing 
very high importance on the visit. A triumphal arch greeted the 
delegation at the new German-Hungarian frontier, an elaborate 
welcoming was staged at the Westbanhof in Vienna, and the railway 
route was decorated with a profusion of flags all the way across 
Germany to Kiel.23 
As it arrived at Kiel in the morning of August 22, the Hungarian 
party was greeted by Hitler, Ribbentropp, Goering, Admiral 
Raeder, and other German officials. The exceptional display of 
ostentation continued here and throughout the journey. The 
professed rationale for the visit, the launching of the cruiser Prinz 
Eugen, followed shortly at the Krupp shipyards during the same 
morning. In arranging the visit, the hosts obviously had not been 
unmindful of Regent Horthy's well known former career as an 
admiral of the Austro-Hungarian navy. Mme Horthy christened the 
ship successfully and, together with other ladies and guests, she later 
boarded the oceanliner Patria. Horthy and Hitler proceeded to the 
yacht Grille, from her deck they watched an impressive naval parade 
in the harbor, and then cruised out onto the Baltic, in order to view 
extensive naval maneuvers held on the open sea.21 
Hitler wasted no time in coming to his real objective concerning 
the Hungarian state visit. In the late afternoon of August 22, during 
the return trip to Kiel on the Grille, he drew Horthy into a 
face-to-face discussion. The Fuehrer fairly bluntly exposed to the 
Regent the essence of the military plan uFall Gruen," expressing his 
determination to attack and to destroy Czechoslovakia, with the 
intention of absorbing her western half into Germany. Hitler 
requested Horthy that Hungary attack Slovakia from the south as 
Germany marched against Bohemia and Moravia. The territory 
Hungary conquered, she could keep, suggested the Fuehrer. 
According to Horthy's own account, "I replied with all the courtesy 
but with great firmness that there could be no possibility of 
Hungarian participation," because of the peaceful nature of Hun-
garian revisionist intentions and due to Hungary's military un-
preparedness. From the German record, the bulk of which had been 
most likely orally transmitted by Hitler to State Secretary Ernst 
Weizsacker, a seemingly contradictory picture emerges. First, Weiz-
sacker places the Hitler-Horthy meeting for the morning of August 
23, simultaneously with the Ribbentropp-Imredy-Kanya discus-
sions, and not for the afternoon of August 22, as stated in Horthy's 
memoirs. Perhaps there were two meetings between Horthy and 
Hitler at the opening of the visit or perhaps one or both sources are 
somewhat inaccurate in this regard. Second, the Weizsacker memo-
randum states that "Horthy had expressed himself to the Fuehrer in 
more definite language. While not keeping silent on his misgivings 
as to the British attitude, he nevertheless made it clear that Hungary 
intended to cooperate." The contradictory nature of these state-
ments is probably more apparent than real. Actually, the two 
statements should be perceived as mostly complementary, if we 
understand that, after the fact, both Horthy and Hitler must have 
wished to place a different emphasis on what had transpired, for the 
sake of appearances. Consequently, Horthy most likely did express 
Hungary's general intention of moving against Czechoslovakia, as 
the German records indicate, but not in the fall, because of her 
military unpreparedness and her fear of a general European war, 
involving Britain, France, and perhaps the Soviet Union, the Regent 
stated. At this stage of the discussion, Hitler lost his temper and the 
meeting came to an abrupt end.2° 
Historical literature occasionally labels Hitler's offer to Horthy as 
an "alliance." This interpretation is not entirely accurate, for a 
variety of reasons. What Hitler offered was a coordinated German 
and Hungarian military attack on a third country, and in the course 
of the discussion, he did promise arms shipments to Hungary. But 
that was all. There is no indication that Hitler desired to put 
anything in writing. He mentioned nothing about dispatching 
troops for Hungary's assistance against Czechoslovakia, should the 
need arise. By not raising the topic, he underlined his unwillingness 
to promise a military guarantee against another possible antagonist, 
namely Yugoslavia. Consequently, Kanya's subsequent reference, 
phrased as a "military convention," is perhaps the most appropriate 
in describing what Hitler had in mind.26 
Hitler's eagerness for luring Hungary into cooperation is explica-
ble on both political and military grounds. A combined German, 
Hungarian, and Polish attack would lift the burden of sole responsi-
bility from the shoulders of the Fuehrer. A united assault by three of 
her neighbors would illustrate to the world the "artificial" nature of 
Czechoslovakia. The march of three armies, moreover, would 
provide the likelihood of a rapid victory, on which Hitler heavily 
counted for the prevention of possible Western intervention. The 
southern (Austrian) theater of German operations was seriously 
handicapped by transportation problems: there was only one 
railroad line in existence for deploying troops against the southern, 
and unfortified, frontier of Bohemia and Moravia. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that Hitler intended an important role for the 
Hungarian politicians and soldiers.27 
Horthy was not entirely surprised by Hitler's request. For many 
years, Budapest had shared with Berlin the hope of moving against 
Czechoslovakia some day. The Hungarian-German discussions of 
November, 1937, had strongly reinforced these expectations. The 
fate of Austria had been another indication of possible future 
developments. In fact, on the day of their departure and even 
during the journey by train, the Hungarian politicians had received 
warning messages from a few of Germany's uneasy military leaders 
about Hitler's exact intentions: Czechoslovakia would be attacked in 
late September or early October, even at the risk of a major 
European war.28 
With its guard up, the Hungarian delegation, before arriving to 
Kiel, had formulated a general response, almost certainly under the 
guidance of Kanya, to a likely request or demand by Hitler. The 
position stated that "Hungary, for the benefit of her own goals, is 
also determined to move against Czechoslovakia, however, the 
timing can not be determined; the fall of this year is not very 
suitable, because our preparations are not sufficiently advanced."29 
It is most probably this line of argument that Horthy conveyed to 
Hitler aboard the Grille on August 22. 
Despite its brevity, the Hungarian statement of position is 
factually quite valid. Hungary was indeed unprepared militarily, 
particularly against a well-armed Czechoslovak army deployed 
behind strong permanent fortifications along the Danube frontier.30 
But the crux of the matter lay beyond military considerations. As 
Kanya understood and stressed to his colleagues, Hungary was very 
much unprepared diplomatically. Yugoslavia's neutrality in case of a 
German-Czechoslovak-Hungarian clash was still uncertain. The 
same was the case for Romania. To date, Germany had been 
unwilling to guarantee Yugoslav neutrality. Mussolini, as well, 
would not make the same commitment for Hungary's benefit, in any 
other but rather offhand oral form. Poland had not desired to tie 
herself to a Hungarian alliance either. It is not surprising therefore, 
that the unfavorable international situation was the uppermost 
factor for the leading figures of the Hungarian delegation, we must 
add, down to the last man. During the discussions in Germany, 
however, Hungary's military unpreparedness served as a conve-
nient excuse for fending off Hitler's requests. 
Throughout the visit to Germany, the issue of Yugoslav neutrali-
ty, consequently, hung over Kanya's head as a Damoclean sword. 
The Hungarian Foreign Minister comprehended with a great deal 
of trepidation that a local Hungarian-Czechoslovak conflict, in 
cooperation with Germany, could very well result in an East Central 
European war, should Yugoslavia decide to march. He understood 
that in Belgrade, especially on the political "left" and in the military, 
a strong pro-Czechoslovak sentiment continued to exist, with the 
possible effect of firming up the Little Entente alliance. If Yugosla-
via would march, Romania would likely follow. But a Yugoslav 
military action would quite likely force Mussolini's hand. With 
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania, and 
Italy all in the conflict, how long could France refrain from 
honoring her alliances and for how many days could Britain remain 
on the sidelines? How would the Soviet Union react?31 
The Hungarian Foreign Minister knew fully well that the inter-
locking sympathies, commitments, and alliances could, with ease, 
escalate a local German-Czechoslovak-Hungarian conflict, via 
Yugoslavia, into an East Central European war, which could rapidly 
drag Italy, France, Britain, and other states into a major European 
or world war. Much to his credit, Kanya discerned the existence of 
these dangerous linkages underneath the uneasy surface of Europe-
an international life and he was very cautious not to make the wrong 
move and thereby trigger the outbreak of a major conflict. This is 
not surprising, particularly from a former Austro-Hungarian 
diplomat, who had witnessed from far away Mexico a similar 
interlocking chain of events plunge Europe into a world war during 
the summer of 1914. The resultant First World War, after all, had 
culminated in the defeat and disintegration of Austria-Hungary and 
it had led to a drastic truncation of Hungary in the Treaty of 
Trianon. In 1938, Kanya feared, the effect of irresponsible adven-
turism would be even worse — a Hungarian national suicide.32 
Given the possible unfavorable consequences, many European 
politicians would have recoiled from any action under ordinary 
circumstances. But the circumstances were hardly ordinary for 
Hungary. Having lost in the Treaty of Trianon two-thirds of her 
territory and three fifths of her population (including three million 
Hungarians), Hungary was permeated, no less in 1938 than before, 
with a strong irredentist spirit for the recovery of as much lost 
territory as possible. Kanya was not an exception in this sense. He 
was a spirited nationalist and a determined revisionist, though his 
policies were very much guided and moderated by his sense of 
political realism. He was willing to act "if the chances of success were 
only sixty or seventy percent," according to his own admission in 
reference to regaining territory from Czechoslovakia. 33 For Kanya, 
the primary condition for that eventuality, however, was that a 
German-Hungarian move against Czechoslovakia would remain a 
local one. In Kanya's mind, it was Yugoslavia's action or inaction that 
would keep such a conflict localized or not, as we have seen. The 
most certain way to assure that condition was to wrest from Berlin a 
guarantee, given to Hungary, of Belgrade's neutrality. Naturally, 
the Western spirit of appeasement would have to continue un-
abated, otherwise a localization of the conflict would also be 
impossible. It is with these general concerns and specific objectives 
in mind that we should consider another concurrent manifestation 
of Kanya's foreign policy — the discussions between Hungary and 
the Little Entente. 
* * * 
The negotiations with the Little Entente, in view of their far-
reaching and manifold ramifications, shed a great deal of light on 
the extreme complexity of Kanya's foreign policy and they clearly 
underline the aging, white-haired Hungarian Foreign Minister's 
diplomatic brilliance. Kanya had sent out feelers in late 1936 for the 
possibility of commencing discussions. It had not been an accident 
that Hungary's first steps toward her neighbors had been taken 
shortly after Kanya's realization that his multilateral grand design 
would not materialize. Ostensibly, Kanya's goal was the normaliza-
tion of relations with Yugoslavia, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. As 
the negotiations had begun in early 1937, Hungary had sought the 
Little Entente's recognition of her military equality, that is, her right 
to rearm openly. In response, Hungary would promise a pledge of 
non-aggression toward her neighbors, based on the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact, which these states would reciprocally affirm. Before too long, 
Kanya had also insisted on bilateral minorities agreements between 
Hungary and each of the states in question, professed to be 
necessary for the protection of the Hungarian minorities detached 
from the homeland by the Treaty of Trianon. This last effort had 
been undoubtedly sincere, but it also served the ulterior purpose of 
becoming an instrument for breaking up the Little Entente, as we 
shall see.34 
As the negotiations had begun — through normal diplomatic 
channels, at Geneva, and at Sinaia in Romania — at first Czechoslo-
vakia proved to be quite eager for a settlement, in the hope of 
making a headway toward the formation of a bloc against German 
expansionism. Yugoslavia, on the other hand, attempted to edge 
toward Berlin, in a fence-straddling effort between the two sides, 
and consequently seemed willing in the spring of 1937 to come to a 
separate agreement with Hungary. But her two partners had vetoed 
the move in the council of the Little Entente. Conversely, during 
1937, Romania had been the most reluctant to come to terms with 
Hungary, because of the sensitive Hungarian minority issue in 
Transylvania. Britain and France favored a settlement of antago-
nisms in Danubian Europe, for much the same reason as Prague. 
Berlin and Rome were somewhat puzzled by the entire proceedings. 
Budapest provided different versions of the negotiations to the Axis 
capitals and to the West. After delays and interruptions, the 
meetings continued, and in May, 1938, Kanya had succeeded, with 
Stojadinovic's cooperation, on a key point. Yugoslavia and Romania 
would negotiate with Hungary on the minority issue without 
Czechoslovakia's participation. But no immediate agreement had 
resulted, because Bucharest had balked at the last moment. Czecho-
slovak Foreign Minister Emil Krofta was beginning to see the 
handwriting on the wall, as he had reproached the Hungarians in 
May: Budapest desires no settlement with Prague, but wants to split 
the Little Entente and awaits the dismemberment of Czechoslova-
kia. Now Prague had become the main opponent of reconciliation, 
while the new Romanian government had proved to be more 
agreeable. In May, Bucharest had issued a Minorities Statute. The 
statute was not particularly far-reaching, but Kanya had jumped at 
the opportunity in early August and had signaled the Romanians 
that the time had arrived for the conclusion of the Hungarian-Little 
Entente negotiations. On August 19, the day before the Hungarian 
delegation's departure to Germany, the two sides were still holding 
discussions.33 
The timing of the subsequent Hungarian agreement with the 
Little Entente had been more of a design on Kanya's part than an 
accident. Hitler's decision for the dates of the Hungarian state visit 
had been made in April and the Little Entente had set the next 
meeting of its council for Bled, Yugoslavia, as its May meeting, when 
the dates of the Hungarian delegation's journey to Germany had not 
yet been made public. But Kanya had been cognizant of the timing 
for both of the planned events and he had decided to profit from the 
opportunity provided by their fortunate congruence. It had not 
been an accident that Kanya had expressed his readiness for an 
agreement with Romania on August 9, just two days before the 
Hungarian press had announced, on August 11, the dates of the 
impending state visit to Germany. In fact, it was the Hungarian 
Foreign Minister who had drafted and had proposed the communi-
que that the two sides accepted, after minor modifications, and 
published in the evening of August 23, 1938, simultaneously at Bled 
and Budapest, though in different formats.3'1 
The communique represented the published component of the 
so-called Bled agreements. In it, the Little Entente accepted 
Hungary's military equality and all four states renounced the use of 
force as an instrument of national policy in their mutual relations, in 
the spirit of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.3' Simultaneously, a confiden-
tial agreement was concluded on the Hungarian minority issue 
between Hungary, on the one side, and Yugoslavia and Romania on 
the other. During the morning of August 23, both components of 
the Bled agreements were signed by Gyorgy Bakacz-Bessenyey, the 
Hungarian representative in Belgrade, and by Prime Minister 
Stojadinovic of Yugoslavia.38 Before departing for Germany, Kanya 
had raised his demands for the Hungarian minority in Czechoslova-
kia to the level of "sovereign self-administration," designed to be 
unacceptably high for the Prague government. An agreement 
between Czechoslovakia and Hungary on the nationality issue, 
therefore, was not possible, but was to be handled through future 
bilateral discussions.39 Kanya, by stressing the importance of the 
minority agreements, was consequently able to have the entire Bled 
agreements considered by all participants — including Prague — as 
only a temporary agreement, which would become final, as an 
agreement complex, once a Hungarian-Czechoslovak minorities 
accord would also be reached.40 It should be stressed that Kanya was 
in control of the Hungarian side of the proceedings at Bled, with the 
help of telephone and telegraph communications from Kiel. The 
final permission for the signing of the documents had to come from 
the officials of the foreign ministry at Budapest, because Kanya was 
at sea at the time — but Kanya gave his retroactive assent, as well as 
the approval for the publication of the final communique.41 It 
should be mentioned that Czechoslovakia was willing to acquiesce in 
an unequal treatment by Hungary only under the pressure of 
London and Paris. Yugoslavia and Romania, on the other hand, 
were playing a double game, during and after the Bled meeting. In 
fact, subsequently to their signing, each of the governments 
interpreted the agreements somewhat differently, depending on 
the time and place, to suit that particular country's immediate 
political interests.42 
Another rather important facet of the Bled agreements was the 
divergence of prevalent perceptions about their nature and impor-
tance. In the Little Entente capitals and in Western Europe, 
particularly in the popular press, the Bled accords were considered 
as permanent and therefore a significant victory for anti-German 
cooperation in Danubian Europe — just at the time when the 
Hungarian delegation was feared to be concluding an offensive 
alliance with the Third Reich. In this regard, an important fact is 
that Kanya wished to utilize the perception of permanency for 
increasing the importance of Hungary in the eyes of the German 
leaders. On the other hand, when the situation in Germany did not 
develop as expected, Kanya would be forced to emphasize the Bled 
agreements' "temporary" nature.4 3 The value of Kanya's delicate 
diplomatic construction was not only that the agreements could be 
perceived in two contrasting fashions, but that they could be made 
final in either direction as well, as the train of events would 
necessitate. Should German expansionistic pressure require it, 
Hungary would be in a position to conclude a permanent agreement 
with Czechoslovakia and the entire Little Entente. Or, on the 
contrary, she could refuse to come to a permanent agreement with 
the same, thereby allowing the whole agreement complex to lapse, as 
it would in actuality happen. In this sense, the Bled agreements 
represented the brilliant climax of Kanya's policy of free hand. 
The delineation of Kanya's motives may reduce our perplexity 
over the seemingly complicated and contradictory developments at 
Kiel and Bled. First and foremost, Kanya strove to enhance 
Hungary's importance to Germany. Hitler had rejected the Hun-
garian grand design, much to Kanya's chagrin. The Hungarian 
Foreign Minister would now play his trump card — as he had 
threatened then German Foreign Minister Konstantin Neurath in 
late 1934 — of making up with the Little Entente or at least 
appearing to do so.44 This was done hardly out of spite, but rather as 
a result of cool calculation. Most likely, Kanya still hoped during 
August of 1938 to wrest from Hitler his guarantee of Yugoslav 
neutrality, considered indispensable for the safety of Hungary's 
rear in case of her participation against Czechoslovakia. Secondly, 
Kanya was indeed attempting to break up the Little Entente. If 
successful, Hungary would gain a welcome relief from coordinated 
pressure and intimidation by Prague, Belgrade, and Bucharest. But 
more importantly, by isolating Czechoslovakia from her allies, 
Hungary would make an advance diplomatic preparation for the 
eventuality of a local conflict for the recovery of Slovakia and 
Ruthenia. Third, with the Bled agreements in hand, the Hungarian 
delegation in Germany would be able to minimize the chances, 
though fairly remote, of being meted out the same type of 
intimidating treatment that had been accorded to Austrian Chancel-
lor Kurt von Schuschnigg by Hitler and his generals at Obersalzberg 
on February 12, 1938.43 Hungary would not be pressured into a 
premature war against Czechoslovakia, particularly if the situation 
could degenerate into an East Central European, European, or 
world war. If pressure were applied, Hungary could attempt to 
retreat into the company of her newly-found Little Entente friends, 
honor her pledge of non-aggression to Czechoslovakia and hope at 
the same time for Western support. 
All told, in pursuit of her irredentist goals, Hungary still con-
tinued to count heavily on Germany's and Italy's international 
support, as Kanya had revealed to European diplomats over the 
years and as he had repeated to the members of the foreign policy 
committee of the Hungarian parliament time after time.4*' Hungary 
was unable to escape the deterministic conditions of her history and 
of her geography and she could not overcome the lack of serious 
interest in her problems on the part of other major European states. 
Kanya's entire foreign policy approach during 1937-1938 did 
indeed represent a "policy of free hand," because Hungary did not 
unreservedly commit herself to any one state or configuration of 
states. But, in reality, it was a policy of free hand only to the extent 
that Hungary's escape routes were left fairly open. Perhaps Kanya's 
line should be labeled as a "policy of safe escape." Yet, at the same 
time, because Kanya did not base the course of foreign affairs on 
sentiment, he would have been entirely willing to change sides, if 
Britain and France, despite the odds, would have made their power 
effectively felt in distant East Central Europe. 
* * * 
In the meanwhile, the Hungarian-German discussions continued 
in Kiel, but in an increasingly somber atmosphere, as the news of 
Bled rapidly spread. Kanya and Imredy met with German Foreign 
Minister Joachim Ribbentropp aboard the Patria during the morn-
ing of August 23, as the entire entourage sailed to the island of 
Heligoland, for inspecting its fortifications and its military bases.47 
Understandably, Ribbentropp was highly perplexed about Bled. 
But Kanya was in a self-confident and even arrogant mood. He had 
created conditions at Bled that he would now attempt to exploit for 
Hungary's benefit. The negotiations with the Little Entente were 
"historical" and had brought nothing new, Kanya claimed. The Bled 
communique actually to be issued in the afternoon had not been 
really justified by the negotiations, he continued; in any case, the 
approval for the communique had been given by his subordinates; 
and finally, the whole matter was not really timely any more. But 
Ribbentrop could not be that easily put off. The Bled communique 
will not lead to Yugoslav neutrality; Hungary is blocking the way of 
her intervention in Czechoslovakia; morally it will be more difficult 
for the Yugoslavs to abandon their Czech allies; it will be so 
perceived that Hungary is moving away from the German-Czech 
conflict; and she is consequently renouncing revisionism — so ran 
the counter argument of the German Foreign Minister. 
Kanya's rejoinder, unfortunately, is only touched upon in the 
German minutes and there is no extant official Hungarian record of 
the meeting. It was at this stage that Kanya, most likely, attempted to 
use his Bled leverage to the advantage of attempting to secure, once 
again, a German guarantee of Yugoslav neutrality. The German 
minutes reflect the situation to some degree. In response to 
Ribbentropp's query as to what the Hungarians would do if the 
Fuehrer would implement his decision of responding to new "Czech 
provocations" with the use of force, Kanya's main concern surfaced: 
"Yugoslavia must remain neutral if Hungary were to march 
northward" against Czechoslovakia. Moreover, Hungarian rearma-
ment had just begun and would require one or more additional 
years to complete. But Ribbentropp was not willing to reply any 
more affirmatively than "the Yugoslavs would take care not to walk 
into the pincers of the Axis powers." The German Foreign Minister 
made similar assurances for Romania, France, and England. Quite 
likely, it was somewhere at this stage of the discussions that Kanya, 
seeing his hopes dashed anew, lost control of his tongue, and made a 
few sarcastic remarks at the expense of his German counterpart, 
which the latter would never forgive. In other words, "the direct 
danger of Hungary's unprotected flanks" continued to be a serious 
and unresolved concern for Kanya and Imredy. If Yugoslav (and 
consequently Romanian) neutrality could not be assured, then 
Hungary would not march: this was the most crucial conclusion of 
the meeting. In all, the diplomatic skill of a small and unarmed 
country's foreign minister could not overcome a German policy of 
self-interest.'8 
While Yugoslav neutrality seemed to be principally Kanya's 
preoccupation, Prime Minister Imredy voiced his firm conviction 
that in the case of a German-Czech conflict, France would certainly 
intervene. The Hungarian position by the end of the meeting was 
summarized by Weizsacker as: "The Hungarian reply still remained 
subject to conditions," and "No definite political basis for this — the 
exact moment for Hungarian intervention — was agreed." These 
lines indicate that the Hungarians, at this stage, were still largely 
repeating their original position formulated before arriving at 
Kiel.49 
The politicians from Budapest could at least take solace in not 
having been subjected to pressure or having been given an ultima-
tum by Hitler and Ribbentropp. When, in the afternoon of the same 
day, Imredy met briefly with Hitler, the Hungarian Prime Minister 
"was most relieved when the Fuehrer stated to him that, in this 
particular case, he required nothing of Hungary." But, the Fuehrer 
continued, "he who wanted to sit at the table, must at least help in the 
kitchen." Apparently, Hitler had overestimated the Hungarian 
willingness to march."0 
One additional meeting might have taken place between the two 
sides on August 23, perhaps in the evening, because Weizsacker's 
memorandum concludes with the statement that "Hungary is 
convinced that she will not be able to intervene until some 14 days 
after the outbreak of the war."31 This is a surprisingly novel position, 
which to some degree represents a Hungarian willingness to assume 
additional risks, even with an unprepared army, for the sake of 
making a significant irredentis territorial gain. Given its technical 
nature, there can be little doubt that Foreign Minister Kanya played 
a determinant role in creating the position. But, after careful 
consideration, it becomes plain that the new Hungarian formula was 
still a cautious one, if we keep in mind the mitigating impact of a 
number of significant political-military linkages present in the 
European and East Central European strategic situation. Two 
Weeks after the outbreak of a German-Czechoslovak war, the 
belligerency or non-belligerency of France and Britain would have 
been a settled matter, thus the possible outbreak of a major 
European war would have been a foregone conclusion and Hungary 
would have been in a position to act accordingly. Equally important-
ly, as long as Hungary stayed out of a German-Czechoslovak war, 
Yugoslavia and Romania would have had no justification for 
marching against her, particularly in view of the Bled agreements. 
On the other hand, if France and Britain would not have fought 
against Hitler, and after fourteen days Hungary would have joined a 
victorious Germany in the occupation of a defeated Czechoslovakia, 
it would have been very unlikely that Belgrade and Bucharest, 
under the circumstances, would have attacked Hungary. In both 
instances, she could reasonably expect not to be considered the 
instigator of an East Central European war. This line of thinking, 
inferred from the various Hungarian positions on the subject, 
unmistakenly carries the intellectual stamp of Kanya. The latest 
Hungarian position was somewhat more risky than the original 
stand, but because the functioning or non-functioning of pertinent 
international linkages had been taken into consideration, it was not 
radically more so. In this fashion, it is a fitting testimony to Foreign 
Minister Kanya's political flexibility. 
On the morning of August 24, the Patria sailed with the entire 
party from Heligoland to Hamburg. From there Horthy and Hitler 
and their respective entourages traveled by separate trains to Berlin. 
On the way to the Presidential Palace on the Wilhelmstrasse, Horthy 
and Hitler greeted an enthusiastic crowd from an open car they 
rode. The day ended with an official state banquet, during which the 
usual complimentary toasts were made. The next morning, a major 
military parade was held in the capital in honor of the guests, who, 
along with the military attaches of many countries, seemed properly 
impressed with Hitler's latest military hardware. The evening was 
capped with a gala opera performance of Lohengrin.°2 
During the 24th, the impact of the Bled communique, published 
the evening before, was now fully felt. The popular press in Western 
Europe, in the capitals of the Little Entente, and even in Budapest, 
interpreted it as a major anti-German victory. On top of it, the 
Czechoslovak and Romanian ministers to Berlin, along with other 
"friendly" diplomats, appeared at the Berlin railway station to greet, 
above all, Horthy's train. Hitler was so incensed that he gave a good 
dressing down to his master of ceremonies and he toyed with the 
idea of canceling the opera performance. '3 
Kanya soon realized that the Bled communique had overreached 
its purpose. Its negative impact, combined with the Hungarian 
refusals to march, created an uncomfortably tense atmosphere in 
Berlin. Understandably, form this time on, keeping alive the 
damaged Hungarian-German connection became his and the dele-
gation's central preoccupation. In this spirit, Imredy and Kanya 
gave a press conference during the morning of August 25. The 
Prime Minister spoke in enthusiastic terms about his impressions in 
Germany and stressed that the Bled accords represented only an 
"intention." Kanya categorically stated that the agreements would 
not be in effect until a full agreement had been reached with 
Czechoslovakia on the minority issue."1 
Because Hitler would not see him, Kanya requested, for the same 
day, an interview with Ribbentropp.'" Ribbentropp's opening com-
ments indicated how low German-Hungarian relations had sunk, as 
Kanya feared. The Czech and Western press were jubilant over the 
Bled communique, the German Foreign Minister remarked, which 
was interpreted abroad "as a rift in the German-Hungarian friend-
ship and as a renunciation by Hungary of her revisionist aims." 
Comprehending how high the stakes had become, Kanya decided to 
be entirely frank about Bled, repeating his arguments about the 
preliminary nature of the agreements, the tactic of upping demands 
to Prague, and the likelihood that neither Budapest or Prague 
would actually honor what they had signed. Ribbentropp became 
only partially appeased as he agreed with Kanya that the true 
meaning of Bled would depend on how the (inspired) Hungarian 
press would treat it in the days ahead. Next, Kanya came forward 
with a completely new stance: because Hungary's military strength 
had in fact improved, by October 1 she could participate in an attack 
against Czechoslovakia. It is difficult to know if this was a new 
Hungarian view or Kanya's own personal stance. In any case, it 
represented a major concession to Germany, because the new 
position disregarded the requirement of even relative certainty 
about Yugoslav neutrality, committing Hungary to attack simulta-
neously with the Third Reich. The interpretation of Kanya's motives 
is also difficult. It could have constituted a sincere but desperate act 
on Kanya's part for maintaining Hungarian-German friendship or 
could have been only a momentary tactic for appeasing a perturbed 
Ribbentropp — as Horthy would later explain in his memoirs. 
Because no member of the Hungarian delegation — including 
Kanya — would repeat the position again, it must have been the 
latter, though an uncharacteristically unsafe one. The Reich For-
eign Minister, unconvinced, did not even respond.56 
Another face-to-face meeting between Hitler and Horthy in the 
afternoon of August 25 only aggravated the tensions. In the mean-
time, Horthy and General Walther Brauchitsch, the commander-in-
chief of the German army, had shared their misgivings about a 
possible war on Czechoslovakia. Having learned that this had 
happened, Hitler opened with recriminations to Horthy, which the 
latter did not accept kindly. Nothing was agreed upon once again. 
The Regent attempted to appease the Fuehrer, perhaps after this 
meeting sometime, by offering to intercede in Warsaw on Berlin's 
behalf concerning the Corridor issue. But the former advised 
against any such steps.57 
What Hitler could not accomplish with the politicians and 
diplomats, he next tried with the Hungarian military. Probably in 
the morning, before the delegation left Berlin on August 26, Hitler 
met with General Ratz. The Fuehrer gave Ratz the full treatment: 
He was determined to settle accounts with the Czechs; Germany was 
superior militarily to the West; and Britain and France would not 
intervene. T h e novel element in Hitler's line of argument was the 
raising of a supposed Polish threat. Poland would probably inter-
vene, claimed the Fuehrer, in which case Slovakia would fall into her 
hands and Hungary would be left with nothing. Consequently, this 
was the last chance for a Hungarian revisionist success in that region. 
But Ratz would not succumb to Hitler's blandishments. The 
Hungarian military was in the first stage of reorganization, he 
replied, thus the fall would be particularly unsuitable for a cam-
paign. In any case, Belgrade's neutrality was uncertain, Ratz 
continued. Should Yugoslavia fight and should Mussolini honor his 
verbal promise by coming to the aid of Hungary, the conflict would 
cease to be a local war, because "there would be growing repercus-
sions," argued the Hungarian Minister of Defense. Hitler disagreed 
and there was no meeting of the minds between the two sides once 
again. Still, Hitler brought up the need of the Luftwaffe for direction-
inding stations and emergency landing space in Hungary. Ratz gave 
his assent and so would his political superiors. The meeting closed 
with Hitler's assurance of his readiness to authorize German-
Hungarian military staff discussions. Until the very end of the 
Hungarian state visit, Hitler continued to assign a crucial role to 
Hungary in his plans against Czechoslovakia.08 
On August 26, the Hungarians traveled to Potsdam. Imredy and 
Kanya held a short meeting with Ribbentropp in the Charlottenburg 
Palace. Kanya continued his retreat on the Bled accords by claiming, 
inaccurately, that Hungary had not signed any agreements with 
Czechoslovakia because of the minority issue, but only with Yugosla-
via and Romania. In other words, Kanya had given up on attempt-
ing to explain the diplomatic complexity of the Bled agreements, 
instead, he resorted to dissimulation in order to assuage his German 
counterpart. In his defense, it should be stressed that the multiplici-
ty of reasons for which the Bled agreements had been necessary 
before the visit to Germany, were no longer timely at the visit's end. 
Imredy, in his turn, stressed once again to a largely silent Ribben-
tropp his opinion that France would go to the aid of Czechoslovakia 
in the case of a German attack. The discussions were obviously 
deteriorating to a totally non-productive level.'19 
In the afternoon, Horthy went to Karinhall, Hermann Georing's 
hunting lodge in the Schorfheide forest. Because the weather was 
poor, not much hunting was done, thus there was time for 
discussion. Horthy brought up the possibility of postponing the war 
with Czechoslovakia until the spring, to which the pliable Goering 
responded in a fairly positive sense, which the Hungarians accepted 
with delight at first, until they realized the emptiness of the Reich 
Marshall's words. Goering also showed understanding for the 
Hungarian need of being assured about Yugoslav non-belligerency. 
Though he was certain of Stojadinovic's neutrality, Goering prom-
ised to get in touch with Belgrade on the issue and to report back to 
the Hungarians. If that promise sounded encouraging, another 
topic brought up by Goering must have been like cold water on the 
guests. The Reich Marshall inquired whether Hungary would be in 
a position to supply gasoline to Germany "in case a possible conflict 
lasted for any length of time," Imredy politely declined, but the 
implication of Goering's words must have been unmistakable — a 
major war was not being ruled out by one of the chief Figures of the 
Third Reich. On the evening of August 26, the delegation departed 
by train to Nuremberg for a short sightseeing visit there on the next 
day and then continued back toward home.60 
The German Minister to Hungary, Otto Erdmannsdorff, travel-
ing with the delegation back to Budapest, was a witness to the final 
Hungarian reaction to the visit. Horthy was almost apologetic: he 
had for years desired the rapid success of Hungarian revisionism, 
but was now forced by the international situation "to sound a 
warning note." Yet Imredy would not repeat his forebodings — 
which he had given four times in Germany — about the likelihood of 
French intervention. Perhaps he was beginning to have doubts 
about the validity and wisdom of his position. But Kanya was certain 
and satisfied: "The Hungarians would fight even if the chances of 
success were only 60-70 percent. But they could not be expected to 
commit suicide." Stojadinovic would not provide a definite reply; 
whether or not Yugoslavia would fight would be determined by the 
attitude of France and Britain; should Mussolini respond to a 
Yugoslav attack on Hungary, the main strength of the Italian forces 
would be tied down on the French frontier and the remainder would 
quickly become held up in the impassable Karst mountains on the 
Yugoslav border — so reasoned Kanya and the group. That is, 
Hungary would be thrust into the flames of an East Central 
European and a much wider war. As Kanya confided to a fellow 
Hungarian diplomat about Hitler a few days after the state visit: 
"That madman wants to unleash the war whatever the cost."61 But in 
1938, Hungary wanted no part in the tragedy of another major war. 
Yet, during the first weeks of September, a peaceful solution to 
the German-Czechoslovak antagonism was becoming more and 
more a possibility. As Neville Chamberlain gained the initiative in 
the direction of securing a diplomatic solution, Budapest was 
becoming increasingly hopeful that the same approach would be 
applied to the Hungarian minority issue in Czechoslovakia. In fact, 
Chamberlain sent a promise to Budapest on September 19, through 
an intermediary, stating that "I wholeheartedly sympathize with 
Hungary, which has no reason for anxiety. I am carefully keeping 
Hungary's situation in mind." He urged a continuation of Hun-
gary's "peaceful and calm attitude."62 
Hitler, on the other hand, began to fear that a peaceful cession of 
Sudeten German territory would rob him of the opportunity of 
conquering all of Bohemia and Moravia. Consequently, the Fuehrer 
reverted to his original intention of a coordinated outside military 
attack on Czechoslovakia. With this in mind, Hitler invited Imredy 
and Kanya back to Germany. On September 20, the two Hungarians 
flew on Hitler's airplane to Berchtesgaden. There they were treated 
by the Chancellor to a variation on a familiar theme: He was 
determined to destroy Czechoslovakia within three weeks, even if it 
meant world war, but France and Britain would not fight; he would 
be brutal in presenting the German demands to Chamberlain at 
Godesberg; the best solution was a military one, but there was a 
danger that the Czechs would accept every demand; this was the last 
chance for Hungary to take part — most likely simultaneously with 
Germany, we would have to infer. Imredy presented the Hungarian 
stance, while Kanya held his tongue. The Prime Minister expressed 
surprise at the tempo of events; Budapest expected a conflict within 
a year or two; Hungary would make additional military prepara-
tions, but these could not be expected to be completed in fourteen 
days, in any case, the pro-French Yugoslav military had to be taken 
seriously. In all, Imredy, with a fine sense of oblique diplomatic 
language, said "no" to Hitler once again, and even seemed to have 
backed down on the promise of August 23 for possible action 
fourteen days after a German move. With his silence, Kanya 
seconded all of this.63 
For Hitler, the Hungarian refusal of August and September of 
1938 represented a critical setback. For psychological, political, and 
military reasons, a Hungarian military attack was a key component 
of his expectations for defeating Czechoslovakia militarily and 
thereby wiping her off the map. But as a result of the refusal, he was 
forced to revise his intentions downward. The Fuehrer, in fact, was 
rapidly becoming a prisoner of his own expansionistic design. 
Following his secret directives, the German National Socialists in the 
so-called Sudetenland caused serious clashes with the Czechoslovak 
authorities during 1938. With demagogic mastery, Hitler whipped 
the populace of Germany into a state of high emotionalism about the 
condition of their kin beyond the frontier, for example, by his 
Nuremberg speech of September 12, in which he now openly 
claimed the right of national self-determination for the Sudetens. 
Having created the crisis, during which his demands became far 
reaching, the Fuehrer could ill afford, politically speaking, to back 
down again, especially in view of the May Crisis. His generals, 
however, were apprehensive as usual, his ally Mussolini advised 
caution, and the British Prime Minister worked with determination 
for a peaceful solution. In fact, after Chamberlain's meeting with 
Hitler at Berchtesgaden on September 15, London and Paris began 
to advise Prague for conceding to the Fuehrer's demand for the 
Sudetenland. In other words, Britain and France were now willing 
to grant what Hitler's propaganda demanded, the "liberation" of the 
Sudetens f rom the control of Prague. But, as we have seen, in reality 
the Fuehrer desired not an ethnic or "partial," but a territorial or 
"total" solution, by destroying Czechoslovakia entirely. However, 
the remaining credible justification for the latter eventuality was a 
Hungarian military participation against Czechoslovakia, which 
Budapest continued to decline. Having been backed into a corner by 
circumstances, Hitler glumly resigned himself to the road of 
negotiation, which culminated in the Munich Conference of Sep-
tember 29-30, 1938. Its end product was an ethnic solution and 
decidedly a peaceful one — at Czechoslovakia's expense. Under 
Neville Chamberlain's leadership, this diplomatic conference 
turned over to Hitler only the mainly German inhabited border 
regions of Bohemia and Moravia.64 All said and done, Hitler was 
unable to have his war, much to his chagrin. We must admit that the 
Hungarian refusal to march, in this regard, was more crucial in 
preventing a war in 1938 than a multiplicity of other factors so 
obviously also present. Hungary, herself, fell between two stools at 
Munich, because neither Hitler nor Chamberlain would champion 
her cause. That was left to Mussolini, who had been briefed by Istvan 
Csaky, the Foreign Ministry's Chef de Cabinet, hurriedly flown from 
Budapest to Munich. Csaky stated the Hungarian case as a demand 
for the same treatment for the Hungarian minority as for the 
Sudetens, coupled with plebiscites for Slovakia and Ruthenia. The 
Duce transmitted only the first part of the message and the 
conference decided that the case of the Hungarian and Polish 
minorities should be settled by bilateral discussions within the next 
three months, otherwise the four powers would meet again.<,;) 
After the event, Hitler himself considered Hungary responsible 
for his inability to have his war with Czechoslovakia. When the 
Hungarian-Czechoslovak bilateral territorial discussions bogged 
down during October, former Prime Minister Kalman Daranyi was 
sent to Germany to plead the Hungarian case to Hitler. At a meeting 
in Munich on October 14, the Fuehrer was full of recriminations 
about Hungary's past sins. He had warned the Hungarians often, 
"on board ship" at Kiel and also during Imredy's and Kanya's visit to 
Berchtesgaden; but Herr Kanya expressed only doubts; Hungary 
constantly repeated the justness of her claims, but was unwilling to 
gain these by aggressive means; the moment had passed; if it had 
come to a war, Hungary would have had all of Slovakia; and, he had 
cautioned Kanya that if he would not act, he would "come up 
short."66 
When the new Hungarian Foreign Minister, Istvan Csaky, saw 
Hitler in Berlin on January 16, 1939, the latter was still incensed 
about the Hungarian refusal and was even more explicit. During the 
crisis, while Poland had taken some measures, Hungary had "slept." 
Germany would not sacrifice herself "for friends who would leave 
her in the lurch at the critical moment." "In a total solution, which he 
would have preferred," Hitler continued, "it would have been a 
matter of indifference" if Hungary had occupied Slovakia. "If the 
Hungarians had cooperated at the right time, he could have laughed 
in Chamberlain's face at Godesberg," because "at that time the whole 
question had only been whether to solve the problem ethnographi-
cally or territorially." "For the latter," the Fuehrer went on, "the 
matter would have had to be represented as a general Central 
European conflagration." Because "his desire to get the Germans 
back had been fulfilled, he had not been able to wage war," 
complained Hitler. It would be difficult to find a more telling 
testimony about the major role that Hitler had assigned to Hungary 
in the Czechoslovak crisis and it would be problematic to uncover 
more revealing information about the significant and frustrating 
impact Hungary had in the matter of war and peace in 1938.(w 
There was a multitude of other reasons for the maintenance of 
peace in the Czechoslovak crisis of 1938: the Czechs and Slovaks 
decided not to stand up to Hitler militarily; in the spirit of 
appeasement, France and Britain desired not to see another world 
war unleashed; the Soviet Union was therefore conveniently re-
leased form her treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia; the Little 
Entente proved to be weaker than expected; and Chamberlain's 
proposal for an ethnographic solution carried so much appeal to a 
frightened European population — including the Germans — that 
Hitler did not dare avoid a peacef ul diplomatic solution at Munich. 
This is a decisive point. By standing on the twin principles of "peace 
in our time" and national self-determination, even for the Sudeten 
Germans, Chamberlain was able to capture the high ground of 
moral righteousness, in light of which a German military attack 
would have seemed nothing but unmitigatedly naked aggression. 
Hitler knew this well and that is why he sought so desperately a 
convenient excuse, as a bellicose Hungarian accomplice, for launch-
ing his war nevertheless. But the Hungarians proved to be unwilling 
to deliver that excuse or to play that role. 
In this regard, most of the credit belongs to Foreign Minister 
Kanya. With his keen mind, he clearly comprehended both the short 
and long-term international consequences of every possible Hun-
garian step. In this spirit, Hungary acted cautiously and responsibly 
in the crisis. Moreover, Kanya shrewdly perceived the existence of a 
multitude of international linkages in sympathies and alliances, 
which, if allowed to become operative, could have easily escalated a 
German-Czechoslovak-Hungarian conflict into an East Central 
European war with the intervention of Yugoslavia, which in turn 
could have led to a major war, via Italy, through France, all the way 
to Britain and beyond. The aging diplomat understood as well that 
a German-Czechoslovak-Hungarian conflict could have triggered, 
conversely, a German-French-British-Italian conflict, which then 
could have also escalated into an even larger war, once the Little 
Entente had taken its cue from the West. As it turned out, war did 
not come in 1938. But there is no justifiable reason to believe that it 
could not have broken out, had Hungary decided on a military 
adventure, giving Hitler a convenient excuse for unleashing his 
armies. That is the overriding significance of the Hungarian "no" in 
1938. The tragedy of 1914 would not be risked or repeated, as far as 
Kanya and his government were concerned, even if Hungarian 
revisionist yearnings, bordering on obsession, would have to remain 
unfulfilled. Though war did not come in 1938, we should not forget 
that it would come in 1939, when, just as Kanya had feared, a 
Central European-East Central European war, in this case between 
Germany and Poland, would result in a major European and 
eventually world conflict. 
Kanya's motives were first of all based on self-interest — the 
security of Hungary — but that was precisely his appointed 
responsibility in the Hungarian government. He carried out his task 
with skill, determination, and courage, thereby, incidentally, earn-
ing the undying hatred of Hitler.69 Though he was far from naive, 
there is good reason to believe that Kanya wished peace and security 
for the whole of Europe as well. He was willing to accept and even to 
cherish a community of European nations, existing side by side, each 
in its legitimate sphere, guided by the principles of traditional 
European diplomacy, and kept in check by the balance-of-power 
system. His stand against the Danubian status quo was counterpro-
ductive for stability in that region, but there is no reason to believe 
that his actions would have degenerated into irresponsible adven-
turism, even if Hungary had been stronger militarily. Kanya's 
sarcastic tongue was sometimes out of control and he might have 
occasionally lost his temper, but he would never have intentionally 
acted against the best interests of his country. 
Even Hungarian revisionism benefited from his accomplish-
ments. Though he would have preferred another four-power 
conference for settling the deadlocked Hungarian-Czechoslovak 
territorial discussions, he consented to German-Italian arbitration, 
which resulted in the so-called First Vienna Award of November 2, 
1938. In the Belvedere Palace, Ribbentropp and Ciano therewith 
awarded to Hungary the mainly Magyar inhabited southern strip of 
Slovakia and Ruthenia. Kanya, incidentally, gave free reign to his 
arrogant tongue against the participating Slovak politicians. Ironi-
cally, the demarcation line drawn was rather fair, though neither 
side, naturally, was satisfied with it. In any case, peaceful revisionism 
had made headway and subsequently Britain orally accepted the 
settlement, which Kanya considered important for the sake of its 
permanency.70 
* * * 
The August and September of 1938 represented the climax of 
Kanya's long diplomatic career. His complex maneuvering in Bled, 
his able stand at Kiel, his cautious withdrawal in Berlin, his indirect 
— and unheralded — peace keeping role at the Munich Conference, 
and his irredentist success in Vienna, all speak well for the 
Hungarian Foreign Minister. Yet he would be forced out of office 
shortly, at the end of November, as a misadventure for the recovery 
of Ruthenia backfired in Budapest's face. In that connection, Kanya 
proved to be a convenient scapegoat. He was served up, moreover, 
as a sacrificial lamb to Hitler for everything that had transpired at 
Bled and Kiel, as Hungary joined in late 1938 a growing Danubian 
competition for Hitler's full favor. Still, Kanya continued to be 
respected by the Hungarian ruling oligarchy as someone who could 
be called upon for advice in a difficult situation. Kanya would die 
tragically in February, 1945, ironically, in the whirlwind of the very 
world war that he had tried so painstakingly to avert in 1938.71 In all, 
he was the best diplomat interwar Budapest had to offer, and both 
Hungary and Europe benefited. 
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Renaissance Contacts Between 
Dubrovnik (Ragusa) 
and the Kingdom of Hungary 
M.D. Birnbaum 
During the rule of the Angevin dynasty (1308-82) in Hungary, 
towns and cities increasingly assumed greater political influence. 
The first treaty between the King of Hungary and Dubrovnik (in 
those days Ragusa) was signed in 1358, during the reign of Louis 
(Lajos) the Great. According to its text, Dubrovnik was to pay the 
king 500 gold ducats and 300 perpers annually, a sum that 
previously went to Bosnia and Serbia for protection against enemy 
attacks. Dubrovnik, in addition, promised to honor the king and his 
heirs in church services three times a year; to fly the king's flag on 
land and on its vessels; and, in case of a royal visit, to treat the guests 
to two dinners and two suppers at the city's expense. The king's 
friends were declared Dubrovnik's friends, and his enemies the 
adversaries of the city.1 
As was the case with most towns in Hungary, in Dubrovnik too the 
terms defining the city's obligations and privileges were occasinally 
amended by subsequent Hungarian kings. From 1358 on there is an 
abundance of documented interchange between Buda and Dubrov-
nik in the archives of the latter, and this is a crucial source of 
information as in Hungary, owing to the numerous wars and 
foreign occupations, much of the documentary evidence disap-
peared or was destroyed. 
The archival material of Dubrovnik testifies to the fact that the 
Crown frequently turned to Dubrovnik and asked for information 
on or for its mediation with Venice, the Turks, or the Bosnians. 
Dubrovnik's importance for Hungary was growing as time passed. 
In 1378 Sigismund (Zsigmond) of Luxembourg reconfirmed and 
added to its privileges. He later became a refugee and the city's guest 
after his resounding defeat at Nicopolis (1396). Following Sigis-
mund's death, Albert II immediately reconfirmed Dubrovnik's 
privileges, and so did the next king, Vladislas I, in 1444. 
Johannes (Janos) Hunyadi, regent of Hungary and international-
ly one of the most important figures in the wars against the Turks, 
took the Ragusan ambassador along with him when, in Wiener 
Neustadt, he negotiated the terms of a new campaign. Also, in 1447 
Dubrovnik offered Hunyadi 2000 gold ducats in support of his war 
effort.2 
During the rule of Hunyadi's son Matthias Corvinus (1458-90), 
many important Croatian personalities emerged to serve at the 
Buda court. Johannes (Janos) Vitez, archbishop of Esztergom, and 
primate of Hungary and Croatia, who had already served Hunyadi, 
comes readily to mind. At his episcopal court in Varad and later in 
his archdiocese, Vitez surrounded himself with humanist scholars 
and artists f rom all over Europe, and as patron of many a budding 
scholar — among them Janus Pannonius, Petrus Garazda, and 
Johannes Vitez Jr . — he almost single-handedly created a proper 
ambience for Renaissance culture in Hungary-Croatia.3 
It is only natural, therefore, that cultural relations between 
Hungary and Dalmatia became especially lively during the rule of 
Matthias. This was the most felicitous period in the history of in-
dependent Hungary, as well as the height of the Italian-influenced 
Buda Renaissance. 
For the years 1459-90 twenty different Ragusan ambassadors to 
Buda are known, and that number does not include the scores of 
one-time legates or scientists, merchants and church dignitaries who 
had functioned as occasional envoys. The list includes Marin and 
Sigismund di Giorgi, several members of the Gundulic (Gondola) 
family of whom Jacobus Marin was ambassador to the Buda court 
four times (1459, 1464, 1470, and 1471); three members of the 
Gucetic (Gozze), and three of the Palmotic (Palmotha) families.4 
Among the most important ambassadors was Alexander de 
Ragusio who later became Abbot of Telk. He was also dispatched to 
Skanderbeg, and, in 1465, to the Signoria. He returned twice to 
Dubrovnik (in 1469 and 1472) during his tenure as legate. 
With the rule of Matthias also begins what we would call in 
modern terms the "brain-drain" from Dalmatia. Dalmatian scien-
tists and artists were frequent travelers to Italy but traveling to 
Hungary on a grand scale also started during this period. ' 
Matthias' second wife, Beatrix of Naples and Aragon, had two 
successive Dalmatian father confessors. She herself chose Antonius 
de Jadra, but the pope appointed Christophorus Ragusinus, bishop 
of Modrus, instead.*1 Later the bishop became a personal friend of 
the queen and had great influence at the Buda court. 
On the more mundane side, Matthias' own barber and familiaris 
(royal servant) also came from Dubrovnik. Stefanus de Ragusio, 
barbitonsor regis, became a wealthy man in Buda. He owned a 
large house there with a sizable orchard. When in 1506 he returned 
to Dubrovnik, he brought along a letter from the next king, 
Wladislas II, in which he was referred to as "servitor serenissimi regis 
Hungariae."' 
Several Dubrovnik patricians sent their offspring into royal 
service. All five sons of Damiano Marino de Giorgi, the Ragusan 
ambassador, became Matthias' parvuli (pages). They later received 
lucrative positions and special privileges.8 Beatrix too had a Dalma-
tian familiaris. Nicolaus Castro of Senj.9 
Traveling medical doctors were a familiar phenomenon through-
out Europe and the Near East, thus it is not surprising that, in 
1463, Dubrovnik agreed to send Magister Johannes Petrus to join 
Matthias' camp, presumably at Jajce.10 
In 1459, one of the most famous Dubrovnik scientists, Johannes 
Gazulo, was invited to become a court astronomer. He declined, yet 
retained amicable relations with Hungary. In the 1460s, he received 
a letter from Janus Pannonius in which the bishop of Pecs asked for 
further books on astronomy and on measuring instruments.11 The 
instruments could have been meant for Buda, for Esztergom, or 
even for Pecs where it is assumed that one of the towers was built for 
a planetarium. Janus did not initiate any building of note at his Pecs 
see. This tower is the only construction that can be identified with his 
tenure there. He did little to embellish his cathedral. Sigismund 
Ernuszt, who followed Janus in the see, was urged by his father to 
restore it.12 Ernuszt did indeed begin the renovation of the 
cathedral. He also commissioned work at Djurdjevac, on the Drava 
River. A handsome red marble shield bearing his family crest (dated 
1488) shows the expertise of the artisans working for him.13 
The building boom that characterized Matthias' rule brought 
scores of architects and sculptors to Buda, and along with them came 
lapicidae (stone cutters), various artisans, and skilled laborers. Of 
them the most significant figure was Giovanni Dalmata (Ivan 
Duknovic) who probably spent three years (1487-90) at Buda. (He 
also appears in Hungarian sources as Ioannes Duknovich da 
Tragurio.)14 This original artist left the hallmark of his genius on 
each piece he created, revealing a mixture of refined realism and 
tender lyricism.lD 
Matthias obviously appreciated the Dalmatian sculptor's unique 
talent. This is reflected in the tenor of the royal deed. l b As is known, 
Ludovicus Cerva Tubero has also written about Duknovic, referring 
to Matthias' gift, the castle at Majkovec, on the Sava, from which 
Bartholomaeus Berislavus (Prior Varanensis) later removed the 
sculptor by force.17 
Giovanni Dalmata worked at the royal court, but also for Johannes 
de Zokol (Szokoli), bishop of Csanad, who commissioned him to 
carve an altar for the Paulist church at Diosgyor, in the late 1480s. 
This altar fragment is further proof of the range and quality of 
works that adorned the various regional ecclesiastic buildings of 
Hungary during that period, of which so few have survived the wars 
of the centuries that followed. It is also assumed that Giovanni 
Dalmata was entrusted (by the king himself) with Matthias' tomb-
stone at Szekesfehervar.18 
Another artist f rom Trogir, Jacobus Traugirus, was active in 
Hungary during the same period. He worked in stone and perhaps 
also in bronze. He has been identified by some art historians as 
Johannes Statilic, about whom Nicolaus Istvanffy and Jerolim 
Kavanjin the Split historian both wrote, the latter mentioning his 
work at Vac.19 In the lapidary collection of the Pecs cathedral, a red 
marble rosetta — similar to those found in Buda, Split, Hvar, Trogir 
and Sibenik — is also f rom the workshop of Jacobus Traugirus.20 
Marble fragments of a fireplace excavated in the fort of Marevar in 
the vicinity of Pecs, convinced Hungarian scholars that the owner, 
Voivod Paulus Bakic, also used Dalmatian artisans, probably from 
the Pecs workshop.21 Since the remodelling of the building took 
place between 1527 and 1533, the presence of Dalmatian craftsmen 
testifies to the longevity and vitality of the Pecs workshop.22 The 
Dalmatian lapicidae remained popular at the royal court even after 
Matthias' death. In the 1490s Ragusan masons and stone-cutters 
were recorded in Wladislas' service.23 They probably began working 
at the court during Matthias' lifetime and remained there after the 
ruler's death. 
The Dubrovnik lapicidae had a long-standing reputation for 
excellence. As early as 1466 Johannes Thuz of Lak, ambassador to 
Dubrovnik, later Croatian-Slavonian ban, wanted to hire stone-
cutters and carpenters for his own court. At the same time the 
Ragusan Council decreed that Paschoe Michelievich (Paskoje Mili-
cevic), ingenariusprothomagister (master-engineer), travel to Hungary 
with the envoys, Johannes Rozgonyi and Johannes Thuz.24 As is 
known, Paskoje Milicevic built the old harbor in Dubrovnik, and his 
fame reached Matthias who immediately pleaded that he join the 
Buda court.23 
The most sought-after lapicida was Johannes Grubanic, whose 
testament serves as a revealing document. The signatories to his will 
prove that in 1487 at least four more wealthy Ragusan stone carvers 
lived in Buda. Grubanic himself owned a house in Buda, one in 
Sibenik, and a third in Zadar.26 
Works of the famous Dubrovnik silversmiths also found their way 
to the royal palace and to the cathedrals and churches of Hungary. 
Candelabra, bowls, drinking vessels, and goblets testify to their 
expert art. Gifts were sent to Matthias by envoys on special occasions 
such as the celebration of this victory over Bohemia (1468) and at the 
time of his wedding to Beatrix (in 1476), with separate gifts to the 
bride.27 
Not only did the royal couple receive gifts but so did the 
Hungarian envoy to Dubrovnik. Records also show that Archbishop 
Vitez was presented with silver dishes in 1470.28 The silversmith 
Johannes Progonovic, whose work can still be found in the Dubrov-
nik cathedral, is identified as the creator of a number of gifts sent to 
the Hungarian court.29 It is noteworthy that by the 1490s Dubrovnik 
turned less generous, and after a long discussion in the Council, 
Wladislas' gifts were considerably reduced.30 
Not all the presents sent by Dubrovnik were locally produced; 
some were ordered from Italy. But, as is known, there were several 
Dalmatian artisans active in Italy, among them Luca de Ragusa, who 
forged some pieces which Ercole d'Este sent to Matthias from 
Ferrara. Moreover, the Ragusan style became known as an indepen-
dent type of design. In 1525 Yppolito, archbishop of Esztergom, 
referring in his inventory to a number of silver items, had them 
listed as executed "in modo raguseo," and recorded two candelabra 
"ad modum ragusino."31 
There is a strong possibility that as far back as during Matthias' 
rule silversmiths from Dubrovnik were employed at the Buda court. 
In 1505, after the death of the natural son of a Ragusan silversmith, 
the father was listed as Nicholai Pasqualis Lenaic increasing the 
plausibility that some Dubrovnik silversmith moved to Buda as early 
as the fifteenth century. In addition, in the 1508 inventory of the 
Eger diocese, there are silver articles mentioned: among them two in 
"Ragusan style."32 
The most typical features of the Renaissance are the increase in 
humanist contacts, the travel of scholars, and the distribution of 
books. This is the time when humanists move from one center of 
learning, or f rom the service of one monarch or prelate, to another. 
And this is the time when private, secular libraries begin to grow. 
This was the case in Hungary with the collections of Johannes Vitez, 
and Janus Pannonius whose libraries, later confiscated, formed a 
part of Matthias' famed Corviniana. The lively trade in books 
involved primarily Italy, but frequently also Dubrovnik. It has been 
recorded that Johannes Vitez, perhaps the best-read individual in 
Hungary of his time, turned to Dubrovnik to obtain Cicero's 
Epistolae familiares for himself.33 Franko Vasilevic (Francho Vasig-
lievich), a Ragusan citizen, probably also purchased codices for 
Matthias.34 
A controversial issue is the Buda illuminating workshop of Felix 
Ragusinus whom several scholars — with the notable exception of 
Jolan Balogh — identified as Feliks Petancic, earlier ambassador to 
Wladislas II.3 5 Petancic was the author of Itineribus in Turciam libellns, 
first published in Vienna in 1522 (reprinted in Venice in 1542), and 
frequently quoted both by contemporary "turcologists," and travel-
ers to the Holy Land.3(> Nicolaus Olaus referred to Felix Ragusinus 
in his Hungaria when describing the court of Buda, Matthias' 
treasures, and the Corviniana. He placed him in the illuminators' 
workshop and commented on his knowledge of Greek, Latin, 
Chaldaic and Arabic.3' Although I too believe that the Cassianus 
codex, earlier attributed to him, was not his work,38 I accept the 
views of those who hold Feliks Petancic and Felix Ragusinus to be 
identical.39 
Italian merchants, especially from Florence, had simultaneous 
contact with Dubrovnik, Zagreb and Buda.10 Antonio Melini, a 
Florentine merchant living in Dubrovnik, had a brother Ridolfo 
who had his business in Buda, and through him Antonio also traded 
with Hungary.41 Nichus Pribissaglich (Pribisaglic), twice ambassador 
to Hungary, was a respected merchant in Ragusa. 
Matthias most probably never visited Dubrovnik, although it was 
thought for a while, based on an official invitation by the City 
Council dated November 3, 1463. There is also a letter by him to 
Samko de Ragusio (December 24, 1480), in which he refers to 
having been his guest. But the Ragusan also owned property in 
Zagreb, and the king's letter thanking Samko for his hospitality is 
also dated from Zagreb.42 Thus it is more plausible that, for want of 
documentation of the royal visit in the Dubrovnik archives, Mat-
thias' letter refers to his having been entertained in Zagreb. 
Instead, there is much information about Matthias and his court 
that has come down to us directly from Ragusan sources. The king's 
summer residence was described by Janus Dubravius in his De 
piscinis ad Antonium Fuggerum,43 Dubravius traveled in Hungary 
after Matthias' death and wrote about the famous fountains and 
fishponds he had seen, comparing them with those he had visited in 
Bohemia.44 It was the Ragusan poet, Aelius Lampridius Cervinus 
(Ilija Crijevic, 1463-1520) who, on May 4, 1490, delivered a funeral 
oration over Matthias, eulogizing him as a great ruler and a glorious 
fighter against the Turks. He also emphasized the king's turning the 
Buda palace into a citadel of learning. As almost every contempo-
rary, when referring to the palace, Crijevic too mentioned its kudos, 
the prodigious library of Matthias.4:' The same poet also wrote 
epitaphia in Matthias' memory.4'1 The king fared less well in the 
work of the Ragusan Ludovicus Cerva I ubero (Ludovik Crijevic 
Tuberon, 1459-1527), who, strongly criticizing Matthias in his 
Commentariorum de rebus suo tempore..., stated that he only cared for 
his own glory.47 
Dubrovnik's privileges were confirmed in 1465 by Matthias, who 
sent out letters to the ordines and the free towns in which he 
reminded them of the special protection of the Crown the Ragusans 
enjoyed. In 1466 he commended Dubrovnik en bloc to Ferdinad of 
Naples, and in 1470 the city received additional privileges from the 
Hungarian king. 
After the death of Matthias, Dubrovnik turned its hopes to the 
next ruler, Wladislas II, who in 1493 indeed confirmed all privileges 
that had earlier been granted the city. Yet soon thereafter, in 1493, 
with their usually perfect foresight, the Ragusans strengthened 
their contacts with Emperor Maxmilian. He began to use their 
information regarding the Ottoman danger, about which they 
regularly advised the Emperor. 
Wladislas too was aware of the Turkish army's advances but did 
little else than watch the slow disintegration of the kingdom of his 
famed predecessor. Ineffective as he was in politics, Wladislas made 
no lasting impression on Hungary's cultural life either. His human-
ist court was made up of holdovers from Matthias' people. The most 
important Croatian scholar in his court was Petrus of Warda, 
archbishop of Kalocsa, a relative of Johannes Vitez. He was 
educated in Vienna, at Vitez' expense. His humanist activities 
connect him with yet another member of the same family. It was he 
to whom Matthias entrusted the collecting of Janus Pannonius' 
epigrams. During Wladislas' rule Cervinus sent his poetry from 
Dalmatia to the king in hopes of being invited to the court, but 
despite having sought Archbishop Szathmari's support, the invita-
tion never came. 
The next king, Louis II, who followed his father on the throne in 
1516 only to die at the battle of Mohacs ten years later, did not 
improve the quality of intellectual and artistic life at his court either. 
The Jagiello kings, although expected to act as Renaissance patrons 
of the arts, had little interest in the muses. The gradual depletion of 
the Corviniana (through the giving away of volumes, and through 
general indifference and neglect) was the beginning of the final 
destruction of the treasures of the Hungarian court. 
Yet, when Suleiman entered the deserted streets of Buda on 
September 8, 1526, he was still mesmerized by the beauty of the city 
and the splendor of the royal palace. "I wish I could move this castle 
to the shore of the Bosporus," he allegedly said.48 He was of course 
unable to move the entire palace, but he did the best he could. Laden 
with the priceless tomes of the library, which Naldo had not so long 
before called the "sanctuary of wisdom," Suleiman's galleys made 
several trips from Buda to Constantinople. He had the bronze 
statues, the silver candelabra, and the precious gold and silver dishes 
— the pride of the Dalmatian artists — moved to his palace in 
Istanbul. Soon the fabulous capital became but a shadow of its 
former self, its memory kept alive merely in the descriptions of 
Olaus and a few others. 
With the Turkish conquest of Hungary, Hungarian-Dalmatian 
(especially Ragusan) relations ended. The relationship was not 
restored after the departure of the Turks from Hungary 150 years 
later. The Kingdom of Hungary had become a part of the Habsburg 
realm. And so did Dubrovnik: on August 24, 1684, it accepted the 
sovereignty of Emperor Leopold I. 
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Matthias Corvinus and His Library 
Rose (Rozsi) Stein 
Hungary in the fifteenth century was threatened by the danger of 
Turkish invasion. Only a central power, such as that created by King 
Matthias (Matyas) Corvinus (1440?—90), could muster enough 
strength to withstand the onslaught of the Turks. 
Matthias's whole regal concept since 1458, the year of his 
coronation, was centred on the unification of European strength 
against this menace. In his domestic politics he preferred common 
men of talent to the dissenting oligarchy; abroad he made alliances 
to build an empire. His great personal qualities, his political 
concepts, and his pursuit of dynastic policy led him to prefer the 
humanistic spirit of the Renaissance to that of medieval scholasti-
cism. A love of lavish splendour and culture resulted in a flourishing 
of royal residences in Buda and Visegrad, both situated on the 
Danube, and to the establishment of the Bibliotheca Corvina in 
Buda in 1471. 
Matthias Corvinus did not claim any substantial heritage of 
manuscripts as his own; a small number of codices originating from 
the collections of earlier kings of Hungary formed the nucleus of his 
library. Louis (Lajos) the Great, of Angevin lineage, ordered the 
illuminated chronicle of Hungary's history to be executed by Mark 
Kalti, a Hungarian canon. It contained the history of the Magyars 
until 1330 and included miniatures and the portrait of Louis the 
Great. 
Another patron of codices was Sigismund (Zsigmond) of Luxem-
bourg, king of Hungary and later ruler of the Holy Roman Empire 
(1368-1437) whose Liber de Septem Signis also came into the Corvina 
Library. 
The sidereal sciences: astronomy and astrology, stood in high 
favour in Matthias's court. His interest in both was demonstrated by 
a globe placed at the entrance of the library, showing the constella-
tion of stars at the time of his coronation as king of Bohemia (twenty 
years after having been elected king of Hungary). The palace was 
also decorated with the twelve signs of the zodiac carved from wood 
and gilded. 
The library itself consisted of two spacious rooms with vaulted 
ceilings; one housed the Latin the other the Greek and oriental 
manuscripts. The rooms were arranged somewhat similarly to those 
of the Laurentiana in Florence. The reading pulpits were covered 
with red velvet decorated with gold. Books were arranged "in foruli" 
(on shelves) with a label attached to each one. They were shielded by 
curtains of silk interwoven with gold. The books in the lowest section 
were only encased, not labelled. 
There was a royal couch between the two rooms for the king so 
that discussions with his scholars, as well as reading would be more 
relaxing. Sometimes, appropriately for a great builder, he enjoyed 
reading Vitruvius and Leon Battista Alberti: sometimes he con-
ferred with diplomats and envoys of foreign courts. It can be said 
that this bibliophile, when not at war, made the library the centre of 
his activities in cultural and political matters as well. The passionate 
collector was well known to his contemporaries; this was the origin of 
the dictum that to earn the good graces of the sultan one had to send 
him beautiful odalisks but to earn those of Matthias one had to 
present him with books that he enjoyed "avec une sensualite 
cerebrale" (A. de Hevesy's expression). 
Archbishop Janos Vitez, possessor of the first great library before 
Matthias, was his preceptor from his early youth. The archbishop 
transmitted his humanistic interest to the young king, and this was a 
decisive factor in the foundation of the Corvina library. A nephew 
and another pupil of Vitez was the well-known humanist and poet, 
Janus Pannonius (1434-72), the bishop of Pecs. He was sent by his 
uncle to the humanistic school of Veronese Guarino (1370-1460) in 
Ferrara, and through him many of his former fellow students, later 
great humanists themselves, were invited to Buda. In 1465 Janus 
Pannonius went as ambassador to Italy where he made contacts with 
the Academies of Florence and Rome and also purchased manu-
scripts for Matthias. At that time he was introduced to the most 
important personage in the book trade, Vespasiano da Bisticci, 
through Galeotto Marzio (1427-97), who later held the office of 
historian at the court of Buda until the king's death. 
Vespasiano's shop bore the inscription "Vespasiano procurante," 
since he served the Medici, Matthias Corvinus, Federico da Urbino 
(Montefeltro, 1422-82) and many other bibliophiles. His opinion 
was that it is shameful to house printed books together with worthy 
handwritten codices. This remark may have reflected some bias 
against the new trade of printing. In his memoirs Vespasiano 
accused King Matthias of ingratitude toward Janos Vitez, one of his 
shop's regular customers. 
The historical background of this remark, which later had some 
impact on the holdings of the Corvina library, was as follows: the 
oligarchy rebelled against the strong rule of the king. Janos Vitez, 
who lost his influence on his former pupil, led the insurrection. 
Matthias, after quelling the rebellion, confiscated many treasures of 
the magnates, among them the Latin manuscripts of Janos Vitez and 
Janus Pannonius. 
The year 1476, when Matthias married Beatrix, daughter of the 
king of Naples, furthered his interest in the miniators of Naples and 
also those of Ferrara, the court of his queen's sister, especially since 
his contacts with Vespasiano da Bisdcci had been severed owing to 
the latter's opinion about the royal ire towards Janos Vitez. At the 
time of his marriage the library contained about one-third of its 
subsequent total. 
Italian humanists and artists followed the young queen to join 
those who already resided there and Matthias's aim began to form 
out of "Pannonia altera Italia." Famous names at the court of Buda 
were Antonio Bonfini (1434-1503), the humanist who wrote the 
history of Hungary in a style imitating antiquity; and Galeotto 
Marzio, librarian and preceptor of the king's natural son, Janos 
Corvin, whom Matthias hoped to make his successor. Galeotto 
collected anecdotes about the king as well as his witty and clever 
remarks and formed a kind of biography from these mosaics 
entitled: "Galeotti Martii de Egregie Sapienter locose Dictis ac Factis 
Regis Matthiae ad Ducem Johannem Eius Filium Liber." 
Johann Miiller of Konigsberg, called Regiomontanus (1436-76), 
was a renowned astronomer and a special favourite of the king, who 
invited him to the court of Buda. Later he was a professor at the 
Academia Istropolitana (Pozsony-Bratislava). In 1467 he wrote the 
"Ephemerides Budenses." In time he left Hungary to establish a 
printing press in Ntirnberg in 1471. 
Lodovico Carbone (1436-82), professor at the University of 
Ferrara, dedicated his work "Dialogus de Mathiae Regis Laudibus" 
to the king (Budapest, Hungarian Academy of Sciences). In this 
eulogy he alluded to the king's dream of being chosen Holy Roman 
Emperor. 
Even before his marriage to Beatrix a great scriptorium was 
installed in Buda, where a staff of thirty men worked as painters, 
miniators and scriptors, according to the report of Bishop Miklos 
Olah. One of the superintendents of this scriptorium was Bartolo-
meo Delia Font (Bartholomaeus Fontius, 1445-1513) of Florence. 
On occasion complete codices were executed here; others were 
ordered from Italy, where four masters in Florence were engaged to 
copy Greek and Latin manuscripts. Often added in Buda were the 
decoration of the borders, the coats-of-arms of Hungary and of the 
king with symbols to illustrate Matthias's personal qualities such as 
the dragon representing courage; the beehive representing indus-
try; the well representing profoundness of thought; the hour-glass 
representing right timing of action. 
The codices of the early period were primarily decorated in the 
so-called style of the Danube valley (A. de Hevesy), which evolved 
f rom Tyrol to the Carpathian Mountains. The charming freshness 
of local plants, flowers and fruits bordered the text (e.g., "In 
Ptolemaeum" by Regiomontanus). 
The king turned to Italy for more sumptuous manuscripts. 
Francesco d'Antonio del Chierico was the illuminator of the "Corvin 
Psalterium" (Wolfenbiittel, Staatsbibliothek). The Canto del Garbo 
shop was the work place of the brothers, Gherardo and Monte del 
Fora, masters of the Codex "Hieronymus" of the Vienna National 
Library. More ornamental was the art of Attavante degli Attavanti 
(1452-ca. 1517), whose shop provided thirty-one of the known 
Corvina, eighteen of his own handiwork, for example, the "Brussels 
Missal." 
Matthias's imperial ambitions were expressed on some manu-
scripts, for example, the codex of Didymus Alexandrinus's "De 
Spiritu Sanctu" (New York, P. Morgan Library) where the initials on 
the frontispiece "M A" stand for Matthias Augustus. This codex was 
illuminated by Gherardo and Monte del Fora and written by 
Sigismundus de Sigismundis in 1488. The political tendency in the 
illustration of the frontispiece is further enhanced by the picture of 
Janos Corvin in addition to the portrait of the king and queen. 
Some codices of the later period were called the Beatrix codices, as 
the one by Giovanni Ambrogio da Predis (b. ca. 1455) known as the 
"Marlianus" Corvina with the coat-of-arms of Janos Corvin and 
Bianca Sforza (Volterra Library) as evidence of a marriage plan. 
The superb "Sforza Book of Hours" was planned originally as a 
wedding gift from Bona Sforza to her daughter. The illuminations 
are attributed to Ambrogio da Predis. After the death of Matthias 
(1490) the marriage was called off, and Bianca married Emperor 
Maximilian I in 1493. The pages referring to Matthias Corvinus had 
been removed but were later reinserted by the order of Emperor 
Charles V. 
The king showed a keen interest in the content of books. Some 
records of printed books in his possession can be found. Marsiglio 
Ficino (1433-99), an Italian philosopher, sent him his work printed 
in Basel in 1461.Taddeo Ugoletti (d. ca. 1514) wrote to the king that 
Bonfini would bring some printed books from Rome. 
In 1470 the provost, Bishop Laszlo Karai (d. ca. 1485), was on a 
diplomatic mission to Rome. At that time he acquired some 
familiarity with the new art through the printers Sweynheym and 
Pannartz. In Rome Karai also met Andreas Hess whom he invited to 
set up a printing press in Buda. Hess ordered the type used by 
Sweynheym and Pannartz to be cast in Hungary, and he used it to 
print the Chronica Hungarorum and Magni Basilii de Legendis Poeticis. 
As King Matthias was involved in warfare at that time, he did not 
show great interest and the dedication of these works quoted Karai 
as the books' patron. 
A Hungarian scholar, Jozsef Fitz, studied the history of many 
printing presses in Rome and compared the type used by Hess with 
that of Georgias Lauer. Fitz came to the conclusion that Hess had 
been apprenticed in Lauer's shop and that Lauer's type was used in 
Buda. Hess's shop, the first Hungarian printing press, was manned 
by fourteen men besides himself. 
Fitz also cited the fact that the king had sent Blandius, one of his 
illuminators, to Rome to buy books. On this occasion Pomponius 
Laetus (1428-97), the editor and corrector of the Lauer shop, sent a 
gift to the king, the printed edition of Silius Italicus's "Punica." 
Matthias thanked him in a gracious letter, referring to the great 
pleasure he had derived from several readings of a work printed 
with so much care and fine ornamentation. 
Fitz's book about Hungarian printing, A magyar nyomdaszat, 
konyvkiadas es konyvkereskedelem tortenete, adds more to our knowledge 
about the king's contacts with the printing trade. The Corvina 
contained a great number of contemporary works, some quite 
simple in appearance. Bishop Miklos Olah reported in his 
"Hungaria" that the books were arranged by classes in the library; 
consequently handwritten and printed works were shelved to-
gether. It is also of interest that all three of Matthias's librarians: 
Galeotto Marzio, Taddeo Ugoletti and Bartholomaeus Fontius, 
were exposed at one period of their lives to experience in a printing 
shop. 
Besides the printing press of Andreas Hess, which operated, as far 
as is known, from 1473 to 1749, another press was established in 
Briinn in 1486 that also belonged to Matthias's kingdom. In Buda, a 
prosperous publisher-businessman, Theobaldus Feger, ordered 
liturgical books for the sees of Zagreb, Olmiitz, etc., to be printed in 
Germany under the king's patronage. There is every reason to 
believe that the king's library had included works such as the 
Thurdczy Chronicle, printed in Augsburg, or the Missale Strigoniense, 
printed by Anton Koberger in Niirnberg (1484). 
The king's versatile mind also made modern use of a new art. He 
ordered propaganda leaflets to be printed in Germany and had 
them posted on buildings in Vienna before he occupied that city. 
Although none of these has been found, the facts can be ascertained 
f rom a written complaint by Emperor Frederic III, who was driven 
out of Vienna by Matthias. This document was addressed to the 
Councils of Niirnberg and Strassburg, objecting to their permitting 
such printing to be done. 
In 1666 Austrian Emperor Leopold I sent his librarian, Peter 
Lambeck (Lambecius, 1628-80), to the Sublime Porte in search of 
the remnants of the Corvina taken from Buda earlier by the Turks. 
Lambeck was conducted into a crypt-like room where 300-400 
stacked volumes presented a dismal picture. He stated that many of 
them were printed books. After lengthy persuasion he was able to 
rescue three codices (housed today in the National Library in 
Vienna). 
The bindings of the codices show great variety. Some were bound 
in the Italian manner in red silk or velvet. More important are those 
which reflect the king's own taste. These are covered with calfskin or 
maroquin, and the centrepieces bear the royal coat-of-arms. The 
ornamentation with blind tooling and guilding is enclosed in a 
rectangle. The covers had a balanced appearance, some of them 
reminiscent of the harmony of the sixteenth-century Grolier 
bindings. Others were richly ornamented in the Renaissance style. 
T h e binding of "Xenophon" (Vienna, National Library) had pat-
terns of Hungarian motif in the floral design.* 
Janos Csontosi, the former curator of the Hungarian National 
Museum, gave us the description of the Corvina returned by the 
Sultan to Emperor Francis Joseph I. As a gesture of courtesy the 
damaged original bindings had been removed and the codices were 
rebound with great care in leather. One side of the cover carried the 
insignia of Matthias, the opposite side that of the Turkish Empire. 
The original bindings could not be recovered. 
Special mention should be made of the "Graduale" (National 
Szechenyi Library, Budapest). It was a gift from Charles VIII, king 
of France, in return for the lavish presents of Matthias, who sought 
his alliance against Frederic III, the German emperor. 
The codex (503 x 370 mm) contains 201 leaves and is bound in 
leather. It was made in France about 1487 by French scribes and 
miniators. Four initials were added in the scriptorium in Buda, the 
initial "I" having been executed by Giovanni Cattaneo de Mediolano 
(d. ca. 1531). This Dominican monk, master of the "Averulinus" 
Corvina in Venice, found his way to Buda through the court of 
Ferrara in 1482. The description of the historiated initial "I" on leaf 
7a of the "Graduale" (185 x 195 mm), entitled "The entrance of the 
Jews in the Holy Land" (The Land of Milk and Honey), is as follows. 
The landscape of the miniature was a riddle until recent years; now 
it is accepted as the contemporary picture of Visegrad, the royal 
residence on the Danube. Against the hills and fortresses in the 
background and the gentle slopes in the middle ground with trees 
full of fruit, a scene is depicted of a peasant milking a goat and 
another tending sheep. In the left-hand corner, half-hidden by the 
column-shaped "I" a beehive (also an emblem of Matthias). On the 
road a procession of richly clad men is led by Joshua. These men are 
to be viewed as a group of humanists with the king in their midst. 
Two of them carry codices. One personage deserves special atten-
tion, since he is dressed in Dominican garb and his face is 
portrait-like, presumably the artist himself. God the Father in his 
Glory, surrounded by seraphim and holding the Hungarian orb in 
his hand, blesses the scene from above. 
The initial "I" is represented as a purple column decorated with 
green acanthus leaves and the halls so familiar to the style of 
Lombardy. Remarkable for their local importance are the tulip-like 
flowers and a figure of the child Hercules (in humanistic interpreta-
tion Matthias himself) strangling the hydra. The latter motif is 
represented on the Matthias fountain in the court of Visegrad made 
out of red marble, the spouts of which poured forth different 
precious wines on festive occasions. This fountain was reconstructed 
during the excavations of Visegrad carried out after World War II. 
The bottom of the column shows a putto playing the lute, with a 
white dog, a frequently applied motif in the Lombard school, 
listening attentively. The dog probably stands for the artist in the 
interpretation of Dominicans as "Domini canes," the faithful dogs of 
the Lord. 
The miniature is in a frame on a golden background with the 
familiar attributes of the horn of plenty, flowers in a harmonious 
blending of the colours of purple, blue and green with white bells 
between. Although the style of the bordering flowers reoccurs in 
other works of the Lombard school, it may be that their shape 
represents the influence of the surroundings and is a mixture of the 
styles of the masters of Italy and Hungary. 
Matthias died suddenly in Vienna in 1490, and the ensuing years 
of indecision offered easy spoils to anyone. Janos Corvin was the 
first to try to save his patrimony. Queen Beatrix, when her marriage 
plans to Matthias's successor, King Wladislav, were not realized, 
took her treasures back to Naples. Wladislav, himself a weak ruler 
burdened by debts, was easy prey to the cupidity of foreign 
potentates (e.g., Emperor Maximilian I) and ambassadors; he even 
distributed codices as gifts. 
After the defeat of the Hungarians by the Turks at Mohacs in 
1526, where King Louis (Lajos) II died in battle, his widow, Maria, a 
Habsburg, brought some Corvina to The Netherlands, for example, 
the "Corvin Missale" (Madrid, Escorial Library). After Turkish 
troops sacked Buda, 7,000 chests of loot were shipped via the 
Danube to Istanbul. Some manuscripts were sold and became 
known as the "Budenses," enjoying great popularity from Venice to 
Paris. 
No catalogue of the library has yet been discovered and the exact 
number of the holdings of the Bibliotheca Corvina since 1471, the 
year of its beginnings, is unknown. Today the Corvina are dispersed 
in many countries. Most are in Hungary; others can be found in 
England, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, Germany, 
Italy, Turkey and the United States. 
Author's note: 
* Earliest record of gold-tooled binding: record of payment to Baldassare Scariglia 
for binding seven volumes in Cordovan leather tooled in gold for Corvinus 
(Document of 1480 from Naples). 
Editor's note: 
A selected bibliography of the subject, prepared by the author, is available from our 
journal's editorial office. 
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Linda and Marsha Frey, A Question of Empire: Leopold I and the War of 
the Spanish Succession, 1701-1705. Boulder, Colorado: Eastern Euro-
pean Monographs, 1983. 165pp. [Distributed by Columbia Univer-
sity Press, New York, as Eastern European Monograph number 
cxvli and Brooklyn College Studies on Society in Change number 
36. 
"A Question of Empire: Leopold I and the War of the Spanish 
Succession" is an enticing title. It suggests to the casual browser that 
here is the much needed, in-depth study of the Austrian court in 
terms of the ebb and flow of court opinion and politics as it touched 
on the stressful relationship between Leopold's foreign policy and 
his imperial ambitions. A close reading of the book reveals some-
thing quite different: an 88-page essay describing European inter-
national affairs in the period 1701 to 1705 with only a superficial 
summary of Austrian views. As such it is useful, but it does not reveal 
the nature of conflicting opinion within the court or the sources and 
nature of the views which were the foundation of policy. It is 
disappointing to find that 77 of the tiny book's 165 pages are neither 
text nor interpretation, but lists of sources and a bibliography. 
On reflection, so heavy a weight of scholarly apparatus seems 
unnecessary. 
Readers of this journal will want to look particularly at pages 
69-74 and 80-84 to find the authors' views on Hungary. There, too, 
one will find only a general summary of well-known events. Of 
course, this is very useful, but specialists will be frustrated by the 
want of depth, detail and scope. 
In discussing Hungary, as with other subjects, the authors 
continually cavil about the failure of Austria's allies to understand 
her. "What was said and ignored about Austria and Hungary 
became more important than what Austria and Hungary actually 
were," they write (p. 73). T rue enough, but the authors seem to fail 
to understand that it is in the nature of alliances and international 
politics that this is so. It is nothing unusual. Moreover, the authors 
fail to link this fact with the purposeful misrepresentations which 
were made at the time, particularly those received by the Dutch and 
the English. 
The Freys have given us an essentially correct summary of events, 
but they leave us with a strange view of the leaders who dominated 
the European stage in the early years of the War of the Spanish 
Succession. First, we meet Charles II of Spain, "neurotic, indecisive 
and vacillating," as well as "nervous, weak-minded, melancholy, 
conscience-ridden like his predecessors." Then there is the "shy and 
reserved future king Philip V, easily led and like his father, lazy." In 
due course, we meet the "irritatingly indecisive" Leopold I, "silent 
and reserved." Then there is Prince Euguene, "reserved, austere, 
taciturn," but whose "taciturnity and reserve would be submerged 
by a firey vitality." In Holland, there was Pensionary Heinsius, 
"whose decisiveness and fervour of youth had been replaced by 
"vacillation and vagueness." And in England, the "curt, undemon-
strative" William III was followed by "Anne, reserved, suspicious 
and easily hurt and offended." She was a "dull dumpling of a 
Queen," whose husband, George of Denmark, was "lethargic, 
clumsy, shy, often silent." One could go on with such quotations, but 
this is enough to suggest the authors' iconoclastic portrayal of the 
great. The descriptions may well carry a grain of truth in them, but if 
they do, the authors have failed to explain how European nations 
managed their foreign affairs under such weak-kneed individuals 
during a critical juncture in European history. 
The Freys' book contains far too much general background to 
make the substantial contribution which is needed for this period. It 
does fill the gap of years which John P. Spielman glossed over in his 
biography, Leopold I of Austria (1977). Yet the background in 
Spielman's book, when combined with the depth provided by 
Charles Ingrao's In Quest and Crisis: Emperor Joseph I and the Habsburg 
Monarchy (1979), gives greater understanding to the process by 
which Austrian policy was formulated and how her imperial 
ambitions related to her foreign policy objectives. 
John B. Hattendorf 
Naval War College 
Tokaji, Andras. Mozgalom es Hivatal. Tomegdal Magyar orszagon 
1945-1956. Budapest: Zenemukiado, 1983. 285pp., tables, notes, 
charts, index, bibliography. 
Tokaji's book presents a detailed and careful account of popular 
songs (known also as workers' songs, Arbeiterlied, revolutsionnaia 
pesna) in Hungary f rom 1945 until 1956, a year that brought its 
decline and sudden end. The author is primarily interested in the 
cultural process that transformed Hungary's musical tradition and, 
based on the earlier patterns of songs such as the well-known 
"Volga Boatmen," "Internationale," "Carmagnole," "Qa Ira," "Mar-
seillaise," etc., helped the emergence of a new socialist musical 
culture. In Part I he describes the political changes and cultural 
revolution in Hungary that followed World War II. Here we begin 
to understand the real meaning of this musical tradition in its 
socio-cultural context, for the first time examined with clarity and 
objectivity. The core of the book is Part II in which texts, songs and 
melodies are transcribed and carefully analysed. This study illus-
trates the virtue of keeping music and lyrics in juxtaposition. 
Developed from the author's longer thesis (originally in four 
volumes), at the Institute for Culture, this book looks at the changes 
in Hungary affected by the outcome of World War II and views 
politics and culture as one and the same in the immediate postwar 
decade. The major thesis of "Movement and the Office" is that after 
1945 a country of ten million suddenly experienced a change never 
felt before: a fundamental transformation of the country's social, 
economic and political systems that made Hungary a socialist 
nation-state and a powerful ally of the Soviet Union. The musical 
culture that grew out of this societal process is what the author tries 
to understand in its proper context. This book is not, as the writer 
admits himself (p. 22), a study in musical aesthetics. Rather it is a 
scholarly analysis in the sociology of music. One look at the author's 
notes and references will convince the reader; for Tokaji uses the 
works by Th. Adorno, Gyorgy Lukacs, Hanns Eisler, A.N. Szohor, 
K. Marx and others. 
By far the greatest attention is devoted to the analysis of the songs 
and their meanings, with extensive discussion contributing to the 
tonal analysis. This and the section that analyses the lyrics of this 
truly socialist/proletarian song culture, made in the "surge of the 
socialist realism," leave the reader well informed on the symbolism, 
social context and overwhelming political importance given to them 
in those years (pp. 167-99). Commissioned songs, such as "Hands 
Off from Korea," "Rakosi Is Our Leader," "Ode to Stalin," "Stalin 
Cantata," "Greetings to Comrade Stalin," and others, the author 
argues, were to reflect the heroic fight of the Hungarian proletariat 
against capitalism, the peaceful building of communism, the unwill-
ing commitment to Stalin, the crushing of bourgeoisie elements 
and art forms in Hungarian society and the basic concern of 
communism. 
In this period of Stalinism, former musical institutions, organiza-
tions, choruses and newspapers were described as "unsuitable" and 
"undesirable." Folk music, reflecting the life-styles of the peasantry 
and their former (i.e., feudalistic) tradition, was looked upon with 
official disfavour and banned in certain instances. Even the works of 
B. Bartok and Z. Kodaly were questioned and scrutinized for their 
possible anti-state and anti-government characteristics (pp. 133-35). 
We learn from Tokaji that pentatonic melodies of folk songs were 
described as "too pessimistic" in official party meetings and newspa-
pers; and that the use of such scale was not suitable to express "real 
socialist meaning" (p. 192). The author, a thorough sociologist and 
interpreter, provides us with a balanced view of the social and 
political milieu and official policy that helped the mass production 
of this socialist realist song-tradition. From detailed transcripts of 
meetings of party officials, policy-makers, cultural leaders, com-
posers, singers and musicians, he discerns the major themes of these 
songs. It is ironic, however, that the party bureaucrats and the blind 
policy-makers, in their cultural inquisition, could not produce 
anything of considerable artistic merit. For example, and Tokaji 
proves this beyond any doubt, several so-called "truly socialist" songs 
were written in the style of military marching songs fashionable in 
the Habsburg army; or some were simply plagerized versions of 
turn-of-the-century Viennese operettas (pp. 188-89).-
The "Movement and the Office" is a readable work on an 
important topic and makes a credible case in discussing an era that 
was until very recently a taboo in Eastern Europe. This is a valuable 
contribution to the study of music and politics and should be read 
not only by ethnomusicologists but historians and sociologists as 
well. Andras Tokaji's book can be recommended, at the very least, 
for its outstanding treatment and analysis of the role that music 
played at the beginning of the socialist transformation in Hungary. 
We are fortunate to have him as a spokesman for the intriguing 
music tradition of a culture that has been known only for its folk 
music. I expected much less from this book and I received much 
more than I had hoped. I thoroughly enjoyed the book, its humour 
and style, and learned about an era that we heard of only from our 
parents whisperings. I only wish there had been more. Let us hope 
that this scholarly study will be translated and published in English 
as soon as possible. Clearly the sociology of music is coming of age in 
Hungary. 
Laszlo Kiirti 
University of Massachusetts, Amherst 
Aladar Komjathy, A kitantorgott egyhaz [The Uprooted Church] 
Budapest: A Reformatus Zsinati Iroda Sajtoosztalya, 1984. 279pp. 
This book is a fascinating account of the establishment of the 
Hungarian Reformed Church in North America. Upon reading this 
book one can understand why millions stayed glued to their 
television sets last year when the author read passages from his 
forthcoming book in Budapest. This study was born on American 
soil; it grew from a Ph.D. thesis completed at Princeton. It covers the 
history of the Reformed Church from the end of the last century to 
the end of World War II. This church was officially founded by the 
Rev. Gusztav Juranyi in Pittsburgh in May 1891. 
However, Komjathy considers the founding father of the church 
to be Rev. Ferenc Ferenczy, the third minister of that congregation. 
From 1893 until his death in 1898, he managed to establish Re-
formed churches in eight cities, including New York and Chicago. 
The author's description of life in these parishes is a deep insight 
into the enormous difficulties that the early Hungarian immigrants 
faced. The book is also an analysis of the vicissitudes of the 
Hungarian Calvinists in North America. It is pointed out that for 
many years the leading dignitaries of the Reformed Church in 
Hungary ignored the existence of the church on the American 
continent. Even when relations were established, the mother coun-
try's attitude remained ambivalent towards those who had left it. 
Before World War I, elements of the Hungarian establishment 
encouraged immigration to America. This was thought to be a 
means of getting rid of "anti-social" elements and troublesome 
ethnic minorities. The attitude of the government changed com-
pletely when hard-working, law-abiding Hungarians left for the 
New World in large numbers. Some never returned, some returned 
"as convinced Democrats or Republicans." Hungary's behaviour 
towards the Reformed Church in America was constantly subject to 
political considerations. T h e author of the book thoroughly docu-
ments every move made by Hungary towards the church and its 
repercussions in Calvinist parishes in America. 
Apart f rom being a meticulous historian presenting a large 
amount of new material, Komjathy is also a distinguished stylist. He 
belongs to the long line of Hungarian Calvinist ministers who have a 
passionate love of and appreciation for the language. While reading 
Komjathy's book the reader is immersed in the purest Hungarian. 
Its form is rooted in the classical tradition as far back as Gaspar 
Heltai. 
The reviews published in Hungary proclaim Komjathy's book to 
be an outstanding contribution to the history of Hungarians living 
abroad. Some express the hope that the book will function as "an 
important supporting pillar in the bridge to be built towards the 




Malyusz, Edith Csaszar. The Theater and National Awakening: East 
Central Europe. Translation and introduction by Thomas Szendrey. 
Atlanta: Hungarian Cultural Foundation, 1980. 349pp. 
This ambitious work attempts to trace the role the theatre played 
in the emergence of a national consciousness, as well as the influence 
that an emerging national consciousness had on the evolution of 
national theatres in Austria, Hungary and the Czech lands of 
Bohemia and Moravia. This is never really accomplished for reasons 
that will be discussed below. A great deal of information is given on 
theatrical troupes and conditions in the three countries from the 
eighteenth century through the 1860s. The introductory section, 
containing only one chapter entitled "The Three Chief Actors," 
gives a brief yet adequate historical preamble, emphasizing the role 
of the House of Habsburg in each of these national movements. The 
rest of the book is divided into three parts: "Antecedents of the 
National Theater in East-Central Europe," "The Struggle for the 
Development of the National Theaters," and "On the Threshold." 
The table of contents seems to suggest an orderly development of 
the theme that the author unfortunately fails to live up to. Part of the 
problem is that the framework is imposed from above rather than 
being developed from the needs of the material. The material 
presented is rich and diverse, but there are few clear guideposts for 
the reader: dates are given haphazardly, historical and literary 
figures are not always identified on first mention, and their 
significance is seldom made clear. Much irrelevant information is 
given, and often the relevant information is hidden in the oblique 
style and the author's assumption that the reader is already familiar 
with all of the information, and therefore an enigmatic reference is 
all that is needed as proof of an argument. The notes also fail to 
provide the often necessary factual underpinning for each thesis 
advanced. 
The three introductory chapters of Part I sketch the factors in the 
development of a theatre and theatrical tastes in Austria, the Czech 
lands and Hungary. The threads reach back to the seventeenth 
century, and while historical and social developments in each region 
affected the emergence of the theatre, certain factors were common 
to all of these lands: the patronage of the court (or lack of it), the 
language and social composition of the cities, the touring companies 
and the opportunities for education and training. In the Czech lands 
musical interests proved an important factor; in Hungary, the role 
of the counties and of the gentry, as well as of the important 
provincial cities, was considerable. 
The six chapters of Part II form the nucleus of the book where the 
thesis presented in the title is partially developed: Austria's pre-
eminent position gradually declined and the national theatres 
gained increasing independence. Joseph II is credited with estab-
lishing a good German theatre in the Hof- und Nationaltheater; he 
encouraged the formation of German theatres in other cities of the 
empire as well, and the Viennese example could certainly inspire 
others. In the Bohemian and Moravian cities the Czech troupes 
competed rather successfully with the German companies which 
were often jealous of them. A Czech lower middle class did, 
however, exert some influence by the end of the eighteenth century, 
whereas no similar groundwork was laid in Hungary. Some signifi-
cant differences between the Czech lands and Hungary are men-
tioned, though the lack of order and oblique style make the author's 
arguments difficult to follow. In Hungary the "aristocracy" (lower 
nobility in the counties rather than the magnates, so "gentry" would 
probably be a better term) played a more important role than in 
Bohemia and Moravia. Also, the national theatres in Transylvania 
provided a training ground for Hungarian actors and acting 
companies; on the other hand, the jealousy of the German-language 
theatres of the Hungarian cities proved no less an obstacle to the 
fledgling companies here than in Prague or Brunn. Reference is also 
made to the characters of early showmen who often destroyed the 
troupe through bickering and dishonesty. 
The early decades of the nineteenth century saw the emergence of 
some significant dramatists and theatre directors (Grillparzer, 
Raimund, Nestroy, Schreyvogel) in Austria, but the restrictions of 
censorship soon forced them to withdraw their plays or to modify 
their productions. The Czech national theatre became stronger, and 
Malyusz states that there were no real economic or linguistic 
difficulties. This is an over-simplification. Moreover, she also argues 
that the tension between German- and Czech-language productions 
continued, with Czech productions generally relegated to the less 
lucrative periods of the day or week. 
Malyusz suggests that the acquisition of a suitable theatre building 
and the development of a good repertory of quality plays were the 
catalysts needed for a national theatre to become established. 
However, she mentions many other factors and topics, all of them 
presumably influential yet too briefly noted and without her 
demonstrating their relationship or relevance to the thesis. Further-
more, it is highly questionable whether the simple formula of plays 
and good actors would have been the solution to the development of 
a theatrical tradition. Many other factors did influence this process, 
as the author herself implies later. Some of these were the changing 
nature of the cities (the German population being diluted by 
Hungarian settlers on the one hand, and their becoming quickly 
"Magyarized" on the other); the contributions of often viable 
touring companies to the development of both a more unified 
language and the beginnings of critical review; the inception of 
dramatic theory in the emergence of the "critical schools" in the 
persons of Vorosmarty, Bajza and Toldy; the significance of the 
Honmuvesz. Even the Diet of 1832 made a contribution. 
The final chapter, "By way of Epilogue," attempts to tie off loose 
ends. It gives an overview of the decline and rise of Austrian theatre 
in the nineteenth century and some more information on the 
problems Hungarian theatre in Pest faced in the early years 
(repeating information from previous chapters), as well as the 
decline of German theatre in Pest, which was destroyed as much by 
natural disasters as by the loss of audience. The section on Czech 
theatre best fits into an epilogue as it traces the increasing good 
fortune of those groups through the 1860s. 
It is unfortunate that the material gathered here has not been 
better organized and presented. The general organizational prob-
lems were discussed above. The presentation is marred by sentences 
and paragraphs that lose themselves in irrelevant details. For 
example, on page 29, Malyusz writes, "one of the scions of the 
Haugwitz family also participated in school drama. This family had 
estates in Moravia, and the 'Black Army' of Matthias Corvinus was 
named after one of its members. (Its captain was the 'black' 
Haugwitz.) Two young noble boys of Olmiitz also appeared in the 
play on that occasion." What does the Black Army have to do with a 
school drama in the Scottish Benedictine School? More importantly, 
what was the contribution of the Haugwitz family or of the Scottish 
Benedictine School to national drama? The author often loses sight 
of her subject. Her writing lacks a clearly perceived thesis and 
outline to guide the development of the narrative and to organize 
ideas. This difficulty is aggravated by an oblique style. Perhaps the 
former is the result of the latter. In any case, a style characterized by 
vagueness and indirectness confuses rather than illuminates. 
The obscure style, as pointed out earlier, is not a simple failure of 
grammar and rhetoric, which fault might be attributed to the 
translator had he not done a generally good job with a very difficult 
text. The obscurity is based to a large degree on the author's failure 
to support her conclusions with a clear line of argument, or 
conversely, to present facts without marshalling these to a con-
clusion. 
On page 64 she refers to the bourgeois theatre as a "new concept," 
yet nothing in the chapter which these comments conclude indicated 
that the types of theatre discussed were "bourgeois." Later, in 
speaking of the increasingly repressive control of the Habsburg 
Court over the theatre, she states: "Podmaniczky retained his 
position: neither the ruler nor the palatine had any illusions 
concerning him, since it was widely-known that in 1790 he had 
conferred with the Prussians over the dethronement of the Habs-
burgs." (p. 145) Distrusted as he was, how did Podmaniczky retain 
his position? The reader is left to guess. Similarly, after introducing 
Fedor Grimm as a person who speculated on the possibilities of a 
permanent theatre in Buda, she states, "In the fall of'1835 he retired 
from the theater." (p. 277) What, then, was the point of the 
preceding passage? The reader is constantly confronted with such 
disappointments. Or, a theatrical personality might be described as 
"sweeping the high-hearted citizens of Pest off their feet," even 
though "they did not understand any of his words.... He ranted 
through the presentation, his declamation failed to move his 
audience, and he never learned to recite a poem." (p. 81) Yet, no 
explanation is given for his success in spite of these shortcomings. 
In the reference to Roza Szeppataky in connection with Jozsef 
Katona: "No one could count on the favors of the nineteen-year-old 
Roza Szeppataky (later Madame Dery): the young actress, engrossed 
in her artistic ambitions, did not bestow her favors on anyone in 
particular. Katona, therefore, made a decision." (pp. 259-60) Since 
the decision was to join the theatre only as an amateur actor, the 
passage suggests that Katona might have made the theatre his career 
if Roza had given him her favours. Yet, there is no proof of this, nor 
does anything else in the passage suggest that. What is one to do with 
the remark? 
The translator points out in his preface the difficulty he faced with 
the documentation because one note was used for several passages 
of text. Thomas Szendrey seems to have untangled this problem in 
most instances, although a few cases of misappropriation remain. 
Note 13 in Chapter 2, for example, comes almost four long 
paragraphs after the statement it supports, and the statements on 
Renaissance culture are documented by reference to the language 
of the Chancery. In most cases the documentation is cumbersome as 
generally accepted facts are backed up by numerous references 
while less obvious and accepted facts lack support. Essential infor-
mation that should be in the text, on the other hand, is given in the 
notes. Obviously, these are faults in the structure of the book that 
neither a translator nor an editor should have to solve. 
The bibliography is extensive (159 entries), and like the notes, 
attests to thorough research. Works range from basic reference and 
source books to biographies and works on the economic and social 
conditions of the eras covered, to individual plays and anthologies. 
It can serve as a bibliography for any number of research topics. A 
list of relevant archives and libraries with major collections is 
included; this information would be known to any serious student, 
but might be helpful to the beginner. 
A fairly long index is included, but its usefulness is questionable 
since names are not always given in full, e.g., Adam, 225 or Arpad, 
111 do not mean much. When the full name is given, or the person is 
so well known (Beethoven) that a last name is sufficient, the entry is 
more helpful, but inconsistencies in the form of the name remain. 
While the foregoing has touched on translation to some extent, 
and it is often hard to identify whether a particularly obscure 
passage is so as a result of the original obtuseness or the failure of the 
translation, some specific comments are in order. Admittedly, the 
greatest difficulty was in the original text, yet the translator has too 
often stayed with a literal translation that made little sense in English 
or which was ungrammatical. The manuscript should have been 
revised for proper grammar and rhetoric. Inconsistencies and 
inaccuracies abound here no less than in the text so that the meaning 
of the original is fur ther obscured. (Or did the translator have 
difficulty understanding the author's intentions? In that case, close 
consultation might have been the only solution.) 
Even a literal translation should not keep double negatives such as 
"could not obtain a free hand in only a single country," (p. 195) or 
"no one, nowhere" (p. 297). Verb tenses are also misused as are 
adjectives: "Bayer would not have done so if he were aware," 
(p. 116), or "this children's troupes." Sometimes the translation is 
simply inaccurate as when idiomatic expressions are translated word 
for word so that "szeget szeggel" becomes "nail for nail" rather than 
"tit for tat." Other phrases include: "become suspicious" for "fell 
under suspicion," or "reminiscent" for "reminded," "interpreted" 
for "intercepted," "compatible to" for "compatible with" or "com-
parable to" — it is not clear from the context which would be more 
accurate. Adverbials, particularly "however," are misused. Even the 
titles of plays do not escape the problem of re-translation: Grill-
parzer's Ein Bruderzwist in Habsburg is given as Ein Bruderzwist im 
Hause Habsburg, and Korner's Zriny as Zrinyi. 
Inconsistencies, whether the translator's or the author's, leave 
questions in the mind of the reader. "Buda" is cited when the Prague 
"Bouda" is being discussed. In the passage on Maria Batori she is 
suddenly called "Mary." Titles and quotations are likewise some-
times translated and sometimes given in the original. There seems to 
be no method, and the reader is thus forced to guess at the original 
title or the English title in order to identify the work. He is at the very 
least curious about the original language of the letters, plays and 
other quoted material. 
A good editor and a thorough copy editing would have benefited 
the book, though without extensive revision the major organization-
al problems would have remained. It is unfortunate that this 
publisher, who specializes in Hungarian subjects, does not strive for 
quality. While this work is far more useful and potentially far less 
damaging to Hungarian studies than many other publications of this 
and similar publishers, it does fall short of scholarly standards. 
Eniko Molnar Basa 
Washington, D.C. 
Sandor Csoori, Memory of Snow. Translated by Nicholas Kolumban. 
Penmaen Press (Great Barrington, Massachusetts), 1983. 67 pp. 
$22.50 hardcover, $8.50 paperback. 
This selection of poems is the first book to appear in English by 
the outstanding contemporary Hungarian writer Sandor Csoori, 
author of seven volumes of poetry and seven volumes of prose and 
co-author of several filmscripts, including Ten Thousand Days, 
winner of the Grand Prize at the Cannes Film Festival. Memory of 
Snow is therefore not only a welcome publication but a necessary one 
and should appeal both to students of Hungarian literature and to 
the more general poetry-reading audience. 
Csoori, born in 1930, began writing in the early fifties, during the 
days of the Thaw. From the start he resisted schematism, the 
subordination of the individual to State ideology. This volume 
clearly displays that spirit. In a prefatory statement, Csoori says that 
a fundamental concern of his is to "preserve the 'I' in our war against 
dehumanizing impersonalization." T h e opening of "A Poem for My 
Well-Wishers" derives from that concern: 
You wanted me to calm down, 
to grow a beard, to look for a pin 
in the hush of a warm, womanly corner. 
A pin that could be used for murder . 
I didn't stay here with your babbling mouths. 
My body longed instead to be a guest 
in the mountains that are covered with bunchberries. 
The book is appropriately divided into three sections that 
progress in an unbroken line from this individual "I," the founda-
tion for all action, to some Thou outside the self—Csoori is a master of 
the love-lyric—and from there even fur ther outward to the larger 
community of the national, as in "Poland": 
Poland—a statue of Christ, struck by lightning. 
July sunlight roams over your blackening wounds 
and flies kiss your bones. 
The book's first poems are implicit in its last ones, and vice-versa. All 
the poems seem to spring impassioned from a single source. 
An Italian aphorism claims that translations are like spouses— 
beautiful ones are apt to be unfaithful and faithful ones are apt to be 
ugly. Unfortunately, this reviewer is not qualified to judge these 
translations against the originals. Nevertheless, as independent 
English poems, Kolumban's translations offer some clear advan-
tages over the next most readily-available selection, Daniel Abon-
dolo's in Albert Tezla's Ocean at the Window: Hungarian Prose and 
Poetry Since 1945 (U. of Minnesota, 1980). Kolumban's, with their 
naturalness of tone and rhythm, carry considerable energy along 
their lines, whereas Abondolo's have a constrained quality, as if the 
tether of the original language pulled at them. (For example, notice 
the important differences between Kolumban's "The women come 
to make love / and stool pigeons to flatter. / Their chins are 
covered / with tobacco stains" and Abondolo's "women come to 
love / and informers, their chins flecked with tobacco, to flatter.") 
Csoori's poetry has been praised in Hungary for its "freshness and 
exhilaration." Kolumban, a poet himself and the editor and transla-
tor of Turmoil in Hungary, an anthology of 20th-century Hungarian 
poetry published in 1982 by New Rivers Press, demonstrates the 
justice of that description by his work in Memory of Snow. In "People, 
Branches," "the world is filled with silence," an evil silence suggest-
ing repressions of various sorts. But Csoori imagines a resolution: 
Maybe I should learn to love someone again: 
her breath, 
the noise her clogs make 
on the stairway. 
I'd listen to her hair crackling 
as she pulls the comb through. 
A year would pass and another 
and the sounds would return to me 
like the swallows from Africa 
that screech in the dark — 
the voices of dishes 
the voices of countries 
the rain that kicks the windowsill, 
the crackle of spring's shoulder blades 
from under the Beethoven mane of the clouds, 
the voice of a small leaf — 
they all would whisper in my ear: 
we were once and will be again. 
People, branches, murmuring. 
Sweet words. 
Murmuring and sweet words, indeed. Kolumban, with Csoori as his 
guide and stimulus, translates into English as if he were making it all 
up, and delighting in doing so. 
Some readers might regret the absence of an introduction. How 
these poems fit into Csoori's long career is not clear. No dates 
accompany individual poems, nor do we know what principles of 
selection Kolumban followed, or if Csoori himself had a hand in the 
formation of this book in any way. Some words on the challenge of 
translating Csoori might have been interesting and helpful. Still, the 
very surrender of the entire book to the words of Csoori, in preface 
and poems, serves as a moving tribute to him and highlights his 
powerful voice. 
According to Miklos Vajda, in his introduction to Modern Hungar-
ian Poetry (Columbia U. Press, 1977), few of the other arts have ever 
flourished in Hungary the way poetry has. Cities could be destroyed, 
but poetry, partly thanks to memory, could not. These poems are in 
part about that very history. Although "misery has nailed [him] to a 
bed" and his spine is "derailed," his 
breath escapes 
with the early morning 
blackbird 
and races with a stagecoach, 
pulled by birds, 
through the buffeting forest. 
Resurrection is a motif of this book. History is present as a constant 
challenge but never a determinant. The "unconquerable hen" 
amidst "the dead of the war" has "collared the longest spring worm / 
in the world!" The poetry of Csoori shuttles vitally between these 
two poles of the war-dead and the spring worm. Paradoxically, the 
poet transcends Hungarian history not by resisting it but by giving 
himself wholly to it. 
Nicholas Kolumban and Penmaen Press have performed a 
valuable service. T h e book, handsomely printed to meet the high 
standards of Penmaen books, is graced by a woodcut portrait of the 
poet by Michael McCurdy. Memory of Snow is a must for any library 
that wishes to represent 20th-century international achievement in 
literature and for any individual interested in the same. 
Philip Dacey 
Southwest State University, Marshall, Minnesota 
Editor's Note: 
This review was accepted for publication before our Journal's policy on reviewing 
translations of poetry had changed. 
Continued from page 2 
to the Hungarian Research Institute of Canada. The editors of the 
planned volume will be Professors M.L. Kovacs (of the University of 
Regina) and N.F. Dreisziger. The articles for this "special issue" will 
be selected from among the papers that had been given at the first 
two annual conferences of the Hungarian Studies Association of 
Canada and those that have been submitted to our journal in the 
past two years. Work on the volume is behind schedule — please 
accept our apologies for the lateness of the 1986 issues. 
The third annual meeting of the Hungarian Studies Association 
will be held in conjuction with the gathering of the Canadian 
Learned Societies, at the end of May, at McMaster University in 
Hamilton, Ontario. Those interested in attending and/or in giving 
papers, should contact Professor Robert Blumstock, of McMaster's 
Department of Sociology. Our journal will be pleased to consider 
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Dudley Bard, Gazi Rocksaman, 
and the Tree of Life: 
Perspectives on Canada, Hungary 
and Hungarian-Canadians 
An Introduction by N.F. Dreisziger 
Dudley Bard was the illegitimate son of Prince Rupert of Rupert's 
Land fame. Gazi Rocksaman is the media name of L.G. Waszlavik, a 
colourful figure within present-day East European counter-culture. 
The Tree of Life is the name of an orchestra in Toronto made up of 
young Hungarian-Canadian musicians. The three have no apparent 
relationship to each other. Similarly, the possibility of historical ties 
between Canada and Hungary, between the culture of Canadians 
and that of Hungarians (in Hungary and in other ancient Hungar-
ian homelands in the neighbouring countries of Rumania, Czecho-
slovakia, Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R.), might appear to many 
people to be limited or even improbable. Yet, as some of the essays in 
this anthology reveal, an inter-relationship does exist among those 
enumerated, just as links between the ancient lands of the Hungar-
ians and Canada go back at least three centuries. 
Proving the existence of hitherto little-known relationships, as 
well as of the products of cultural cross-fertilization between 
Hungary and Canada, is only an incidental aim of this volume. Its 
primary purpose is the celebration of a number of anniversaries, the 
most relevant being the centenary of the beginning of Hungarian 
settlement in Canada. 
Hungarian immigration to this country is usually dated from 1886 
mainly because the best-known of the early Hungarian colonies, the 
Esterhaz settlement (not far from the present-day city of Esterhazy 
— named after the colony's founder) was established that year. 
There had been individual Hungarians who had come to this land 
prior to 1886, but our knowledge of where they settled and for how 
long, is sparse. Thanks to Professor M.L. Kovacs's researches, we 
know more about the Hungarians who came to Canada in the 
mid-1880s, especially the group that established the colony of 
Esterhaz.1 Alas, the other contemporary Hungarian settlements, the 
one at Hunsvalley and the other at Lethbridge (both in the old 
North-West Territory), are less familiar as their history still awaits 
the attention of researchers. 
Writing a historical outline of the Hungarian-Canadian commu-
nity's evolution since 1886 is not the purpose of this publication. The 
subject is much larger in scope than can be adequately handled in a 
small volume, and it has already been substantially covered else-
where, to a large extent by the editors of this collection.2 Neverthe-
less, three papers in this volume deal with some aspects of the 
Hungarian-Canadian community's development. 
The essay covering the longest time-span is Dreisziger's study of 
the evolving urban-rural distribution of Hungarian Canadians from 
the 1880s to the 1980s. This paper pays special attention to the 
forces that played a role in the transformation of a largely rural 
immigrant community into a predominantly urban one. One of the 
important determinants in this development, according to the 
article, was the increasing propensity among more recent Hungar-
ian arrivals to settle in the cities, or to re-migrate there after a 
temporary stay on farms or in other non-urban settings. 
While Dreisziger's paper deals with the historical statistics of 
Hungarian-Canadian demographic evolution since 1886, Professor 
Adele Csima's paper compares some aspects of Canada's as well as 
the Hungarian-Canadian groups' demography with that of the 
population of Hungary. In the third paper dealing with Hungarian 
Canadians, Stephen Satory outlines certain facets of the cultural life 
of this ethnic group as it existed nearly a century after its modest 
beginnings in the 1880s. Satory finds, in the Hungarian community 
of Toronto, a great deal of dynamism and sophistication. He 
discovers that some members of this group devote themselves to 
very specialized cultural pursuits, such as the study of the authentic 
music and folk-dancing of the ancient Hungarian villages of north-
western and northeastern Rumania (Transylvania and Bukovina-
Moldavia respectively). His paper outlines the multi-layered interac-
tions between Hungarian-Canadian society and elements of Hung-
ary's community interested in ethnomusicology and folk-dancing 
(which in the same period was also involved in the study of the 
authentic music and dancing of the old and culturally unspoiled 
Hungarian communities in Rumania). 
* * H= 
For Hungarians, 1986 was not only the centenary of their 
beginnings in Canada, but a year of several other notable anniversa-
ries. One of these was the trecentenary of the reconquest of Buda 
(the capital of medieval Hungary) from the Turks after nearly 150 
years of Ottoman rule. In 1686 an international army, outfitted and 
commanded by some of the Christian rulers of Europe, successfully 
besieged the old Hungarian capital, at the time a frontier post of the 
Ottoman Empire. It was in this struggle that the young Dudley Bard 
lost his life and thereby entered the pantheon of heroes of 
Hungarian history. As Maria H. Krisztinkovich's opening paper 
points out, this fact was not the only connection that Prince Rupert's 
family had to Hungary. T h e Prince's own godfather was another — 
and much better-known — Hungarian hero, Gabor Bethlen, Prince 
of Transylvania and for a brief time the ruler of much of Hungary. 
In the figure of Prince Rupert then, aspects of Transylvanian, 
Hungarian and Canadian history converge, mainly as a result of 
historical coincidences, the most important being the Protestant 
Reformation. Krisztinkovich outlines how developments associated 
with the spread of Protestantism led to Bethlen being chosen as 
Rupert's godfather, and hints at the fact that Rupert's association 
with Canada was in part the result of these same factors. 
* * * 
Another milestone marked by Hungarians in 1986 was the 
thirtieth anniversary of their uprising against Soviet rule. As far as 
the Hungarian-Canadian community is concerned, the most signifi-
cant outcome of this event was the arrival in Canada of the 
"ref ugees," a group of about 37,000 newcomers that constituted the 
largest ever influx of Hungarians to this country. The direct and 
indirect consequences of this development are touched on in the 
three essays that deal with Hungarian Canadians. Some of the 
immediate and long-range effects on the Magyar community's 
demography are discussed in Dreisziger's paper and, to a lesser 
extent, in Csima's. Some of the long-term cultural consequences of 
the coming of the refugees can be gauged from Satory's article. The 
importance of the ref ugee's cultural legacy becomes clearer when it 
is pointed out that Toronto's Kodaly Ensemble was itself largely the 
creation of refugees. This institution played a dominant role in 
virtually all of the Toronto area's Hungarian folk-music and 
folk-dancing activities since its founding. It should be mentioned 
that Satory's paper, written in 1985, marked the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the Kodaly's establishment. 
The Kodaly Ensemble itself evolved from a cultural association 
dedicated to the maintenance of folk-singing, dancing and music, as 
these were known to its members before their arrival in Canada, into 
an institution with a flexible and sophisticated approach to its 
multi-faceted work (research, teaching, repertoire selection, per-
forming and so on). One of the remarkable aspects of the Ensem-
ble's evolution was the close attention many of its leaders paid to 
developments in Hungarian ethnomusicology and folk-dancing in 
Eastern Europe. Satory explains how the young men and women 
leading the Ensemble introduced the tdnchaz movement to Canada, 
a movement dedicated to the study of the authentic, still unadulter-
ated Hungarian dances of Transylvania and other Szekely districts 
of Rumania. The Tree of Life [Eletfa] orchestra was a Canadian part 
of this movement, concerned with its musical aspects. 
* * * 
Robert Keyserlingk's and Victor Buyniak's papers in this collec-
tion do not deal with strictly Hungarian subjects. The former dis-
cusses the evolution of attitudes to the study of Austro-Hungarian 
history in Britain especially during the Second World War. The 
latter evaluates the results of Canada's policy of multiculturalism 
during its first fifteen years of existence (1971-86). Both papers are 
of interest to Hungarians in Canada and elsewhere. In the last paper 
in this volume Professor M.L. Kovacs examines the impact of 
ancient Hungarian religious traditions on present-day Hungarian 
culture. This study reveals a truly remarkable persistence of 
religious and cultural influences and their ability to take on new 
forms and to interact with new trends and ideas. One colourful 
figure Kovacs mentions is Laszlo Gazi (Gazember, i.e., the Rogue) 
Rocksaman, who is at once a member of the East European "rock" 
culture, and a twentieth century representative (admittedly self-
proclaimed) of an ancient Eastern pagan tradition. Rocksaman's 
cultural preoccupations are global. It might be said that in his figure 
East and West meet and centuries are transcended. He stands for 
universal culture in time and space. 
* * * 
Several of the essays in this volume touch on the subjects of culture 
transfer and cultural cross-fertilization. The opportunities for these 
arise occasionally through the historical interactions of states or 
statesmen such as described in the study by Krisztinkovich. A more 
likely originator of culture transfer from one nation to another, 
from one part of the globe to anot her, is the process of international 
migration. The Hungarian-Canadian community is a product of 
such migration and, as such, it is an agency of culture transfer. As 
explained in Satory's essay, this community is responsible not only 
for bringing certain Hungarian cultural traditions to Canada, but 
also for keeping this country in touch with new developments in the 
culture of the East Central European lands where Hungarians 
reside. Conversely, Hungarian Canadians (and Hungarians in other 
Western countries) no doubt contribute to the introduction of 
Western cultural influences and trends to their ancestral lands. 
While no claim can be made for the fact that the Hungarians of the 
West are alone or even largely responsible for the high degree of 
awareness in Hungary of cultural trends in Western Europe and 
North America, their frequent contacts with Hungary no doubt 
reinforce this awareness. Phenomena such as represented by 
Waszlavik are prominent in Hungary, despite the fact that a 
"counter-culture" is barely tolerated in Communist societies. 
The essays in this volume, by touching on the themes of culture 
transfer, culture maintenance and cultural cross-fertilization, hint at 
the unity of Hungarian and Western history and culture in general 
and the affinity and compatibility of the culture and history of 
Hungary and Canada. Dudley Bard is a symbol of this historical 
unity. He was the son of a prominent seventeenth-century Europe-
an and British historical figure — himself the godson of a major 
Hungarian personage — who gave his life for a "Christian," that is a 
"European" Hungary. 
While Bard is someone who today lives on in Hungarian national 
mythology, Waszlavik the "Rocksaman" is part of the present. He, 
and others like him who combine modern Western influences with 
the cultural legacy of an Eastern past, suggest the compatibility of 
these values and traditions. The existence of the Tree of Life 
orchestra in Toronto in the 1980s, inspired by the ancient folk-
music of the Szekely villages of Transylvania, Moldavia and Bukov-
ina, is proof of a most remarkable culture transfer and cultural 
cross-fertilization, as well as of the potential unity of aspects of 
Eastern and Western cultures. 
A great many other examples of historical and cultural inter-
connections and interactions between Western — in particular 
Canadian — and Hungarian history and culture could be cited both 
from the essays that follow and from the available literature. 
Nevertheless, a comprehensive examination of these ties still awaits 
the efforts of scholars in the arts, humanities and the social sciences. 
It is hoped that this small collection of essays will help provide 
inspiration for such work. 
The preparation of this volume was the idea of members of the 
executive of the Hungarian Studies Association of Canada, an 
organization dedicated to the study — and the popularization of the 
study — of Hungary and things Hungarian. The purpose was to 
publish much of the proceedings of the Association's 1986 confer-
ence held at the Learned Societies meeting in Winnipeg. As the 
Association's conference was organized by Professor Kovacs, the 
papers were collected by him. They were edited, revised and 
re-typed in the fall and winter of that year. A few had to be 
translated into English. Several of the papers were still not in 
publishable shape in the spring of 1987 when the printing of the 
volume had to get under way. These as yet incomplete or unrevised 
studies may be published at a later date in an "occasional volume" of 
the Chair of Hungarian Studies at the University of Toronto, as a 
companion volume to the present "special issue." 
It remains to offer a few acknowledgements. The 1986 issues of 
our journal are published with a grant f rom the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada. For its 1986 meeting the 
Hungarian Studies Association of Canada had a conference grant 
from the same agency. This financial assistance enabled Professor 
Kovacs to organize the Association's meeting in Winnipeg and to do 
the lion's share of the initial editing of the papers. To assist in the 
publication of these manuscripts, we received a publication grant 
from the Department of the Secretary of State of Canada (Multicul-
turalism Sector). For this support we are most thankful. Copy 
editing on the volume was done in part by Ms. Anne McCarthy of 
Toronto. She also helped prepare the manuscripts for electronic 
typesetting. 
Notes 
1 M.L. Kovacs, Esterhazy and Early Hungarian Immigration to Canada (Regina: 
Canadian Plains Studies, 1974). For further bibliographical references see below, in 
the notes to the study by N.F. Dreisziger. 
2 See Dreisziger, Kovacs, et al. Struggle and Hope: The Hungarian-Canadian Experience 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982). 
Prince Rupert, Godson of Gabor Bethlen 
Maria H. Krisztinkovich 
Prince Rupert's life is familiar to Canadian readers and scholars. 
Not so well known are Rupert's and his family's connections to 
Hungarian history, which were predominantly Calvinistic, like 
Rupert's own roots.1 The countries in this Protestant power-play 
were: his father's homeland, the Palatinate; his grandfather's 
England; his parents' kingdom, Bohemia; his godfather's principali-
ty, Transylvania; and his Protestant aunts' and uncles' Holland 
and Sweden. Five of Rupert's many brothers and sisters also left 
their mark on history. They lived through the Thirty Years' War, 
of which Rupert's family was partly the victim, and partly the 
cause. 
Various writers have referred to the compelling personality of the 
prince by using colourful epithets: the Son of the Winter King, 
Robert le Diable, the Dark and Handsome Prince, the Cavalry 
Leader, the Mercenary of the King of Hungary, the Prince Without 
a Principality, the Would-be King of Madagascar, the Buccaneer, 
the Pirate, the Robber Prince, the Recluse Rupert, and so on, which 
reveal many facets of Rupert's life story, except for a generally 
ignored one: Prince Rupert was godson of Gabor Bethlen, Prince of 
Transylvania and, for a brief time, King of Hungary. 
Here we must resist the temptation to immerse ourselves in the 
tales of Rupert's romantic life of adventure and prowess, or in the 
portraits displaying his martial good looks. It is no exaggeration, 
perhaps, to claim that Rupert was the most talked about person of 
his era. This he achieved both through his exploits on behalf of the 
Stuart cause and through his varied life-style. While historical gossip 
bequeaths to us the image of a true seventeenth century cavalier, 
episodes unmentioned indicate a very private Rupert, a scientist, an 
inventor, a gifted artist — a man far ahead of his century. 
Rupert's mother, Elizabeth, daughter of James I of England, gave 
birth to her third son shortly after her own coronation as Queen of 
Bohemia (27 December 1619). Her husband, Frederick V of the 
Palatinate (Frederick I of Bohemia), was by tradition chief among 
German princes, the "Electors of the Holy Roman Empire." Both 
parents were good-looking, charming, spirited and learned, and 
committed to the Reformed Church. That is why they were invited 
to the throne of Bohemia. At that time, Czech nobility had not yet 
realized that the people of the Palatinate were offering more 
pronounced support for the extreme reformers.2 Their outlook was 
closer to what the extremists at that time called "illumination." In 
seventeenth century Bohemia, any religious deviation meant con-
frontation with the Habsburg Emperor, then the foremost protago-
nist of the Roman Catholic Church. Thus, some malicious Jesuits 
felt prompted to prophesy that Frederick's Czech kingdom would 
not last longer than the winter. Sadly for the inhabitants of the 
Palatinate, this prophecy was fulfilled, and Frederick is known as 
"the Winter King" to this day.3 
Even though Rupert was born into an ephemeral royal reign, the 
citizens of Prague celebrated the event joyfully since the child was 
their first indigenous prince. Elizabeth informed her father, James 
I, that: "The King [her husband] hath bidden Bethlen Gabor, the 
Prince of Transylvania, to christen this little boy. He [Bethlen] is 
altogether of our religion." To this, Eliot Warburton, Rupert's 
biographer, added the following remark: "...this ingenious and 
daring savage [Bethlen] was selected as sponsor... as he... had almost 
secured for himself the Kingdom of Hungary."4 Bethlen sent Imre 
Thurzo, a diplomat in his stead to the christening of Rupert. 
Warburton has this to say: "His representative, count Thurzo, in 
complete armour, received the child f rom the archbourgravine, and 
transferred it from his mail-clad arms to the gauntleted hands of the 
deputies of Lusatia, Moravia, and Silesia; such martial dandling 
suited well with the fu ture fortunes of the child."5 Another English 
writer described Thurzo as "a splendid if barbaric figure. 
These remarks are misleading; Bethlen, although warring and 
preoccupied with balancing the fate of his country between two 
formidable enemies — the Turks and the Habsburgs — neverthe-
less, patronized science, literature and art. His reign was called the 
golden era of Transylvania. Thurzo, his envoy to Prague, was the 
author of several Latin rhetorical works, and Chancellor of the 
University of Wittenberg.' 
An eighteenth century account of the events can be found in the 
work of the Hungarian historian, Istvan Katona: 
Imre Thurzo set out for Kassa (Kaschau, Kosice) in spite of the 
glacial weather, on the fourth of March 1620. On the tenth, he was 
greeted by the citizens of Kassa. There he obtained from Bethlen 
documents, instructions and other instruments regarding the 
plan of a Federation between Gabor Bethlen and the new King of 
Bohemia. On the seventeenth of March, Imre Thurzo began his 
mission. Passing through his own domain at Biccse, he reached 
Prague on the thirtieth of March. Before the gate of the city, the 
Nobles of Bohemia and the Provinces received him with great 
pomp. Coinciding with this diplomatic mission, says an eyewit-
ness, were the solemnities of Rupert's christening. In the Cathe-
dral of Prague, Thurzo lifted the infant in his arms and held it 
over the baptismal font. A son of a Protestant King was thus 
baptized Robertus, or Rupert, by another Calvinist sovereign. On 
behalf of Gabor Bethlen, Thurzo negotiated matters of a Protes-
tant alliance to be formed against the Habsburg Emperor. At the 
same time, he acquitted himself of yet another mission, present ing 
splendid gifts sent by the godfather for the royal family. For 
Frederick, he brought from Hungary a white Asiatic horse with 
oriental carpet saddlery and trappings; for the Queen, various 
objects, such as rare stones exquisitely cut; a kind of Cambric or 
linen embroidered and studded with precious stones; all in 
"oriental" style. Bethlen regaled his godson Rupert with a 
precious sword encrusted with turquoise stones.8 
In Katona's history we also find the voluminous correspondence 
between Frederick and the so-called ingenious and savage Bethlen. 
The Fall of 1620 brought disaster. At Prague's White Mountain, 
one of the shortest battles in history was lost by Frederick within an 
hour. While the king and his family were entertaining English 
envoys in Hradcany Castle, the Czech army was overwhelmed by the 
Imperial forces.'1 By the time Frederick had risen from the table, his 
fate had already been decided. The family had to evacuate Prague 
immediately: 
Much frenzied packing was done on the dark November after-
noon, but Frederick's chamberlain, on a last progress through 
the deserted royal apartments, discovered something important 
which had been left behind. He picked it up, and hurrying down 
to the courtyard, was just in time to catch the last coach drawing 
away from the palace doors. Not until the bundle thrown in ... 
rolled ... onto the floor of the carriage and burst into a roar, did his 
astonished fellow-travellers discover that the infant Prince Rupert 
was amongst them.10 
Such was the first recorded episode of Rupert "the Adventurer." 
The Battle of White Mountain ended the dream of both Bethlen 
and Frederick, of a f ederation of Protestant princes. Their defeat on 
the battlefield brought the greatest disaster upon their subjects. Of 
special interest was the exodus of thousands of Anabaptist settlers 
from Frederick's lost realm. These people in particular brought 
upon themselves the wrath of the Imperialists. After his coronation, 
the Anabaptists had paid their respects to Frederick while he was 
travelling around his new kingdom. He had stopped at Alexovice 
(Mahrisch Kromau, Krumlov), where the Anabaptist Hutterite 
Brethren presented the king with a finely wrought iron bedstead, 
various precision knives and fur-lined gloves. For the queen they 
offered their renowned majolica ware.11 The presents had im-
pressed Frederick deeply. He wrote to his queen that if only these 
interesting people lived nearer Prague, he would like to visit their 
colony more often.12 It was not by chance that Bethlen hurried to 
their assistance, transferring the industrious craf tsmen from belea-
guered Moravia to his Transylvanian estate at Alvinc.u The 
Hutterite connection — considered minor, or neglected altogether 
by historians — can be followed throughout the rest of Rupert's and 
his family's life. 
The infant Rupert and his parents first found refuge with the 
Elector of Brandenburg, brother-in-law of Frederick; later they 
stayed with his uncle, Prince Maurice of Orange, in Holland. During 
most of the Thirty Years' War, the Palatine refugees enjoyed the 
hospitality of the latter, a great naval and military strategist in the 
Netherlands. He was Rupert's beloved benefactor and mentor 
through his formative years. Rupert was able to witness the 
movements of the Dutch fleet and to hear about adventures and 
explorations in the New World. It was in Holland that he first 
learned about endeavours to relocate thousands of Protestant 
refugees overseas. It is conceivable that the Hutterite Brethren 
shared, with their patrons from the Palatinate, their earlier experi-
ences on Canadian shores since their first scout made the trip in 
1595. This scout, Johannes Sermond, reported directly to Maurice 
of Orange at The Hague on his return, four years later, from his 
Labrador voyage.14 
Rupert was barely twenty years old when he was captured in battle 
by the Austrians. The young warrior spent four years in captivity at 
the Castle of Linz (1637-41). He occupied himself with self-
education, drawing, experimenting in chemistry, playing tennis and 
falling in love with Countess Kufstein, the daughter of his jailer. The 
affair changed Rupert from a reckless young soldier into a mature 
person with avid interests in science, the arts and beautiful and 
erudite women. Warburton, Rupert's biographer, reflected on the 
impact of his time in captivity: "So long ago as 1637, when immured 
in the Castle of Linz, he had exercised his active genius in some 
etchings that still remain, and bear that date." In 
During the scourge of the Thirty Years' War, when 500,000 men, 
women and children were put to the sword in Germany alone and 
whole provinces were ravaged to utter desolation, the Palatinate was 
also in shambles. This situation earned Rupert the name "Prince 
Without a Principality." In 1648, the war was over and the Emperor 
mellowed towards the children of the rebellious Frederick. Notwith-
standing the reconciliation, the Palatines still refused to give the 
Habsburgs the title of Emperor because their father was not 
consulted at the time of the election. They stubbornly called the 
Kaiser "King of Hungary."16 
When peace returned, it brought back a semblance of religious 
tolerance. Rupert's older brother, Charles Louis, was restored as 
Elector to a portion of the Palatinate, holding the posit ion from 1648 
to 1680. Charles Louis set his mind exclusively to rebuilding the 
homeland of his parents. He withheld Rupert's part of the inheri-
tance and spent the family funds on founding his residence and the 
new capital, Mannheim. Charles Louis invited Hutterite settlers 
from Hungary and Transylvania, promising them religious free-
dom. Many Anabaptists from the counties of Nyitra, Pozsony and 
the town of Alvinc moved to Mannheim.17 While this haven of 
religious tolerance prospered, Rupert continued his existence as 
prince without a principality, travelling over land and sea to Fight on 
various battlefields. Charles Louis had reason to keep Rupert out of 
the Palatinate. Rupert had courted the Countess Louise von 
Degenfeld, maid-in-waiting to the Electress, and written a love letter 
to her. Unfortunately, this letter reached the Electress, who was 
herself interested in Rupert.18 When the countess openly refuted 
her alleged coldness, Rupert realized that his letter had got into the 
wrong hands. The Electress realized it also. She raided Degenfeld's 
quarters, Finding many letters in Latin, written not by Rupert, but by 
her own husband, the Elector Charles Louis. When the ensuing 
scandal abated, the Elector divorced his wife and married Louise 
morganatically. 
Rupert stayed away from Mannheim for the rest of his life. 
Significantly, around this time, after secretly negotiating with 
settlers from Hungary, the family renewed its ties with Transylva-
nia. Henrietta Maria, Rupert's sister, a great beauty, was to wed 
Sigismund Rakoczi, son of the reigning Prince George Rakoczi I, in 
1651.19 The marriage negotiations, between the Palatines — poor, 
but proud of their prestigious pedigree — and the Rakoczis — rich, 
but regarded as "Asiatic barbarians" — reveal the uninformed 
prejudice of the time. Charles Louis could cover, only with great 
difficulty, the expenses of his sister's Hungarian wedding, providing 
the bare minimum for the princess's trousseau;20 still he persisted in 
being difficult, even condescending towards the Hungarians. Later, 
Henrietta Maria's happy letters appeased him. The princess fell in 
love with Sigismund, and he with her. She wrote: "I wish my lord 
could be so happy as to be known to your Highness, for I feel sure 
you would like your brother-in-law, and would see that people had 
spoken more lies than truth in their reports."21 Reports about the 
magnificence of George Rakoczi and Susanna Lorantffy's court did 
the rest. T h e two families were already connected through Gabor 
Bethlen's marriage with the sister of the Elector George William of 
Brandenburg. This new bond between Protestant princes was eyed 
with suspicion in Vienna. Historians laconically mention the tragic, 
untimely death of the lovers: on 18 September 1651, Henrietta 
Maria's life ended, followed by Sigismund's a few months later. Only 
Caspar Maurer, in his Ungarische Chronica (1664), dares to hint at 
foul play.22 
It appears that Rupert next sought employment at the Viennese 
court. His intention was probably to recover some of the money due 
him after the peace treaty but withheld by his brother Charles Louis. 
When the Imperialists under Montecuccoli assembled at Nagyszom-
bat (Tyrnau, Trnava), Rupert was also on hand as a Lieutenant Field 
Marshal in the army.23 However, he never fought on Hungarian soil, 
in spite of his appointment and the sobriquet "Mercenary of the 
King of Hungary." According to Warburton, he had been sent by 
Charles I on a secret mission to the Emperor.2 1 Rupert was 
welcomed by his Austrian relatives in Vienna, despite his stubborn 
refusal to become a Catholic. Driving the Turks out of Hungary was 
the ultimate adventure at that time. Not so for the common people, 
however, who suffered at the hands of both the foreign adventurers 
and the Turkish armies. It is difficult to understand how the 
Hutterites of Hungary could manage to negotiate and accomplish 
their immigration to the Palatinate, unless they were patronized by 
one of the Protestant adventurers. There must have been a certain 
reciprocity between patrons and emigrants. We know Bethlen had 
availed himself of the services of simple itinerant "pharmacists" in 
order to have letters delivered to the King of Sweden.25 There is also 
a record of the use of double-bottomed barrels of Tokay wine for 
hiding messages. In light of this, Rupert's preoccupation in Vienna 
with arranging for a quantity of Hungarian wine to be shipped to 
England — "four tonnes, or eight pipes, which I hope will serve our 
Court this winter" — takes on a different meaning. 
Rupert returned to London and laboured heartily in his own 
laboratory and forge. The Royal Society Transactions record many of 
his inventions, for instance, his method of producing a gunpowder 
ten times more powerful, even underwater, than that normally used 
at the time in mining. In his mature years, Rupert perfected the 
instruments of his own invention in a special lab at Windsor Castle. 
An experimental toy, a bubble of glass, bears his name, "Rupert's 
Drop." There were other similar experiments done in the potter's 
kiln. One of these might have led to the first porcellanous substance 
used for ceramics in England. According to Johann Joachim Becher 
— Rupert's director of mines and a famous economist and scientist 
— such ware was sold in London around 1680.26 In a chapter, 
entitled "Haffnerey und Pottebackerey," in one of Becher's books, 
he mentions a Hungarian potter who probably assisted Rupert with 
this particular technology. It cannot be just another coincidence that 
around this time the Hutterites were on the move again. The 
so-called "Hungarian potter" of Rupert's retinue was likely a 
refugee from Mannheim. After the death of Charles Louis in 1680, 
the Palatinate was claimed by Louis XIV on behalf of Elisabeth 
Charlotte of Orleans. France invaded the territory, burned Mann-
heim, and reinstated Catholicism, forcing Protestants to flee. 
Elisabeth Charlotte (Charles Louis's daughter) had frequently 
visited the Hutterite Bruderhof in Mannheim as a child; at an 
advanced age in 1718, she still recalled clearly having watched them 
at work, saying "one made handsome knives of fragrant wood, and 
another was a potter."27 
Rupert's involvement with the two adventurer-explorers Radis-
son and Groseilliers, who approached him for sponsorship of their 
voyage to Hudson's Bay, is well known, but rarely interpreted as a 
natural consequence of their having been Huguenots.28 
Returning to the private life of Prince Rupert, around the year 
1665, Rupert fell in love with Francesca, the daughter of Sir Henry 
Bard, Lord Bellamont. Little is known of this affair except that its 
issue, an illegitimate son, the gallant Dudley Bard, died 300 years 
ago in Buda, at the age of twenty. He had joined the army of Charles 
of Lorraine in an adventurous march to liberate the city from the 
Turks. On 13 July 1686, during a desperate attempt to scale the 
walls of the fortress of Castle Hill, the young warrior lost his life. The 
place where he fell was close to the former Haymarket (Szena Ter, 
now Moscow Place) in Budapest, near the Nador Laktanya (Palatine 
Caserne).29 Hungary can claim the son of Prince Rupert as her own 
martyr. 
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Immigration and Re-migration: 
The Changing Urban-Rural Distribution 
of Hungarian Canadians, 1886-1986 
N.F. Dreisziger 
The settlement of Hungarians in Canada is traditionally dated 
from 1885-86 when Magyar and Slavic peasants from Hungary 
established the earliest Hungarian colonies on the Prairies. The first 
such colony came about near Minnedosa, Manitoba, and the second, 
near the site of Esterhazy, Saskatchewan. These early Hungarian 
settlers in the Canadian West were transmigrants from the United 
States, in particular, from the mining and smelting towns of 
Pennsylvania. In the 1890s they were followed by more of their 
countrymen, most of them coming directly f rom Hungary. Al-
though by this time a few immigrants from that country were 
showing up in Canadian cities, the vast majority of Hungarians in 
Canada were rural residents. Even two decades after the turn of the 
century, in 1921, when Canada's population was divided equally 
between rural and urban inhabitants, nearly 74 per cent of 
Hungarians in the country still resided in rural districts. In fact, 68 
per cent of them lived in largely agricultural Saskatchewan.1 
Sixty years later, in 1981, the census results spoke of a very 
different Hungarian-Canadian ethnic group. First of all, it was no 
longer based in Saskatchewan or even in the Canadian West. 
According to the census data of that year, a little more than half of 
Canada's Hungarian population (51 per cent to be exact), resided in 
Ontario. At the same time Saskatchewan's share declined to 9.5 per 
cent.2 Second, even greater changes had taken place in the group's 
urban-rural distribution. At the time of the 1981 census, 82 per cent 
of Hungarian Canadians were urban residents. Farm population (as 
distinct from non-farm rural people) among them had declined to a 
mere 6.4 per cent of the total.3 
This paper will outline this dramatic transformation and will try 
to determine its probable causes. It will suggest that the changes 
wrought in the urban-rural distribution of the Hungarian-Canadian 
community were caused not only by evolving economic and social 
conditions in Canada, but also by the changing nature of the 
immigration from Hungary. In arguing this, the paper wishes to 
highlight the close relationship that exists between immigration (or, 
more precisely, the nature or characteristics of a wave of immi-
grants) and the newcomers' choice of destination in Canada, as well 
as the re-migrations that they often undertake after arrival. 
This essay will also try to determine the main stages and most 
important turning-points of the transformation of the Hungarian-
Canadian community from a largely rural society to a predominant-
ly urban one. It will also pay some attention to regional trends in the 
urbanization of Canada's Hungarian population, and will note 
major local deviations f rom regional and provincial tendencies 
displayed by Hungarian-Canadian communities. While it is evident 
that the foresaking of a predominantly rural lifestyle for an 
urban one has wrought extensive and significant changes in the 
Hungarian-Canadian community's economic, social and cultural 
circumstances, the details of this transformation, and its impact on 
the lives of individual Hungarian Canadians, can not be examined 
here as an exhaustive treatment of these themes would require more 
space than is available in this volume. In fact, such a treatise might 
well constitute a series of future papers or even a book. 
* * * 
Although, as has been noted, the vast majority of early Hungarian 
newcomers to Canada settled in farming districts, there always were 
a few Magyar immigrants who preferred to work and live in cities or 
other non-agricultural settlements. The very first of these were the 
people who took employment in the coal mines of Lethbridge in the 
District of Alberta during the second half of the 1880s. They were 
followed by other Hungarians who sought work in other mining 
towns of the Canadian West. 
At the turn of the century, Hungarians began to appear in 
Canada's industrial centres as well. There are records of their 
presence in Niagara Falls, Ontario, and North Sydney, Nova Scotia. 
In the former location they were being employed in the construction 
of hydro-electric generating stations, while in the latter community 
they worked in iron foundries. In both locations it seems, they were 
brought in from the United States.1 
Soon after the turn of the century, Hungarians began to appear in 
other Canadian industrial centres as well, for instance, in Windsor, 
Gait, Welland, Brantford, and Hamilton. In the latter two centres 
they even established several lay and religious organizations/1 In the 
meantime, the urbanization of Hungarians began — continued, if 
we consider turn-of-the-century Lethbridge an urban centre — in 
Western Canada as well. There, the largest colony of Magyars grew 
up in Winnipeg. It started around 1900 and became a colony of 
several hundred people in a few years. By about 1910 it had become 
one of the most advanced Hungarian colonies in Canada in terms of 
the number, variety and size of its immigrant institutions.6 
The First World War brought important changes in the life of 
Canada's Hungarian community and, in particular, in the process of 
its urbanization. In many respects, the war caused setbacks in the 
development of the Hungarian ethnic group's institutional life. The 
restrictions placed on organizations of "enemy aliens," and the 
general climate of public opinion which made life for Hungarians in 
Canada unpleasant, resulted in a decline of community life in many 
Hungarian colonies. At the same time, the internal migrations that 
the war induced, resulted in the emergence of new concentrations of 
Hungarians in the country, mainly in industrialized Central Cana-
da. As a result of wartime migration to manufacturing centres, the 
Hungarian colonies in cities such as Hamilton and Brantford 
continued to grow, and Hungarians began appearing in several 
Ontario centres where they had not lived before. T h e largest growth 
was recorded by the Hungarian colony in Welland. By the time of 
the 1921 census, Welland would have over two hundred Hungarian 
residents, with hundreds of other Hungarians living in adjacent 
industrial centres.7 
The decade of the 1920s was to bring even more dramatic changes 
in the development of Canada's Hungarian community, and espe-
cially in its urban-rural distribution. The most important general 
cause of these changes has to be sought in the evolution of Canada's 
economy in this period. The continued development of manufac-
turing, the rapid growth of the cities of Central Canada, and the 
existence of major public works programmes such as the construc-
tion of the W7elland Canal, help to explain the influx of Hungarians 
into the urban centres from Windsor to Montreal. The more specific 
cause of the drastic transformation of the group in the 1920s was the 
arrival in Canada of over 27,000 new Hungarian immigrants mainly 
during the second half of the decade. Since this development 
constituted the immediate cause of the beginning of rapid urbaniza-
tion for the Hungarian-Canadian ethnic group, it must be examined 
in some detail. 
Two external factors should be mentioned in order to make clear 
the historical context of the influx of Hungarians into Canada 
during the 1920s. One of these was the imposition of "quota laws" on 
immigration into the United States. The other development that was 
to have a profound effect on the movement of Hungarians out of 
East Central Europe in the 1920s, was the dismemberment of the 
Kingdom of Hungary after the war. 
The overall effect of the introduction of the "quota system" in the 
United States was the stimulation of the immigration of H ungarians 
to Canada. Prior to 1914, the destination of most overseas emigrants 
from Hungary was the American Republic. With the "quota," the 
door became shut to the vast majority of Magyars seeking to start life 
anew in "America." Increasingly, people wishing to leave Hungary 
and settle overseas looked to Canada as a possible place of 
emigration. 
The dismemberment of Hungary in the wake of World War I had 
a similar ef fect. It should be explained that the peace settlement with 
Hungary awarded two-thirds of the old Hungarian Kingdom's 
territory to the so-called successor states: Czechoslovakia, Romania 
and Yugoslavia (the states that arose mainly in the place of the 
dissolved Habsburg Empire). Much of this territory was inhabited 
by non-Hungarians; however, some of it had mixed population, or 
even largely Hungarian population. The overall result was that, as a 
consequence of the peace settlement, well over three million 
Hungarians found themselves under alien rule. Some of them were 
forced to leave their native villages or cities. Most of these tried first 
to start life anew in what was left of Hungary, but found economic 
conditions there unattractive and, as a result, decided to emigrate 
overseas. Some among those who stayed under Czech, Romanian or 
Yugoslav administration, found life in their new country of resi-
dence, and especially service in their armed forces, unpleasant. 
Many of these people, too, eventually decided on emigration to the 
New World. Their decision was made easier by the local authorities. 
Apparently, the Yugoslav and Romanian governments of the time, 
while discouraging the emigration of South Slav and Romanian 
elements respectively, were quite happy to see the Hungarians 
leave.8 
While the post-war peace settlements were in a large part 
responsible for the immigration to Canada of those Hungarians 
whose homelands were transferred to the successor states, they also 
created conditions that tended to induce more residents of Hungary 
itself to contemplate emigration than would have been the case 
without the imposition of an onerous peace settlement. By creating 
severe economic dislocations in the country (through disrupting 
internal trade patterns, transportation, labour supply etc), the peace 
treaty with Hungary caused much hardship for the people of that 
country, and encouraged some of them to emigrate. 
The influx of Hungarians to Canada that started in 1924 — after 
restrictions on their entry were relaxed by Ottawa — differed in 
some respects from that which had taken place before 1914. An 
important difference from our point of view was the fact that the 
social composition of the new wave of Hungarian immigrants was 
somewhat different from that of the old. While a large majority of 
the newcomers hailed from Hungary's villages, there were hun-
dreds among them who were not agricultural workers, but middle-
class elements whose jobs or lands were lost when Hungary was 
dismembered. At the same time, the members of the new immigra-
tion tended to be people with better education than their pre-1914 
equivalents. Most of them were people who had some familiarity 
with city life. 
There were important Canadian conditions that contributed to 
the flight of the new Hungarian immigrants away from agricultural 
work during the 1920s, and at the same time, their migration from 
the prairie provinces (where most new arrivals were directed by 
Canadian immigration authorities), to the cities of Central Canada. 
One of these was the growing dearth of good agricultural land 
available for homesteading. The result was that by the second half of 
the 1920s, immigrants to the prairie provinces were being settled 
mainly in northern districts with lands that could only be described 
as marginal. In the meantime, farms with better land, in regions with 
more hospitable climates, went up in price and were beyond the 
reach of impoverished newcomers. At the same time, there was also 
a decline in the demand for most types of farm-work. Increased 
mechanization of farm operations in the West reduced the need for 
farm labour. At certain stages of the agricultural season, such as at 
harvest-time, help was still needed, but this type of employment was 
not conducive to the permanent settlement of newcomers on the 
prairies. Employment conditions for agricultural workers began 
deteriorating even before the economic crash in 1929 and became 
very bad with the onset of the Great Depression in the fall of that 
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year. 
The coming of thousands of Hungarian immigrants who were not 
so strongly inclined toward farm-work as their pre-1914 counter-
parts had been, and the increasingly unfavourable conditions for 
agricultural pursuits on the prairies resulted in a near-wholesale 
transformation of Hungarian-Canadian society during the 1920s.10 
From an ethnic group that was predominantly rural-based and 
centred on the prairie provinces, within a decade the Hungarian-
Canadian community became a group characterized by a nearly 
even distribution between rural and urban residents, and between 
residents of the largely agricultural prairie provinces and those 
living elsewhere, especially in Central Canada. 
A brief look at the group's census statistics will illustrate the 
magnitude of its transformation in the 1920s. Despite the great 
influx of Hungarians, between the censuses of 1921 and 1931, 
Saskatchewan's Hungarian population increased by only 48 per 
cent. At the same time, Ontario's underwent an eight-fold increase, 
and Quebec's (more precisely, that of the City of Montreal) 
increased from a few hundred to over four thousand.11 The change 
in the group's urban-rural ratios in this period is equally impressive. 
As it has been mentioned, in 1921 three out of every four Hungarian 
Canadians were rural residents. Ten years later, almost half had 
become urban dwellers. In 1921, only 11 per cent of them lived in 
cities (as opposed to towns and other non-rural communities); by 
1931, this figure had grown to 30 per cent. From being the 
25th-most-urbanized Canadian ethnic group in 1921, Hungarians 
moved to the rank of 12th within the course of a decade.12 
This transformation resulted in a large growth of individual 
urban colonies of Hungarians in Canada. Existing urban concentra-
tions doubled, trebled and quadrupled in size as a result of the influx 
of Hungarians into Canada's cities. Remarkable was the growth of 
the size of the Hungarian colonies in medium-sized cities such as 
Windsor, Welland, and Niagara Falls. Among larger industrial 
centres, Winnipeg and Hamilton experienced a large increase in the 
size of their Hungarian colonies. The former had the largest and 
most influential urban Hungarian community in the West, while the 
latter was called the "Hungarian capital of Eastern Canada" by a 
visitingjournalist from Hungary.13 But the most remarkable growth 
took place in the Hungarian colonies of Canada's two largest cities, 
Montreal and Toronto. 
The beginnings of Montreal's Hungarian community go back to 
before 1914. There is even evidence that the few score of 
Hungarian-speaking Jewish residents of that city had a synagogue 
of their own prior to 1914.11 Nevertheless, substantial growth in the 
size of the city's Hungarian colony had to await the second half of the 
1920s. Once this growth started, it was very rapid. Within a few 
years, the number of Montreal's Hungarians grew from a few 
hundred to several thousand. With the increase in numbers came 
the establishment of immigrant institutions. The first to get started 
were the ethnic churches: a United Church congregation and then a 
Roman Catholic parish. These were followed by lay organizations, 
serving social purposes or acting as meeting grounds for special 
groups of Hungarians or other immigrants from Hungary. For 
example, the late 1920s saw the establishment of the Szekely 
Cultural Society, for Hungarians f rom the Szekely counties of 
eastern Transylvania; and also the German-Hungarian Club for 
German-speaking newcomers from Hungary.10 There can be no 
doubt that the beginning of religious and lay ethnic community 
life in the city played a role in attracting additional Hungarian 
immigrants. 
The story of Toronto's Hungarian community is similar. Many of 
the early Hungarian-speaking settlers in the city were Jews. The 
mass influx of Hungarians into Toronto did not start until the 
second half of the 1920s. The increase of the colony's size was 
followed by the establishment of Hungarian congregations and 
social clubs. lb It is interesting that, while by the end of the decade, 
Toronto's Hungarian colony had become one of the largest in 
Ontario, nevertheless many of the leading immigrant institutions of 
Hungarians in the province remained in smaller cities with older 
Hungarian colonies. Two of the largest Hungarian sick-benefit 
associations in Ontario, for example, continued to operate out of 
Hamilton and Brantford long after Toronto's Hungarian colony 
surpassed those of these two cities in size.17 
Census statistics reveal that the group that led this flow of 
Hungarians into the urban centres of Canada during the 1920s was 
the latest wave of arrivals. By the time of the 1931 census, 62.4 per 
cent of those Hungarians who had entered Canada after 1925 were 
now urban residents. For the groups that came in the previous five 
years, the figure was 54 per cent. For the pre-war generations, the 
figures were much lower. Only 39 per cent of those who came 
between 1911 and 1920 were city dwellers in 1931. For those who 
came before 1910, the figure was 29 per cent.18 
* * * 
One of the consequences of the Great Depression for the 
Hungarian-Canadian community was the interruption of the 
group's rapid urbanization that had started in the 1920s. A reason 
for the termination of the mass influx into the cities was the decline 
in the immigration of Hungarians. Still another reason was the fact 
that, in the 1930s, many immigrants' search for a place to eke out a 
living led them to a rural setting, in parts of Canada other than the 
prairies. 
Immigration of agricultural labourers into Canada did not cease 
immediately with the onset of the Depression in the fall of 1929. 
During the following spring and summer, newcomers continued to 
arrive, only to swell the ranks of the unemployed in the country. 
Even after a ban was placed by Ottawa on the entry of additional 
masses of farm-workers, a trickle of Hungarian immigration pro-
ceeded as wives and children continued to join young men who had 
arrived in Canada before the Depression.19 No doubt many of these 
also ended up in Canada's cities. 
The historical evidence regarding the internal migrations of 
minority groups in Canada is meagre. The standard source that 
helps historians to gauge the results of these migrations is the 
Canadian census. Unfortunately, the censuses rarely coincided with 
the main stages of Canada's demographic and economic evolution. 
Had a census been taken in the fall of 1929, we would have a more 
accurate record of the state of the Hungarian-Canadian group's 
demographic evolution both during the 1920s and during the 
Depression years. Unfortunately, the census was taken in the 
summer of 1931, and its statistics incorporate in them not only the 
demographic trends of the 1920s, but also the impact of the first 
year-and-a-half of the Depression period. 
There can be little doubt that the initial impact of the Depression 
on the Hungarian-Canadian community was to accentuate its rapid 
urbanization. As economic conditions became very bad on the 
prairies, the traditionally wheat-growing area of the Canadian West, 
Hungarian agricultural workers, as well as families driven off their 
homesteads, headed for the cities in search of employment. Not 
finding any means of livelihood there either, they continued their 
search for months, and in some cases, for years. In the end, some 
Hungarian immigrants were able to find work in parts of Canada 
where little or no concentrations of Hungarians had existed before. 
In the West, Hungarians found employment or farming opportuni-
ties in the agricultural districts of the Lower Fraser and Okanagan 
valleys of British Columbia, and in the sugar-beet growing regions 
of Southern Alberta. In Ontario, they found a livelihood in the 
so-called "tobacco-belt," in the vicinity of the towns of Delhi and 
Tillsonburg.20 
The overall result of these migrations was a slight setback to the 
process of the Hungarian group's urbanization. The census statistics 
confirm this fact and reflect the demographic transformation that 
the Depression wrought in Canada.21 Although the Depression 
gradually began to lift during the late 1930s, there was no dramatic 
improvement in the employment prospects of Hungarian Canadi-
ans until the second or third year of the Second World War. It is 
reasonable to suppose then, that the results of the June 1941 census 
reflect predominantly the changes in Hungarian-Canadian urban-
rural distribution that had been caused by the Depression. It may be 
useful to look at some of the 1941 census results not already 
mentioned earlier. 
The 1941 census is particularly useful to the student of 
Hungarian-Canadian history. It prompted many questions and, 
more important from our point of view, it avoided the practice, all 
too prevalent in later censuses, of lumping Hungarians together 
with "other Europeans" when reporting the answers to these 
questions. The overall result is that the 1941 census tells more about 
Hungarian-Canadian urban colonies than most other censuses. 
The 1941 data reveal remarkable similarities and dissimilarities 
about the various Hungarian-Canadian residential concentrations 
in Canada's cities. It shows, for example, that many of them were 
very much the products of the "new" (i.e. post-1924) immigration, 
while a few others were obviously communities of the pre-1914 wave 
of immigrants and their descendants. The best example of the 
former was the largest grouping of Hungarians in Canada, the 
Magyar colony of Montreal. About 80 per cent of its membership 
was made up of immigrants (as opposed to Hungarian Canadians 
born in this country). It may be assumed that the remainder was 
made up mainly of these newcomers' children. Moreover, the census 
data also tell that a vast majority (94 per cent) of the immigrant 
members of this colony, came to Canada after 1921. In this respect, 
the Hungarian colonies of Toronto, Windsor, Calgary, and even to 
some extent that of Hamilton, were similar to Montreal's. All were 
made up largely of immigrants. Three out of every four Hungarian 
Canadians in Toronto, and two out of every three in Windsor and 
Hamilton, were immigrants rather than Canadian-born. Much like 
in Montreal, post-1921 arrivals predominated in all of these cities' 
Hungarian colonies.22 
At the opposite extreme was the Hungarian colony of Regina. 
Though it did not appear a very important centre of Hungarian 
community life in 1941, that city had the largest Hungarian 
community west of Ontario. It was very much a concentration of 
the early immigrants and their descendants. First of all, nearly 
two-thirds of its members were Canadian — more precisely, 
Saskatchewan-born. Furthermore, even among the city's immigrant 
Hungarian population, pre-1921 arrivals predominated, though 
only by a narrow margin.23 
Between the extremes of the "new" Hungarian-Canadian urban 
settlements (Montreal, Calgary, Toronto), and the archetype of the 
"old" (Regina), stood the Hungarian colonies of Winnipeg and 
Vancouver. Almost half the Hungarian population of each was 
made up of the Canadian-born, while the predominance of the 
post-1921 arrivals was not so sharp among the immigrant popula-
tion as it was in the case of the "new" settlements (a little more than 
70 per cent, as opposed to over 90 per cent).24 
Some of the data in the 1941 census allow us to speculate where 
some Canadian-born members of Canada's Hungarian urban 
colonies came from. For each Hungarian-Canadian metropolitan 
colony, it is possible to establish what proportion of its second- and 
third-generation ethnic population were born outside of the prov-
ince of their 1941 residence. In this regard, too, the census reveals 
extreme differences among the various Hungarian-Canadian urban 
groupings. The data reveals, for example, that over 98 per cent of 
Regina's Canadian-born Hungarian population was from Saskatch-
ewan. The extreme opposite case was the Hungarian-Canadian 
colony of Vancouver: nearly two-thirds of its Canadian-born 
members were from outside of the "home province." These Figures 
might suggest that Vancouver's Hungarian colony was the product 
not only of immigrant Hungarians from Europe, but of Canadian-
born Hungarians from various parts of Canada. At the same time, 
Regina's Magyar colony was hardly touched by the inter-provincial 
migration of second- and third-generation Hungarian Canadians. It 
is quite interesting that in this respect, Montreal's Hungarian 
colony, which differed so much from Regina's in the "vintage" of its 
members, was also one that had been quite unaffected by the 
in-migration of Canadian-born Hungarians from provinces other 
than Quebec. Only one per cent of the Montreal colony's population 
was made up of such transmigrants. Toronto's colony differed in 
this respect considerably; 6.2 per cent of its members were born in 
Canada outside of Ontario.2 ' 
The 1941 census offers some concrete data on the place of last 
permanent residence of Canada's immigrant population.2'1 These 
statistics help us in determining to what extent the urban colonies of 
immigrant Hungarian Canadians were made up of transmigrants 
(i.e. of people who previous to the time of the census had resided in 
another province of Canada). More important, these data also reveal 
in which province these people had lived prior to their settlement in 
their 1941 place of residence. 
As has been mentioned earlier, Vancouver was the home of the 
largest proportion of the Canadian-born Hungarian-Canadian 
transmigrants in the country. The statistics regarding the last 
permanent place of residence of Hungarian immigrants confirm 
that this city was also the home of the largest proportion of 
immigrant Hungarian transmigrants. Nearly 60 per cent of the city's 
immigrant Magyar population had resided, prior to settling in 
Vancouver, in a province other than British Columbia. Two other 
Hungarian-Canadian urban colonies had a fair number of transmi-
grants among their immigrant population: Toronto and Windsor. 
In both places, one out of every four Hungarian immigrants 
had lived outside of Ontario since their arrival in Canada. The 
Hungarian-Canadian immigrant urban colony with the smallest 
portion of interprovincial transmigrants was, as might be expected, 
Regina. Apparently, only people who had not tasted life in any other 
part of Canada but Saskatchewan tended to settle in that city. 
In talking about Saskatchewan, it should be mentioned that that 
province was the single most important source of Hungarian 
immigrant transmigrants for every major Hungarian-Canadian 
urban colony. Every one of these groupings of Hungarians received 
more interprovincial transmigrants from Saskatchewan than from 
any other single province, although in the case of Vancouver those 
coming from Alberta, and in the case of Toronto those coming from 
Manitoba, were a very close second. Toronto, Hamilton and 
Windsor among them accounted for more than four hundred of 
these Hungarian transmigrants from Saskatchewan. There can be 
little doubt that, as the Canadian economy continued to gear up for 
war production during the second half of 1941 and thereaf ter, even 
more Hungarian Canadians in general, and more Hungarian 
Saskatchewanians in particular, were attracted to industrial centres 
such as Vancouver, Windsor, Hamilton and Toronto. 
* * * 
1941 brought a turnabout in Canada's economic development. 
Jobs became plentiful in the country's growing war-time industries, 
and men could work to their hearts' content. Historians are 
fortunate to have a detailed and probably quite accurate account of 
the impact of these new economic conditions on Hungarian 
Canadians. During 1942, as part of the federal government's efforts 
to improve relations with Canada's immigrant ethnic community, a 
few individuals were commissioned to report on the state of affairs 
of a small number of Canadian ethnic groups. Probably the best of 
these reports was done on the Hungarians.27 Its author was a certain 
"Dr." Bela Eisner, a leading figure of Montreal's Hungarian 
community. His report depicts not only the economic conditions of 
Hungarians in Canada at the time, but also their state of attitudes. 
Both lent themselves to feverish economic activity on their part. 
Most members of this group were very anxious to make up for the 
missed economic opportunities of the 1930s, and worked as much as 
they could, in order to save as much money as possible. Many of 
them seemed to have been certain that the abundance of jobs was a 
temporary, wartime phenomenon and that, come the end of the 
war, devaluation and depression would follow, and immigrants 
would lose their jobs in the factories. This attitude tended to 
reinforce the immigrants' determination to earn as much as they 
possibly could while the special conditions lasted, and to save or 
invest the money they had earned. In southern Ontario's cities 
especially, Eisner saw unparalleled efforts by Hungarians to make 
the most of the economic upturn. 
In the West, the situation was somewhat different. Gradually, 
better economic conditions were returning to the farms, but with 
wages having gone up, it was not possible to attract agricultural 
workers to the farms. In the cities of the West, job opportunities for 
Hungarians were not as plentiful as they were in Ontario, for 
example. Although Eisner does not discuss the issue of transmigra-
tions, it is evident from his report that conditions were ripe for the 
continued influx of Hungarian Canadians f rom the prairies to the 
manufacturing centres of Canada, and it was undoubtedly taking 
place. Unfortunately, once again we have to say that census statistics 
do not show this wartime migration accurately. As it has been 
mentioned, the 1941 census came too early to indicate this trend, 
and the next census incorporates into its results the impact of six 
post-war years, and the beginning of a new wave of Hungarian 
immigration to Canada. Nevertheless, the 1951 census data are 
interesting, and they document the transformation that the 
Hungarian-Canadian group's urban-rural distribution had under-
gone in the decade after 1941. 
The 1951 census, despite its annoying practice of frequently 
lumping Hungarians together with "other Europeans," still allows 
us to get glimpses of some aspects of the transformation wrought by 
the war in Hungarian-Canadian society. This can be done by looking 
at the statistics regarding the pre-1941 arrivals, i.e. the members of 
the "old" (as opposed to the post-1945) immigration, wherever such 
figures can be found. These figures indicate that during the war, 
another massive shift had taken place in the geographic distribution 
of Hungarian Canadians, on the whole in favour of Ontario. Among 
cities that made substantial gains were Toronto, Hamilton, Vancou-
ver and Calgary. In fact, in 1951 the city with the largest concentra-
tion of pre-1945 Hungarian immigrants was Hamilton. The second 
was Toronto. For this category of Hungarian Canadians, the City of 
Montreal in 1951 stood only third.28 
* * * 
On the eve of the 1950s, Hungarian-Canadian society was on the 
threshold of a transformation even greater than that caused by the 
war years. This was the coming of a new wave of immigrants during 
1948-52, only to be followed by still another, a much larger wave half 
a decade later. The movement of the post-World War II refugees 
began in the 1948-49 fiscal year, when 1,400 Hungarians arrived in 
the country. They were followed by 1,600 in the following year, and 
about 2,000 in 1950-51. In the 1951-52 fiscal year a total of about 
4,500 Hungarians entered Canada. While Canadian officials di-
rected many members of the new immigration to various parts of 
Canada, including the West, by the time of the 1951 census most of 
them were living in Central Canada's cities. Nearly 1,100 of them 
seem to have settled in Toronto alone. Montreal was the second most 
desirable place of settlement for them; 800 of them chose it as their 
home. Hamilton was selected by some 250. In the West, only 
Winnipeg attracted more than 200 of the newcomers.2'' 
The above statistics deal either with the pre-1941 immigrants or 
the post-Second World War arrivals. Despite the deficiencies of the 
1951 census, much interesting information can be gleaned from its 
data on Hungarian-Canadian society as a whole, the Canadian-born 
as well as the "old" and the "new" immigrants, all included. The first 
fact that should be mentioned in connection with this census is that it 
marked the point of no return in the movement of Hungarian 
Canadians to Central Canada and to Canada's cities. In 1951, 53.4 
per cent of Hungarian Canadians, that is, 32,309 out of 60,460, lived 
in Central Canada, predominantly in Ontario.30 The province with 
the second largest Magyar population (12,470) however, continued 
to be Saskatchewan. The urban-rural ratio for the whole group had 
also shifted irreversibly in favour of the cities. The 1951 census 
showed that 33,217 Hungarians, or 54.9 per cent of them, lived in 
Canada's towns and cities.31 
For Hungarian-Canadian society, Quebec remained the most 
urbanized province. There, 95.6 per cent of Hungarian Canadians 
lived in cities, i.e. in Montreal and sister municipalities. For Ontario, 
the figure was 68.4 per cent. Saskatchewan remained the "least 
urbanized" province, with only 17.9 per cent of its Hungarians living 
in urban centres.32 
The three largest Hungarian-Canadian urban colonies in 1951 
were in Hamilton, Montreal and Toronto. They each numbered 
somewhat in excess of 3,000 members, more if we count neighbour-
ing municipalities or suburbs. Other large centres were: Windsor 
(2,044), Welland (1,456), Calgary (1,204), Regina (1,157), Vancou-
ver (1,054), Winnipeg (943), Brantford (900) and Lethbridge 
(832).33 
The census figures also permit us to establish which sections or 
parts of Hungarian-Canadian society were most urbanized and 
which were the least. While only 48.1 per cent of Canadian-born 
Hungarians were urbanized, 61.4 per cent of immigrant Hungar-
ians lived in cities by 1951. For those who had come before 1911, the 
urban-rural ratio was quite low, only 42.3 per cent. For later arrivals, 
the ratios were much higher: for the very numerous 1921-30 group 
for example, it was 61.1 per cent, and for the latest (post-1945) 
newcomers, it was just over 70 per cent.34 The trend was evident: 
every new wave of immigrants from Hungary was more likely to 
settle in cities than the previous one. It is not surprising then, that 
the arrival of still another, even larger, wave of Hungarian immi-
grants during the second half of the 1950s would reinforce the 
demographic trends set in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. 
* * * 
There can be no doubt that one of the most important events in 
the evolution of the Hungarian-Canadian ethnic group was the 
arrival, in the wake of the 1956 events in Hungary, of some 37,000 
refugees. This group represented the largest wave of Hungarians 
ever to come to Canada. Its arrival had an impact on every aspect of 
Hungarian-Canadian evolution, including urban-rural distribu-
tion.3'' The fact is that the coming of the ref ugees reinforced the 
long-standing trend of increasing concentration of Hungarians 
in Canada's industrialized provinces and in particular, in large 
cities. 
The 1961 census confirms this observation. It indicates that 47 per 
cent of the newcomers had settled in Ontario. Quebec became the 
home of nearly 23 per cent, and British Columbia, of 12 per cent. 
Alberta received 9 per cent of the refugees, while Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan and the Atlantic provinces received the remainder.36 
What is even more interesting from our point of view, is that nine 
out of ten refugees had settled in cities. The metropolitan area that 
received the largest group of them was Toronto. Nearly 8,700 
refugees had settled in that city by 1961. Montreal, whose cosmopol-
itan atmosphere must have been a great attraction to many 
Hungarians, became the home of well over 7,000 of the newcomers. 
Vancouver received about 2,200 of them, and Winnipeg 1,740. The 
next most popular cities for the refugees were Calgary and 
Hamilton. A good number of them chose Edmonton and Ottawa as 
places for settlement. The influx of refugees to these and other 
urban centres helped to increase the urban-rural ratio of Hungarian 
Canadians to nearly 75 per cent.3 ' 
With the arrival of the refugees in 1956-57, large-scale immigra-
tion from Hungary came to an end. Hungarians continued to come 
to Canada in small numbers, in part as a result of family unification 
programmes throughout the 1960s and even later. Hungarians 
have continued to leave Hungary — legally or illegally — to our 
days, and many of these more recent emigrants have made their way 
to Canada. Occasionally, Hungarians have come to Canada from 
countries other than Hungary. For example, in the wake of the 
Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, hundreds of Hungarian 
citizens of that country came to Canada as refugees. 
While new immigration had little influence over urban-rural 
distribution after 1960, natural population growth (or the lack of it) 
and internal migrations continued to influence the geographic 
distribution of Hungarian Canadians. Their distribution through-
out Canada kept changing. The changes were recorded by the 
censuses. From 1961 to 1981 three of Canada's provinces (and here 
we ignore Atlantic Canada which was never the home of much more 
than one per cent of the total Hungarian-Canadian population) had 
a declining Hungarian population. T h e province that experienced 
the steepest relative decline was Quebec, whose 12.3 per cent share 
of the total in 1961 had declined to 8.4 by 1981. T h e causes of this 
trend have not been studied in detail. In part, they may have been 
economic; however, Quebec's "quiet revolution" and the rise of 
French-Canadian nationalism might have been a contributing factor 
in the obvious exodus of Hungarians from the province. Almost as 
steep a decline as Quebec's was experienced by Saskatchewan. The 
third province to experience a decline in the size of its Hungarian 
population (from 5,443 in 1961 to 4,160 twenty years later) was 
Manitoba.38 
The provinces that have experienced a relative if not always 
absolute increase in the size of their Hungarian-Canadian popula-
tions were Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia. After 1971 the 
growth recorded by the census is only relative, as in 1981 the census 
for the first time accepted "multiple ancestries" with the result that 
the number of people in Canada who gave Hungarian as their only 
ancestry declined considerably. w In the case of Ontario, and to a 
lesser extent Alberta, this "relative" growth was very gradual, while 
in the case of B.C., it was a little steeper. In 1961 that province was 
home to just about one in ten Hungarian Canadians. By 1981, the 
figure was close to one in seven. Incidentally, by that year, Ontario's 
share of the total Hungarian-Canadian population exceeded 50 per 
cent for the first time, although by a narrow margin only (0.8 per 
cent).40 
Urban ratios (i.e. percentage of the urbanized) also kept chang-
ing, although rather slowly. For the group as a whole, that ratio had 
reached 80.8 per cent by 1971. For 1981, the figure was 82.1 per 
cent. Furthermore, by then, nearly half (49.1 per cent) of Hungar-
ian Canadians were living in centres of over 500,000 inhabitants.41 
Urban ratios for the provinces ranged from 94.5 per cent for 
Quebec, to 50.1 per cent for Saskatchewan. For those living in 
centres of half-a-million or over, it went as high as 89 per cent 
(Quebec).42 
Conclusion 
From being one of the least urbanized groups in Canada at the 
end of the nineteenth century, Hungarian Canadians have become 
one of the most urbanized today. Even in 1921, when for the first 
time half of all Canadians were found living in cities, three-quarters 
of Hungarian Canadians were rural residents. Today, when three 
out of four Canadians live in cities, the figure for Hungarians is 
greater than four out of five. The explanation for this transforma-
tion does not lie entirely in the changes that Canada has undergone 
in the past several decades. Definitely, the evolution of the Canadian 
economy has had an important impact on the movement of 
Hungarians from the farms to the cities. Such developments as the 
increasing mechanization of agriculture, the decline of the West's 
wheat economy, the advent of large-scale manufacturing, and then 
the rise of an economy based largely on service industries, all helped 
to propel Hungarian Canadians from rural to urban settings, or to 
prompt newcomers to head straight for metropolitan centres. Had 
these been the only factors though, Hungarian-Canadian society's 
urbanization would not have proceeded at the pace it did, and 
certainly not at a much greater speed than that of the Canadian 
population at large. 
It has been suggested in this paper that an important factor in the 
rapid urbanization of Hungarians in this country has been the 
coming of newer waves of Hungarian immigrants whose social and 
occupational composition varied, and whose members' propensity 
for rural or urban life differed — in some cases considerably. The 
periods of extensive re-migration of Hungarian immigrants, and of 
rapid growth in Hungarian-Canadian urban colonies coincided 
with, or followed in the wake of, the arrival of a new wave of Magyar 
immigrants. This trend has been confirmed in the census results of 
1931 and 1961. It has also been demonstrated that those who 
flocked to the cities in ever increasing numbers, since the turn of the 
century, were the members of the most recent stream of Hungarian 
immigrants. 
It has been pointed out that the first group to give a massive boost 
to the urbanization of Hungarian Canadians was the immigration 
influx of the 1920s, and that the social composition of this group of 
new arrivals differed to some extent from that of the pre-1914 wave. 
The desire of Canada's immigration officials to exclude non-
agrarian elements notwithstanding, many Hungarians entered the 
country who were not entirely or even primarily "agricultural" 
types. Some of them were declasse middle-class elements, former 
members of Hungary's bureaucracy or nobility, whose jobs or lands 
were lost when Hungary was dismembered. Others were people 
with rural backgrounds who had had a taste of city life acquired, in 
many cases dur ing the war when peasant soldiers took their leaves in 
cities or were stationed in or near them. The overall consequence of 
their coming to Canada was an increased likelihood for their 
eventual settlement in urban areas. 
The argument that the social and occupational makeup of the 
1920s immigration differed f rom its pre-1914 counterpart should 
not be over-stressed. Despite the presence of many hundreds of 
non-agricultural types among these newcomers, the overwhelming 
majority was of peasant stock. Most of these people probably would 
have preferred to settle on Canadian farms, had economic condi-
tions in the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s been favourable to 
such a lifestyle. However, in the case of the post-1945 Hungarian 
newcomers, the argument concerning the differing nature of each 
new immigration stream reinforcing the trend toward urbanization 
becomes stronger. 
According to Canadian immigration records, the majority of the 
postwar Hungarian immigrants (or "displaced persons") were 
agricultural workers or labourers who were expected to find 
employment on Canada's farming, mining, or lumbering frontier. 
But the records are misleading. Many people denied their schooling 
and training if they felt that doing so would improve their chances of 
admission into the country.43 Though it is not possible to make an 
accurate guess, it is probable that a large portion of displaced 
persons were well-educated or highly trained workers or profession-
als unlikely to settle permanently in rural areas. In fact, it is well 
known that such people were disproportionately represented among 
the masses of people who fled from Hungary at the end of the war 
and after. It was these people who had the most to lose as the result 
of a Russian occupation of their country, and they were the most 
likely to flee. Poor peasants and workers, unless they had been 
officers in Hungary's armed forces or police during the war, had 
fewer reasons to leave. 
While the conditions that governed the departure of the displaced 
persons from Hungary had little to do with the exodus of the 
refugees in 1956, research has revealed that the refugees also 
constituted a special element in Hungarian society. The social, 
occupational and even religious composition of this group tended to 
make for the rapid urbanization of its members once they began 
settling in Canada. One of the most remarkable features of the 
refugees as a group was the predominance of young people among 
them. Of the 37,565 Hungarians who entered Canada in 1956-57, 
almost a third were under the age of twenty-four, while only about 
5,000 were over forty-five.44 Thousands of them were university 
students, intent on careers as professionals and on urban life. 
Among the refugees, Jews were disproportionately represented. It 
has been estimated that almost 7,000 Hungarian Jews entered 
Canada after the revolution.4;' Hungary's Jews were highly urban-
ized, and there is every reason to believe that the overwhelming 
majority of those that came to Canada settled in the main centres of 
Jewish-Canadian culture: Montreal and Toronto. But it is the 
occupational composition of the refugees that helps to explain best 
why they headed for and remained in Canada's urban centres. 
According to well-informed sources, professional and intellectual 
elements were over-represented among the refugees. Nearly a 
quarter of refugee men and more than a third of refugee women 
belonged to this category.1() A great many of them were engineers, 
medical doctors and technicians. A large portion of the refugees, 
especially refugee men, were skilled workers: mechanics, metal 
workers, electricians, pipe fitters and so on. Apparently, agricultural 
workers were hardly to be found among the mass exodus from 
Hungary.47 The majority of the refugees came from Hungarian 
cities — in particular, Budapest. In view of these facts, it is not 
surprising that the vast majority of these newcomers settled in 
Canada's metropolitan centres — despite the fact that on arrival they 
tended to be directed elsewhere by immigration officials. 
Once the large, active Hungarian communities were established 
in major Canadian cities, as they were in Montreal and Toronto in 
the 1920s and in Vancouver in the late 1950s, they tended to serve as 
magnets for Hungarians who had settled elsewhere in Canada. 
Thus, the movement to the cities, quite heavy during and immedi-
ately after the arrival of a new wave of Hungarian newcomers to the 
country, continued — albeit somewhat more gradually — even after 
the new arrivals had established themselves in their new Canadian 
environment. 
During the mid- and late 1930s, the Depression thwarted, and in 
some regions even reversed, this trend toward increasing urbaniza-
tion. In the 1960s and the 1970s, however, there were no major 
economic or political developments that would have had similar 
results. The main exception was the Province of Quebec — in 
particular, Montreal — where the political atmosphere of the time 
resulted in an outmigration of Hungarians. Elsewhere in Canada, 
the growth of Hungarian Canadian urban communities continued, 
even in these decades, partly at the expense of rural settlements. As a 
result of these processes, Hungarian Canadians, at one time 
comprising one of the least urbanized groups in the country, have 
become one of the most urbanized. As it has been outlined in this 
paper, the explanation lies only partly in the changing economic and 
social conditions of Canada. Of course, the general trend to an 
increasingly urban life in North America was an important determi-
nant. The fact that by 1921 only half of Canada's population was 
living in the cities, while by the 1980s a little over three-quarters 
were, had a definite impact on Hungarian-Canadian lifestyles as 
well. As it has been mentioned, however, the re-settlement of 
Hungarian Canadians in Canada's cities took place at a much more 
rapid pace than that of the Canadian population as a whole. This 
paper has attempted to show that an important cause of this 
phenomenon has been the post-World War I arrival of three new 
waves of Hungarian immigrants, each with a social and occupational 
composition that dif fered from that of the previous one, and each 
made up of people with social and educational backgrounds that 
varied from those of the previous waves. 
The propensity of Hungarian immigrants for country or city 
living should not be seen as a factor that worked independently from 
or contrary to other economic and social forces that prompted 
newcomers to re-migrate alter their initial settlement in Canada. In 
most cases, the various factors resulting in re-migration undoubtedly 
reinforced each other. This had also been the case over hundred 
years ago when bad economic conditions in the mining and 
iron-producing towns of Pennsylvania, along with a nostalgic 
longing for the agricultural way of life, induced the first Hungarian-
Canadian pioneers to abandon their urban lifestyle and return to 
that of their peasant forefathers.18 During the century that followed, 
the Hungarian immigrants' preference for city life combined with 
economic and other forces and resulted in a population flow in the 
opposite direction: from the countryside to the cities. It remains to 
be seen whether the second century of Hungarian-Canadian 
evolution, in an age that promises to bring ever more rapid 
technological and societal change, will reinforce the trends of the 
first, or reverse them. 
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Some Demographic Comparisons 
between the Present Canadian and 
Hungarian Populations 
Adele Csima 
Canadians of Hungarian origin may have several reasons to be 
interested in a demographic comparison, especially of health and 
mortality statistics, between their old country and their new one. 
Many of us still have close ties with the homeland, having relatives 
and friends in Hungary whose well-being is of concern to us. We are 
also interested in how immigration has improved our living condi-
tions. Canada can serve as a golden standard, since her mortality 
rate is among the lowest in the world, and her standards of health 
care, socio-environmental conditions and nutrition among the best. 
Recent studies have shown how immigrants adapt to their new 
country. The longer the immigrants are in the land, the more they 
become part of the general population statistics. We may conclude 
that environmental factors are more strongly tied to disease 
development than are genetic factors. 
Population Size and Density 
Canada is the second largest country (in area) in the world; 
Hungary ranks 105th among 215. In terms of population, the gap is 
not nearly as wide — Canada with 25 million is 31st and Hungary 
with 11 million is 57th. 
Canada's population density is among the world's lowest, with 2.6 
inhabitants/square kilometre. Of its 10 million square kilometre 
total area, 7 per cent is covered with lakes, and only one-third of the 
remaining land is developed. In contrast, Hungary's area is less than 
one hundredth that of Canada, but her population density is 
115/square kilometre. This is more than five times that of Canada's 
most densely populated province, Prince Edward Island, and 11 
times that of Ontario. 
In spite of Canada's low population density, more Canadians than 
Hungarians live in cities of more than 100,000 population. Canada 
has 25 such cities, containing 52 per cent of her population, while 
Hungary has only 9 similar cities, representing 31 per cent of the 
total population. 
Hungarians in Canada, defined as those reporting Hungarian as 
their mother tongue, comprise only one-third of one per cent of 
Canada's population. Of these 83,700 people, only 64,700 were 
actually born in Hungary. They favour urban living, with 59 per 
cent being inhabitants of cities of greater than 100,000 population. 
Population Growth 
A fundamental fact about population is its rate of growth, 
affecting almost every aspect of national life. In recent years 
Canada's population increased annually by 8 per 1,000 population. 
The world average is 18. It has been predicted that Canada's annual 
level of growth will increase to anywhere from 11 to 28 per 1,000 
and thus, by the year 2000, Canada's population will be 30 per cent 
higher than now, about 31.6 million.1 
Hungary is one of a handful of nations with a negative growth 
rate. In Europe, only West Germany and Denmark share this 
characteristic. Hungary's population decrease was 2 per 1,000 
population in 1984. In the last five years the population decreased 
by about 50,000, and it is projected that the net loss will continue at 
the same rate, which means that by the year 2000, Hungary will have 
lost 150,000 citizens.2 
Population change is influenced by birth, death and net migration 
(difference between immigration and emigration). Later we will 
examine all these factors separately. 
Age and Sex Structure of the Two Populations 
Examining a graph of the population "pyramid" offers us insight 
into the present age and sex composition of a population, as well as 
some important historical and current changes and trends. Figure 1 
shows a Canadian and a Hungarian pyramid. (See the "editors' 
note" at the end of this paper) The vertical axis measures age by 
years, with young people at the bottom and the elderly at the 
top. For each age group, a bar is drawn proportionately to represent 
the percentage contribution of that age and sex group to the 
total population. On both pyramids we see that the right side 
(females) is larger than the left (males), indicating that there are 
more females than males in the total population. Males represent 
49.6 per cent of Canada's population, but only 48.4 per cent of 
Hungary's. This phenomenon is found in most developed coun-
tries, and it is mainly due to men dying at an earlier age than women. 
Worldwide, for every 1,000 girls, 1,050 boys are born. Although 
three male infants die for every two female, the excess of boys 
continues into the teens. Alcohol-related accidents are the main 
cause of death among adults in their early twenties, but since they 
are much more frequent among males, the ratio of males to f emales 
declines even further, until by age 40 there are 991 men for every 
1,000 women in Canada — and only 910 in Hungary. The sex ratio 
steadily decreases at higher ages, as heart attack, as the primary 
cause of death in the over 60 age group, also occurs more frequently 
among males. Now there are about 680 males per 1,000 females in 
both countries. Health professionals believe that this disparity will 
disappear in thirty or forty years because of the changing lifestyle of 
women. With more of them smoking and working in high-pressure 
executive and business positions, they are also being subjected to 
more health risks. 
Neither is there much difference between the two population 
pyramids in the old-to-young ratio. One new problem common to all 
developed countries is the aging of their populations. With birth-
rates decreasing and lifespans increasing, the "grey revolution" 
becomes alarming. Twenty years ago, 11 per cent of the population 
of Canada was over 60; now it is 15 per cent. Hungary is worse off in 
this respect, with corresponding figures of 14 per cent and 18 per 
cent. The problem of an aging population is that more and more 
people will have to be supported by a smaller and smaller tax-base, 
and health services will be severely strained. 
The most dramatic difference between the two pyramids is one of 
contour. T h e Canadian curve is relatively smoother, showing the 
effect of the postwar baby boom, with a bulge at the 33-36-year-old 
level in 1981 (i.e., born in 1945-48). Some decline in fecundity seems 
to have started in 1964-65. 
The erratic contour of the Hungarian pyramid allows for a wide 
range of speculation as to the reasons for each bulge and dip. The 
large gap at ages 65-68 reflects the loss of life during the Second 
World War in the 21-25-year age group. The losses are about equal 
for both sexes. Canadian war losses were not substantial enough to 
show up on the pyramid. The 1945 baby boom is noticeable to a 
degree among the 39-year-olds on the Hungarian graph, but a 
much larger boom seems to have occurred in 1953-56. This may be 
due to changes in abortion laws and government policies in 
promoting fertility; it could also partly be due to the political 
changes in and after 1953. After the 1956 revolution, the decline can 
be partially explained by the emigration of a large number of 
women of child-bearing age. 
The next increase in births, in 1975, may have been due to the 
introduction of the "gyes" (maternity assistance) programs, which 
allowed the mother to stay at home with the baby for three years with 
75 per cent of her salary. This program is still in effect, but the initial 
enthusiasm for it has worn off. A recent survey indicated that 
financial difficulties and a lack of housing are the major reasons for 
the overall decline in the birth-rate since 1975/ 
Marital Status 
The marital status of each age group is also indicated. Canada has 
more single people over 15, 31 per cent (men) and 25 per cent 
(women), than Hungary with 23 and 14 per cent respectively. The 
percentages for the over 40 age group are more similar, 8 and 7 
versus 5 and 4. On the other hand, Hungary has twice as many 
divorced people per population as Canada, and somewhat more 
widows and widowers. In both countries there are about five times as 
many widows as widowers. The average age difference in couples is 
2.2 years in Canada and 3.1 years in Hungary. People also marry 
later in Hungary, at 27.7 and 24.6 years of age for males and females 
respectively, while in Canada, males were married at an average age 
of 25.7 and females at 23.5 in 1981. Five years previous, both of the 
averages were two years lower in Canada,1 but in Hungary they have 
been constant for at least ten years.3 
The marriage rate has declined slightly in both countries, while 
divorces are rapidly increasing. The divorce rate in Canada has 
doubled in the last ten years and we have now reached the stage 
whereby every third marriage is expected to end in divorce.'1 In 
Hungary this rate is even higher; 39 per cent of marriages end in 
divorce. There the increase has been slower; it was already 24 per 
cent in 1970, but still it has doubled since 1960. There has been no 
change in the duration of marriage. The median is around 10 years 
in Canada and 8.5 years in Hungary.7 
Birth Rate 
The decreasing rate of birth is a widespread phenomenon in 
developed nations, but in most countries the decrease is not as 
pronounced as that observed in Hungary in the last few years. Figure 
2 shows the difference between Canada and Hungary in live births 
per 1,000 population from 1960 on. 
Another measure of fertility is the number of children a woman is 
likely to bear in her lifetime, expectations being based on present 
fertility rates within the different age groups. Canadian and 
Hungarian women are predicted to raise an equal number of 1.7 
children. T o maintain either population, 2.2 children are needed 
per woman, and each child must survive to adulthood. In Canada 
immigration as well contributes to population, and this explains the 
positive growth, while Hungary is actually losing people. 
Decreasing fecundity also manifests itself in the largeness of the 
family. In Canada the average size has decreased from 3.1 to 2.9 in 
the last five years, and in Hungary f rom 2.8 to 2.7 in the same 
period. It might be noted here that Hungarians are the least prolific 
ethnic group in Canada. 
The improvement of birth control in technological societies is 
largely responsible for the general decrease in birth-rates. In spite of 
this, abortion laws still have an effect on overall fecundity. In 
Canada, where only therapeutic abortions are permitted, 17.8 
abortions occur for every 100 live births. This statistic has not 
changed in the last five years.8 In Hungary it is relatively easy to get 
an abortion for any of several reasons, which has led to an average 
for all age groups of 62 abortions per 100 live births. However, 40 to 
49-year-old women undergo 741 abortions for every 100 live births. 
The average rate for all age groups was twice as large in the 1960s 
and 1970s, but since 1975 it has been fluctuating between 50 and 60. 
The following are the most common reasons for abortions:'' 
In the last decade, the Canadian population had a net annual 
Woman not married 
Too many live children already 
Woman over 35 
Illness 
No place to live 








increase of about 100,000 through immigration, though there has 
been a decline in both immigration and emigration since 1974. In 
1981 some 129,000 people entered the country and 42,000 left. 
Figure 4 shows the country of origin of the immigrants in 1981. 
Emigration was mainly to the United States and Great Britain.10 
Between 1956 and 1958, close to 40,000 Hungarians made 
Canada their home. In more recent years, about 500 Hungarians 
have received resident status each year. Fifty per cent of Hungarian 
immigrants have chosen Ontario as their place of residence, but 
compared to the population of the province, Saskatchewan has the 
highest percentage of Hungarians (1.1 per cent). Next is the Yukon 
Territory (0.83 per cent), and Ontario is third (0.69 per cent). 
Newfoundland is the least favoured province, by far.11 
Hungarian demographic documents do not contain information 
about migration out of the country, probably because of the very 
small number of occurrences. Statistics on people coming to live in 
Hungary do not exist either. It is safe to assume that there is some 
immigration to Hungary as well, from neighbouring countries and 
through the return of former citizens. 
Mortality Rates 
A major factor in population dynamics is longevity. A Canadian 
male born in 1981 is expected to live 71.9 years; a female, 79.0 years. 
Hungarians are not quite so fortunate. Their males can look 
forward to 65.6 years and the females to 73.5 years. Canada has one 
of the highest life expectancy rates in the world; the highest is to be 
found in Japan, with 73.4 and 79.1 years respectively.12 
The infant mortality rate has a considerable influence upon the 
calculation of life expectancy, first, because it is relatively high 
compared to other mortality rates among the young, and second, 
because it causes the greatest loss in total life years. Differences in 
health standards among countries are often (incorrectly) linked to 
infant mortality alone. In this century, this rate has declined 
everywhere. In Canada it has fallen from 102 per 1,000 live births to 
9 per 1,000 today. The main reasons are improved nutrition, health 
care and living conditions, and fewer children born to older 
mothers. In Hungary in the same period, the rate went down from 
193 to 19, but it is still more than twice that of Canada. Prematurity 
and low birth weight, risk factors for infant mortality, are said to be 
on the rise in Hungary, possibly as a result of the frequent abortions. 
Mortality rates in all other age groups also declined over the last 
decade in Canada, with a steady decrease throughout the older age 
groups. Figure 5 shows the changes in male mortality rates by age 
during this period, for Canada and for Hungary. Only the male 
curves are presented because, while the female curves show very 
similar patterns, the changes are much smaller. As the graph 
indicates, Hungary's mortality rate is on the increase, especially for 
middle-aged males. The country shares this characteristic with very 
few other nations. The largest increase occurred in the 55-59 age 
group, from 14.8 to 22.7 male deaths per 1,000 population, a 53 per 
cent increase.13 
Moreover, in comparing the present mortality rates for the two 
countries, we see that Canada has a lower rate than Hungary in 
every age group, for both sexes (see Figure 6). The largest 
differences in percentage may be seen when we compare middle-
aged males (35-49) in both countries. At ages 40-44, the Hungarian 
death rate of 7 per 1,000 males is 2.5 times higher than the Canadian 
rate of 2.8.14 
Causes of Death 
The leading causes of death are similar in their order of 
importance in the two countries, but not in degree. We see from 
Figure 7 that cardiovascular diseases are responsible, to roughly the 
same extent in both countries, for the largest proportion of deaths. 
Cerebrovascular deaths (strokes) are much more common in 
Hungary than in Canada, and more common with females than with 
males in both countries. All cancers, and those of lungs and breasts 
in particular, are more preponderant in Canada. Accidents claim 
slightly more Canadian males than they do females, but more 
women than men in Hungary, while liver complications, probably 
alcohol-induced in most cases, are more common in Hungary for 
both sexes. In fact, deaths due to liver disease are 3.7 times more 
frequent for Hungarian males than for their Canadian counter-
parts, and 3.4 times for Hungarian females.1 ' 
Figures for specific age and sex groups differ markedly from 
figures for the general population. Pronounced discrepancies can 
be found between the two countries, as for instance among 
10-24-year-old males, for whom accidents are responsible for 65 per 
cent of the deaths in Canada, though only 44 per cent in Hungary. 
On the other hand, cardiovascular disease in Hungary takes a much 
larger toll among 25-44-year-old males than it does in Canada, with 
22 and 17 per cent respectively. 
Suicide and homicide are also bigger problems in Hungary than 
in Canada. The following table offers a comparison: 
Suicide (and Homicide) Rates per 10,000 Population 
Country Males Females 
Canada 2.1(0.29) 0.7(0.17) 
Hungary 6.7(0.40) 2.6(0.21) 
When we break down these figures by age groups, we find that in 
Canada, the rates are almost the same across the board except for a 
slight increase with age; however, there is a wide range in the 
Hungarian rates, rising in the higher age groups from 1.7 to 25.0 
per thousand of population among males. At age 15-19, the rate is 
actually smaller than in Canada, but after age 65, it is six times 
larger. 
Males are murdered more often than females in both countries, 
but the discrepancy between the sexes is slight. 
Changes in Cause-Specific Mortality Rates in the Last Decade 
The 20 per cent increase in the Hungarian mortality rate during 
the last decade is evident in almost every cause-specific death rate 
other than that regarding infectious diseases. The largest absolute 
increase was observed in strokes and heart disease, but the highest 
percentage increase was registered by liver diseases, which went up by 
a staggering 204 per cent, according to the following table:16 
Cause of death Per cent 
increase 
Liver diseases 204 
Respiratory diseases (bronchitis, asthma, emphysema) 136 
Lung cancer 60 
Suicide 32 
Stroke 31 
Cancer (all sites other than lung) 16 
Heart diseases 15 
The Canadian mortality rate decreased across the board by 4 per 
cent between 1971 and 1981. But there are some causes of death for 
which the rate is rising. The most striking of these is lung cancer in 
females, which rose by 140 per cent. It is obviously tied to the 
increase in smoking among women. Lung cancer deaths increased 
in men also, by 40 per cent. Other rises in death rates are also 
connected with lifestyle. Liver disease deaths went up 28 per cent for 
males and 18 per cent for females, and suicide 23 per cent and 6 per 
cent, respectively. All cancer other than that of the lungs increased 
by 7 per cent for both sexes. These hikes are smaller than in 
Hungary, but in view of the improvements in other rates they are 
reasons for concern. Health prof essionals have realized that empha-
sis has to be shifted from curative practices to prevention through 
programs encouraging a healthier lifestyle. 
Lifestyle Factors 
The health of an individual is largely dependent on his lifestyle. 
Some aspects are completely controlled by the person, such as 
smoking, alcohol consumption and physical activity. Reports linking 
cigarette smoking to lung cancer began to appear as early as the 
1920s. Since that time, there has been considerable accumulated 
evidence associating smoking not only with many forms of cancer, 
but also with cardiovascular diseases, bronchitis and perinatal 
mortality when the mother smokes. 
In spite of this, average tobacco consumption among persons 15 
or over increased steadily in Canada in the last 25 to 30 years. 
Although the number of male smokers has declined since 1970, the 
number of female smokers has stayed the same in most age groups, 
and in the 15-19 group it even increased. At present about 44 per cent 
of males and 36 per cent of females smoke in Canada. The highest 
percentage of smokers is in the 20-25 age group, with 52 per cent for 
males and 49 per cent for females. The sex difference in smoking 
behaviour is somewhat less marked in the younger than in the older 
generations and is almost non-existent in the 15-19 age group.17 
Smoking is slightly more popular among Hungarian males than 
among males in Canada, but surprisingly, Hungarian females 
smoke considerably less than their Canadian counterparts. In 
Hungary, 47 per cent of males aged 15 and over smoke. The rate is 
highest (60 per cent) for the 30-35-year-olds. Afterwards there is a 
gradual decline to 23 per cent at age 85 and older. The overall 
smoking rate for females is 21 per cent; at its highest it is 40 per cent 
in the 25-30 age group, but it declines sharply after that to 4 per cent 
for those 60 and over.18 Compare this to 16 per cent for the same age 
group among Canadian women. 
Moderate consumption of alcohol should not pose a health 
hazard, but beyond a certain level, which varies with the individual, 
it becomes harmful. Besides a largely increased risk of accidents, 
alcohol dependence may lead to cirrhosis of the liver, some forms of 
cancer and mental diseases. Alcohol consumption has been steadily 
increasing in most civilized countries since 1970. In Canada it has 
increased by 34 per cent in the last decade. About 80 per cent of the 
adult population drink occasionally, and two-thirds consume an 
alcoholic beverage at least once a week. Only 5 per cent are former 
drinkers. There are more male drinkers in every age group than 
females, and the biggest difference occurs among those who have 
more than two drinks per day. Twenty per cent of all males and 5 per 
cent of females belong in this category.19 
According to the Hungarian report, only two-thirds of the males 
and slightly more than a quarter of the females consume alcohol 
occasionally or regularly, that is, at least one drink per week. These 
numbers are even lower than the Canadian figures of 70 per cent 
and 50 per cent respectively. The discrepancy may indeed be due 
mainly to the reporting system. The Canadian survey reported the 
frequency and quantity of alcohol consumption, but the Hungarian 
survey simply asked people if they drank regularly, occasionally, or 
not at all, leaving it up to them to decide what occasional meant.2" It 
is noteworthy that even among the 15-19 age group in Canada, for 
whom it is unlawful to drink, 75 per cent said they were at least 
occasional drinkers. 
While smoking and drinking are hazardous, physical activity 
carries with it many benefits such as lower heart-rate, blood pressure 
and level of stress and tension. On a five-point scale, 26 per cent of 
Canadian males and 18 per cent of females belong to the very active, 
and 20 per cent of both sexes to the moderately actively, groups.21 
The Hungarian data were collected on a sport-participation basis. 
Competitive, organized sporting activity was reported by 4 per cent 
and 2 per cent of the male and female groups respectively, and 
leisure-time sport participation by 15 and 11 per cent. It would not 
be fair to compare very active Canadians with Hungarian sport 
participants because of possible differences in what is meant by 
"sport" for members of both nations. 
The lifestyle characteristics described above do not explain the 
distinctions between health levels as measured by life expectancy 
and mortality rates in either country. To understand the reasons for 
these variations, other lifestyle factors such as eating and sleeping 
habits, leisure-time activities and drug use should be looked at and 
other determinants of health status examined, i.e., environmental 
factors and respective health-care systems. Biological disparities 
between the individuals of the two populations cannot be important 
factors since differences in health levels are only present in certain 
age categories. 
Notes 
1. Population Projections for Canada and the Provinces, 1972-2001 (Statistics Canada: 
Catalogue 91-514), p. 61. 
2. Az 1984. evi mikrocenzus adatai [Data of the Microcensus of the Year 1984] 
(Budapest: Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal, 1984), p. 5. 
3. Unpublished survey results. Survey conducted by the author. 
4. "Tables of the 1971 and 1981 Census Data." Printed by special request, by 
Statistics Canada Microfilm Records. Requests can be made to Statistics Canada 
Offices, 25 St. Clair Avenue East, Toronto. 
5. Demogrdfiai evkdnyv 1983 [Demographic Yearbook 1983] (Budapest: Kozponti 
Statisztikai Hivatal, 1983), pp. 48, 49. 
6. The Canada Yearbook 1985 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada), p. 46. 
7. Demogrdfiai evkdnyv, p. 82. 
8. Canada Yearbook, p. 107. 
9. Az 1984. evi mikrocenzus adatai, p. 163. 
10. Canada Yearbook, p. 47. 
11. "Tables...Census Data." 
12. 1986 Britannica Book of the Year (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1986). 
13. Demogrdfiai evkdnyv, pp. 171-72. 
14. Ibid., p. 173, and "Tables...Census Data." 
15. Ibid., pp. 196-97. 
16. Ibid. 
17. J. Ableson, P. Paddon, and C. Strohmenger, Perspectives on Health (Ottawa: 
Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, 1983), Catalogue 82-540 E, pp. 30-32. 
18. Az 1984. evi mikrocenzus adatai, p. 120. 
19. Abelson, et ai, Perspectives, p. 26. 
20. Az 1984. evi mikrocenzus adatai, p. 120. 
21. Ableson, et al., Perspectives, p. 34. 
Author's note: T h e quoted figures cannot be found in the sources referred to, but 
have been arrived at through calculations using the basic data contained in the 
statistical tables provided in the sources. 
Editors' note: Some of the charts and graphs illustrating this paper could not be 
printed for financial reasons. They are available (in photo-duplicated form) on 
request from our journal's editorial office. 
Tanchaz: Improvisatory Folk-Dancing 
and String Playing in Toronto's 
Hungarian Community 
Stephen Satory 
"Music is historically constructed, socially maintained and individ-
ually adapted;" this paradigm has been proposed by Tim Rice, as a 
paraphrase of Clifford Geertz.1 I will adapt the above model for use 
in this paper in discussing the dynamics of folk music and also of 
folk-dancing in the Hungarian community of Toronto where I 
conducted field research from November 1984 to March 1985. 
Rather than dealing with Hungarian folk music generally, this 
paper will focus on its most recent importation to Toronto, the 
so-called tanchaz (dance-house) tradition of improvised dancing and 
Gypsy-style string band music. 
Toronto's Hungarian traditions were historically constructed in 
three periods of immigration. T he first period was the 1920s and 
1930s; the second, the years directly after the Second World War; 
and the third, following the Revolution of 1956.2 It is the immigrants 
of the last wave, the wave of 1956-57, who were largely responsible 
for the founding of several cultural and musical organizations in 
Toronto.3 
I he Hungarian Canadian Cultural Centre was founded in 1974 
and has been the home of several organizations. The Kodaly Dance 
Ensemble, founded in 1963, rehearses there every week and has a 
combined membership of fifty to sixty dancers in the junior and 
senior groups. The senior group has ten to twelve couples, dancers 
ranging from fifteen to forty years of age. The Kodaly Chorus, the 
Ensemble's immediate progenitor, was founded in 1960. Nowadays 
it rehearses at the Cultural Centre as well, and has a membership of 
forty-five singers, largely first-generation immigrants in their for-
ties, fifties and sixties. Further, a citera (zither) orchestra called the 
Szivarvany Egyiittes (Rainbow Ensemble) was begun in 1982 by Istvan 
Erdelyi. It has a membership of fifteen to twenty children, between 
the ages of ten and sixteen. 
In addition, there are two string bands which rehearse in various 
members' basement recreation rooms. One group, Eletfa (Tree of 
Life) was initiated in 1982-83 as the "house band" of the Kodaly 
Dance Ensemble and has three, sometimes four, players: a primas, or 
lead violin; one or two bracsa or viola players; and a bogo or string 
bass player. Another string band, which has operated indepen-
dently for nine years is Feketefold (Black Earth). Unlike Eletfa, 
Feketefold has two lead violins or primas-es. Primas Arpad Verseghy — 
the founder of the group — can play all of the instruments, in the 
tradition of the Transylvanian village bands.4 
It was in 1971-72 that the tanchaz movement was initiated in 
Hungary by the urban musicians, Bela Halmos and Ferenc Sebo. 
They had made extended folk music collecting trips to Hungarian 
villages in Transylvania, which had been under Romanian adminis-
tration since the Treaty of Trianon in 1920. Halmos and Sebo 
managed to smuggle their field recordings across the border from 
Romania to Hungary. Almost at once, this Transylvanian village 
tradition of dance and music became an extremely popular means of 
entertainment and socializing in the newly founded tanchaz clubs of 
Budapest. 
In Toronto, tanchaz dancing was first introduced in 1975-76 at 
rehearsals of the Kodaly Ensemble by its present leader, Kalman 
Dreisziger. The first Transylvanian string band was the Mezosegi 
Banda, the forerunner of Feketefold, which made its first public 
appearance in 1976.° 
The tanchaz tradition has been transmitted to Toronto in the 
following ways: firstly, musicians and dancers like Kalman Dreis-
ziger have visited Hungary, often to attend workshops and seminars 
in string playing and dancing.6 Moreover, they have brought back to 
Toronto cassette tapes of field recordings as well as many folk 
instruments and costumes. Secondly, Hungarian teachers of string 
playing and folk-dancing have visited Toronto to give tanchaz 
courses and seminars.7 Thirdly, young Hungarians like Verseghy 
have encountered Hungarian and Transylvanian village music by 
obtaining recordings in libraries and in record shops.8 Fourthly, 
members of Toronto's string bands have brought from Hungary 
and consistently used at rehearsals the transcriptions of dance tunes 
made by Halmos; these transcriptions contain skeletal melodies, 
conventional chord symbols and some song texts which are sung 
occasionally by the dancers. And lastly, folk musicians have used the 
well-known, fully detailed phonetic transcriptions of two Transylva-
nian village repertoires, which were published in Budapest in 1954 
and 1955 by the ethnomusicologist, Laszlo Lajtha.9 
Knowledge of Hungarian culture can be obtained in the new 
urban environment of Toronto through various other Hungarian 
organizations and institutions like the Hungarian scouting move-
ment, various youth clubs and the Saturday Hungarian school held 
at the Cultural Centre. It is available at non-Hungarian institutions 
as well, for example in public libraries and in high school and 
university courses. 
Before a discussion of the social maintenance of tanchaz dancing 
and music, it is necessary to define the improvisatory nature of 
tanchaz. Arpad Verseghy has related that the Transylvanian primas -
who was invariably a Gypsy — originally played solo at village dance 
occasions; the bracsa and bogo were added only in the late nineteenth 
century.10 Given the framework of a village's specific style of musical 
ornamentation and the structure of the tunes, the primas was at 
liberty to improvise. To a limited extent, the bracsa and bogo players 
could also add notes and change rhythms in improvisatory f ashion. 
But it was invariably the primas who started the tunes, and the others 
followed suit only after they recognized the tune in question.11 
Indeed, it is the improvisatory possibilities available to the 
Transylvanian village dancer that gave the dances of Transylvania 
their strongest definition. This was attested by the dance historian, 
choreographer, Gyorgy Martin, when he wrote: "The stylistic 
essence of the general dance performance practice of the Carpath-
ian Basin is an unusually large amount of individual improvisa-
tion." 12 The Carpathian Basin includes Hungary as well as Translyv-
ania. In Hungary improvisatory dancing has long been on the 
decline, whereas in Transylvania's isolated Hungarian community, 
it has survived to the present day. 
In an attempt to define the nature of tanchaz dancing, George 
Tomossy described a dancer's task as follows: "You're given a motif 
which fits a certain rhythm in the dance. You have to become 
accustomed to spotting a certain rhythm and a sequence of rhythms 
and applying certain combinations of steps and that can only be 
done through practice and listening to the music."13 In fact, the 
freedom of the tanchaz dancer's improvisation is limited by three 
factors: specific musical rhythms and melodies that give rise to 
related, similarly specific, dance steps; the choice of steps which is 
limited by the style boundaries of the locality f rom which the dance 
and the musical dialect springs; and a certain limitation on style that 
is imposed by the community of dancers and musicians in Toronto 
and Budapest inasmuch as it was in the original Transylvanian 
villages. As Linda Degh wrote: "The creative freedom of the 
performer is limited by the traditional material and its controlling 
guardian, the community."14 
The means by which tanchaz music and dance are socially 
maintained are highlighted by comparing the three venues in which 
tanchaz music and dance are preserved. In the Hungarian villages of 
Transylvania, tanchaz activity took the form of Friday evening 
get-togethers in community halls, in barns, in villagers' living rooms. 
There the dancing, accompanied by Gypsy string music, functioned 
as entertainment for villagers young and old, providing dancers 
with occasions for impromptu socializing and furnishing gainful 
employment for the members of the Gypsy string bands.1:1 
In Hungary a strong tradition of choreographed dancing has 
been maintained, with government support, since the 1950s. 
Beginning in 1971, however, tanchaz clubs were founded in Buda-
pest and other Hungarian cities to teach young people to improvise, 
using village dance dialects.U) Moreover, recreational tanchaz-es 
transplanted village music and dancing onto city soil with success, 
thereby affording city dwellers, especially young people, opportuni-
ties for recreation and socializing in the improvisatory spirit of the 
villages. Today in Budapest, tanchaz sessions continue to be offered 
every day of the week. 
Consistently with the pervasive world of rock and roll, several 
current Hungarian tanchaz bands like Muzsikas have introduced 
"Western" influences into their recordings. Thus, blues numbers — 
with harmonica and electric bass — alternate with village dance 
pieces. Furthermore, a number of tanchaz clubs have recently 
incorporated South Slavic dance-house styles (which are reportedly 
easier to perform than Transylvanian dialects) and Gypsy dances.1 ' 
The reasons for the consistent popularity of the tanchaz move-
ment in Hungary are twofold: first, Hungarians need to make a 
palpable connection with the isolated Hungarian community of 
Transylvania — with the recent gradual easing of political tensions 
in Hungary, there has been growing concern in Hungary, and 
Canada as well, for the well-being of the oppressed Transylvanian 
Hungarians and a renewed interest in Transylvanian village life.18 
Second, in the continuing urban youth scene of Budapest, the 
tanchaz clubs are the direct descendants of the ballroom dance 
schools of the 1920s and 1930s and of the rock and blues clubs of the 
1970s. Thus, the young people of Budapest and of other Hungarian 
cities have frequented dance clubs for several generations. 
In Toronto it is the choreographed dancing that has been very 
successful.19 However, most dancers and the community at large 
however, have shown little interest in the tanchaz movement as a 
whole.20 Why has the movement not been more popular in Toronto? 
The reason lies in the discrepancy between tanchaz and the values 
espoused by the local Hungarian community which are, in the words 
of informant Gabor Vaski, "goal orientation and hard work."21 
Goal orientation is indeed not present in tanchaz, beyond the 
learning of dance dialects for their own sake. Tanchaz is improvisa-
tional, experimental, with no performing occasion in mind. Con-
versely, choreographed dancing does provide young dancers with 
the goal of gaining the approval of their parents and the community. 
Most of Toronto's Hungarian folk-dancers see tanchaz dancing not 
as hard work, but as an "unstructured activity." In it there is no 
regimentation, no obligation to participate, no commitment to stay. 
It has been described as a "free-for-all," with lots of smoking, 
drinking and telling of jokes — in short, a party atmosphere. All of 
these features clearly oppose the ethic of hard work that the 
immigrant Hungarian community is committed to foster. 
Moreover, in being an art tied to the dialects of specific villages, 
tanchaz lacks the generalized Hungarian-ness of many choreo-
graphed dances, like the csardas and the verbunkos. Consequently, it 
also lacks the approbation that choreographed dance performances 
receive at patriotic ceremonies, like the commemorations of the 
Revolutions of 1848 and 1956. And lastly, choreographed dancing is 
preferred to tanchaz because of the community's interest in promul-
gating a concert tradition: most Hungarians do not participate in 
folk-dancing and are certainly not interested in learning difficult 
tanchaz dance dialects from remote I ransylvanian villages, but 
they are a willing and supportive audience for "presentational" 
dancing.22 
So, the tanchaz tradition with its recreational and improvisational 
nature has not "caught on" in Toronto on a community-wide basis. 
It can, however, be said to serve the needs of at least a small number 
of individuals, who come to it with a variety of unique backgrounds, 
unique even if they are united by their membership in the 
Canadian-Hungarian community. Several of these dedicated indi-
viduals continue to feel responsible for transmitting tanchaz to the 
Hungarian community.23 
Tanchaz has been adapted and expressed by individuals in a 
variety of ways. It has served as a means of retaining and reinforcing 
ethnic identity for twenty-two-year-old Gabor Vaski. A full-time 
student of classical music and jazz, Vaski expresses his Hungarian-
ness through dancing in the Kodaly Dance Ensemble, by playing 
bogo in the Eletfa band and by studying Hungarian language and 
literature at the University of Toronto. He has visited Hungary 
twice, in 1975 and in 1980. He said in an interview that, "being 
Hungarian is extremely important to me, second only to my 
ambition to be a successful musician."24 
Kalman Dreisziger, forty years of age, works in an advertising 
agency. He joined the Kodaly Dance Ensemble in 1964 and became 
its leader in the late 1970s. He has returned to Hungary on several 
visits, but it was during his visit to Transylvania in 1975 that he 
attended a tanchaz in the living room of a farmhouse. For him, 
tanchaz has served as a vehicle for nostalgia, the wish to re-
experience the village life of a bygone era. He wrote in a recent 
article: "There is a need for Canadian dancers to make a link with 
Transylvanian dance culture, so that if they should go to Transylva-
nia, they would fit right in ... they could enter into the ancient 
community and dance and make music with its members."25 
Folk-dancing and playing in string bands has created strong 
friendships for many members and an opportunity for teamwork. 
Fifteen-year-old George Tomossy, in his third season as a dancer in 
the Kodaly Ensemble, said in an interview: "The fact that I'm with 
other people and the fact that we're making an effort to achieve 
something gives me a good feeling." He also valued the opportunity 
that dancing affords to keep in trim, "working up a sweat every 
Tuesday night."26 
Violinist and primas Maria Kovacs (pseudonym), twenty-six years 
old, began studying violin at the age of seven and played in the 
Toronto Symphony Youth Orchestra for three years. She first 
encountered tanchaz music in 1982 in a seminar given by the visiting 
Bela Halmos in Toronto. She was so taken then with tanchaz music 
that to focus on it, she gave up her classical music activity 
altogether.27 
For thirty-four-year-old violinist and primas Arpad Verseghy, 
tanchaz is an all-consuming hobby. A professional music teacher, he 
has a large collection of Field and studio recordings and makes his 
own folk instruments, the most recent of which is an authentic 
cimbalom.2* 
Tanchaz dancing affords individual dancers the enjoyment of 
their own virtuosity. T h e difficulty of the steps and the concentra-
tion needed to match the appropriate steps to musical cues provide a 
physical, intellectual and artistic challenge. 
In conclusion, tanchaz has provided a focus of interest for young 
and energetic individual folk artists in the Toronto Hungarian 
community. These individuals have hoped to replicate the resound-
ing success of the tanchaz movement in Hungary. However, most 
dancers and the community as a whole have resisted the advance of 
this unique, improvisational art, preferring to stay with the pre-
rehearsed, choreographed performances. The Hungarian commu-
nity's preference for choreographed, presentational dancing can 
thus be understood in terms of its need to have a finished product, a 
demonstration of achievement at hand. In Hungary tanchaz has 
been steadily maintained alongside choreographed dancing, but in 
Toronto, most community support has gone to choreographed 
dancing. Despite the fact that the tanchaz tradition does not involve 
the whole of the community, it does remain a very rich source of 
culture for certain dedicated individuals. 
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The Rehabilitation of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire: British Postwar 
Planning in the Second World War 
Robert H. Keyserlingk 
In the interwar years, academics tended to consider the Austro-
Hungarian Empire a "failure" and focussed their attention on the 
nationalities of eastern Europe. Then after 1945, a revolution 
occurred and there arose a truly remarkable proliferation of 
specialized studies on the Habsburg lands and peoples. A 1964 
survey revealed that between the wars Austro-Hungarian history 
had been an inert area of academic publishing. Yet since the Second 
World War it has spawned 83 major books and 366 learned articles 
by 175 North American academics.1 This achievement was celebrat-
ed in 1966 by an international conf erence of Habsburg scholars at 
Indiana University, at which Paul Schroeder reported with satisfac-
tion on the past generation of an expansion in Habsburg studies in 
North America, while Adam Wandruska and Fritz Fellner reached 
the same conclusion with regard to Europe.2 
At this meeting, Wandruska posed the question of why after 1945 
there had appeared so many "Habsburg" publications. He gave, as 
the main reason, the postwar search within Austro-Hungarian 
history for a multinational model, or a solution to the evils of integral 
or extreme nationalism in the Danubian area.3 After the Second 
World War, the main cause for the collapse of the region into 
disunity and conflict was seen to be nationalism. Perhaps the old 
multinational empire had, after all, something to teach the world. In 
1968, the doyen of this new historical school, Robert Kann, proudly 
reflected that at the end of the war he had selected the nationality 
problem in the Austro-Hungarian Empire as his Columbia Univer-
sity thesis topic for this reason: 
It occurred to me to compile and comment on the various 
attempts that had been made towards a solution of the nationality 
problem in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in order to investi-
gate to what extent they might correspond to the upcoming 
problems of a peaceful order in Europe. ... What interested me 
above all were the modifications of basic ideas of the nationality 
problem in a changing historical framework — possibly a frame-
work of the future.4 
The new postwar sympathy for the Habsburg monarchy of the 
previous generation represented a reversal in mood, from national 
towards multinational answers. 
This paper will link this shift in sentiments to off icial post-World 
War II British plans for central and southeastern Europe. Assisted 
by some of the best academic minds available, the British and the 
American governments came to the conclusion, during the war, that 
Austria, Hungary, and the successor states were too weak to be set 
up again as independent states, but must instead be formed into 
some sort of Danubian federation; an Austria-Hungary without the 
Habsburgs. Despite Russian reservations, this federative program 
was to remain basic Allied policy to the end of the war. Whereas 
during the First World War propagandists had called for the 
dismemberment of the Empire in the interests of nationalism, by 
World War II, planners felt the breakup of Austria-Hungary had 
been a mistake and hoped to re-establish a multinational solution for 
the area. In the process, the old Austro-Hungarian Empire was 
rehabilitated. As the wartime academic planners returned to the 
universities with their new "multinational" conclusions, this view 
entered the mainstream of academic historical interest. Although 
this study will discuss the British side of the story, it is important to 
note that the Americans came to a similar conclusion during this 
period. 
The Second World War was fought by the West, at First, not to 
bring about change in the international order, but to rescue Europe 
from Hitler; a later aim was to rebuild Europe on a sounder basis. 
The planners were certainly unable, at least in the early stages of the 
war — during which their own nations' existence was threatened — 
to conceive that the hostilities would end in a completely unexpected 
fashion with a weakened Britain, a strong Soviet presence in eastern 
Europe, and a United States deeply implicated in European affairs. 
Thus, planning in a wartime vacuum became, in effect, a series of 
historical seminars about the peace of 1919 and its consequences, 
rather than an analysis or speculation about an as yet unknown 
future of a very different nature. The net result was a sharp 
repudiation of some of the basic principles of the post-World War I 
treaties, especially the touchstone of nationalism as a historically 
legitimate organizing factor for political life in central and south-
eastern Europe. 
Between the wars, the mysterious arena of foreign affairs was 
opened up for the first time to public and academic scrutiny, 
creating a large pool of interested citizens and scholarly experts. 
Wilson's 1917-19 "Inquiry," a private group of scholarly advisers to 
the peace conference, was the harbinger of change, which became 
more general as broader groups of people began asking how it had 
been possible for the nations to have fallen into such a bloody and 
costly war and unsatisfactory peace.7 Large public, and publicly 
funded, bodies appeared on the scene to arouse public opinion 
about international relations that, before the war, had been the 
preserve of statesmen and professional diplomats. Two powerful 
(and public) international affairs organizations sprang from the 
British and American delegations to the 1919 Versailles conference: 
the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) in London and 
the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in New York.*' Other 
interested groups, such as the various League of Nations and peace 
societies, prospered as well. New chairs of international affairs were 
established at universities, and history courses stressed international 
affairs more than ever. Public political inquiries studied the causes 
of war and the foundations of peace. 
In the First World War, there had been little attempt to discuss a 
comprehensive peace settlement while hostilities continued. In the 
Second World War the planners hoped to avoid what they saw as the 
mistakes of the previous war by scanning the past for clues to a better 
future. Their historical approach was reinforced through a unique 
cooperation between official diplomatic planners and highly quali-
fied academic experts from the universities, the RIIA and the CFR. 
Many of these leading outside experts pressed into planning service 
in the Second World War were the same scholars who, in World War 
I, had praised the principle of nationalism as the only basis for a 
legitimate and secure peace in Europe. In 1939 when the tragedy of 
war exploded once again, the scholarly RIIA and CFR almost 
immediately initiated studies on the future peace and offered their 
vast resources for research and planning to the Foreign Office and 
the State Department. The offers were gratefully accepted by busy 
diplomatic bureaux overwhelmed by the rush of day-to-day events, 
in this way encouraging — in the official World War II planning 
process — a historical and academic slant to postwar peace 
problems. 
British wartime political planning was centred in the Foreign 
Office, which made sure that it maintained its predominant influ-
ence over the process. The Foreign Office produced the govern-
ment's long, thoughtful background planning papers and policy 
recommendations for the War Cabinet, based on position papers 
written for it by Arnold Toynbee's RIIA independent wartime 
research branch, the Foreign Research and Press Service (FRPS), 
and its successor, the Foreign Office's Research Department 
(FORD). The FRPS was a research, and eventually a planning, 
agency organized in 1939 by Toynbee and staffed largely by 
academics, which operated until 1943 as a branch of the RIIA at 
Balliol College, Oxford. The FORD eventually took over this work 
when Toynbee and some of his staff entered the Foreign Of fice 
directly in 1943. 
Toynbee was no stranger to the Foreign Office, having been active 
there as a young man during the First World War, if only as a 
propagandist. Early in that war the Foreign Office established a 
four-man Political Intelligence Department under the chairman-
ship of the eminent historian Sir James Headlam-Morley.8 His staff 
consisted of the two young historians: Toynbee and Lewis Napier, as 
well as two Australian brothers, Allen and Rex Leeper. Their activity 
at the Foreign Office under Headlam-Morley had more to do with 
propaganda than with the historian's craft, as Toynbee later 
admitted. One of Toynbee's first tasks was to edit the Blue Book on 
the treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. He also 
collaborated with Lord Bryce on official propaganda publications 
about alleged German atrocities in Belgium and France, an activity 
he later regretted, writing that "we behaved irresponsibly."9 Like 
others of his generation, Toynbee believed strongly that nationalism 
was the force of the future and deserved to take the place of the old 
multinational empires in eastern Europe. His first books on the 
virtues of nationalism for Europe were published during this phase 
of his career.10 
Five years after RIIA's foundation, Toynbee joined its staff in 
1925 as research director, remaining active in that position for over 
thirty years.11 He had just left his chair of Byzantine and Greek 
studies at the University of London, after supporting the Turkish 
side in the Greco-Turkish War, and gratefully accepted the new 
position.12 Until 1939 Toynbee spent half his time on the Survey and 
the rest on his other activities as a professor of international relations 
at the University of London and as author of the multi-volume Study 
of History, which began to appear in print in 1934 under RIIA 
sponsorship. In theory, Toynbee completely supported the RIIA 
aim of encouraging the writing of objective, non-partisan studies of 
international affairs, and then the Nazi threat became serious and 
he felt moved to take sides and warn against it.1"3 
The year 1938 was a great lesson, as the Anschluss and threats of 
war over Czechoslovakia caused some to begin to listen to Cassan-
dras such as Toynbee. At the same time, the Foreign Office became 
aware that it was unable to keep up with the Nazis' new, hyperactive 
style of foreign policy initiatives. Its small staff could do nothing 
more than try to cope with its traditional diplomatic activity, leaving 
it powerless to meet any additional crisis or task.11 Rex Leeper, 
Toynbee's old colleague from the days of World War I Foreign 
Office propaganda work and now an official in the F.O., turned to 
his influential friend for advice and assistance.1:> The result was the 
formation at Oxford of a nominally independent, but in reality 
Foreign Office-supported, research organization run by Toynbee, 
the FRPS. 
They agreed Toynbee would recruit a large team of international 
affairs experts from the RIIA in London, as well as from the 
universities, to operate as a semi-independent, confidential infor-
mation and intelligence group for the Foreign Of fice. In return, the 
government would subsidize the group's work.16 Toynbee made an 
agreement with Oxford to set up his new group at Balliol College. 
He attached to it other eminent specialists in international affairs, 
including Professor Robert W. Seton-Watson (one of the most 
powerful voices during the First World War in favour of the 
breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire).1 ' This arrangement was 
formally confirmed between RIIA and the Foreign Office on the eve 
of the second war, in August 1939.1,s Toynbee collected a large staff 
of 121.19 Oxford and its colleges agreed to cover the salaries of 1 1 of 
Toynbee's academic assistants.20 At the end of 1940, Toynbee 
reorganized FRPS's research structure on a new basis of geography 
and included a separate unit for the "Danubian Countries," which 
was to consider the crucial postwar problems of those nations.21 
One of the first postwar planning papers requested of the FRPS 
by the Foreign Office dealt with the sensitive problem of the 
Danubian region or as one official worded it (apparently not 
realizing that the term had no relevance in the context of the day), 
"the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy."22 Long before officials con-
sidered entering into the difficult question of Germany's recon-
struction, in 1941 they took up the problem of how to avoid another 
German, or perhaps Soviet, threat to the splintered and weak area of 
Austria, Hungary and the successor states in southeastern Europe. 
The FRPS was commissioned to see whether this region should be 
returned to its prewar condition as a collection of independent 
countries, or whether this area would stand a better chance 
politically, economically and strategically in the postwar world if its 
nations aligned themselves in some sort of eastern European bloc.23 
It quickly became evident that official Foreign Office and 
academic FRPS opinions on the Danubian question were similar. 
Prewar official reports had long pondered this intractable Danubian 
problem from the viewpoint that the internal instability of these 
countries and their sharp, irreconcilable interstate rivalries had 
allowed Germany to move easily into the area. The victors of the 
First World War had expected the region to become sufficiently 
strong and prosperous to resist German and Soviet pressures, but 
these hopes were dashed in the interwar period.24 Such Foreign 
Office views did not differ, in essence, f rom those held before the 
Second World War by the scholarly RIIA experts. 
Between the wars, nationalist ideologues such as Toynbee and 
Seton-Watson had begun to reverse their positions. In 1929, in his 
Survey of International Affairs, Toynbee had compared the area's 
weakness and rivalries and the Franco-Italian competition there to 
the situation immediately preceding the outbreak of the First World 
War.21 Seton-Watson, who had once been a leader in the campaign 
for national independence in the region, and who saw that ideal as 
the only practical and historically justified solution for the crum-
bling Austro-Hungarian Empire, by the 1930s, also came to the 
reluctant realization that the importance of the question of frontiers 
in southeastern Europe had to be reduced in importance in order to 
arrive at some sort of supranational economic and political union or 
federation.26 His son Hugh took up his father's cause during the 
war.2/ A 1939 RIIA study on southeastern Europe, although 
concentrating specifically on the Nazi threat, was able to record only 
geographical, political, economic, and cultural friction in the area, 
rendering it impotent and indefensible.28 Thus, even before FRPS 
was established in 1939, official and academic minds had moved 
towards the notion of a federative solution as the only possible route 
out of the Danubian labyrinth for Austria, Hungary and the 
successor states. 
The 1941 FRPS paper on southeastern Europe, therefore, not 
surprisingly suggested that the countries of the Danube should form 
a multinational Danubian state of some sort after the war. The 
organizational approach to the problem was to forecast the future 
on the basis of the past, generally a not unreasonable strategy in the 
eyes of historians. Almost its entire thirty-two pages were devoted to 
reviewing the sad history of southeastern Europe since 1918. Its 
multinational recommendation was arrived at as a historically 
determined conclusion. No attempt was made to speculate about the 
role of Soviet Russia there. This was probably not too surprising 
because at the time, the Russians were still battling for their lives and 
their continued survival was in grave doubt. On the other hand, one 
of the advantages of the federation proposal was that it countered 
not only a possible German threat, but it might counteract any Soviet 
pressure as well.29 When the document was adopted almost un-
changed by the War Cabinet as official policy two years later in 1943, 
the military situation of the Soviets had changed dramatically, yet 
the same purely historical arguments regarding a revived, postwar 
German threat were still mustered.30 
Southeastern Europe, or as the paper termed it, "Danubia," had 
finally fallen prey to undesirable forms of nationalism. What this 
bold admission represented was a savage repudiation, on the part of 
Toynbee, Seton-Watson, and the other FRPS experts, of what they 
had once called for as the only possible solution for the region. The 
League of Nations had provided a wholly inadequate interstate 
bond, and there had not been, after 1918, the hoped for movement 
towards voluntary political and economic cooperation between the 
states. Any evolution in this direction, essential for the well-being of 
all the nations in the region, had been rendered sterile by local 
interstate rivalries. These rivalries, and the ensuing regional weak-
ness, had allowed Germany easy penetration of the area in the 
1930s, first economically, then politically and, in the end, militarily. 
A later Foreign Office memorandum said: "The time for a healthy 
and independent Danubian union, in which Austria could have 
found her natural function as an experienced and cultured 'older 
brother' of the successor states, had gone."31 Instead of giving 
the region the benefit of their greater experience, Austria and 
Hungary, still smarting from the loss of their conationals and the 
breakup of their economic hinterland in the First World War, had 
done their bit to regain lost territories and rend asunder the 
post-1919 territorial arrangement. 
Ironically, the one-time critics of the old Austro-Hungarian 
Empire now found themselves cast in the role of its defenders in 
more modern dress. The failed 1919-39 model of independent 
eastern European states dominated their thinking. The national 
principle had obviously proved to be unworkable in a "Danubia," as 
its people were too intermixed and too inclined towards emotional 
displays ever to coexist in peace and order, and so some other 
supranational idea had to be introduced. The FRPS's chastened 
historians and planners now admitted that the easy application in 
1919 of t he national principle to the region had been a misapplica-
tion of a sound western idea in a totally different and inappropriate 
context. At the basis of the area's tragedy lay the "enthusiastic 
application of Western ideas torn from their Western context." One 
of the main derivatives of this shattering new wisdom was that the 
old, multinational Habsburg state, as viewed from 1938, seemed to 
have been much more successful than it had appeared prior to and 
during the First World War. What then of the future? Once touted 
in its innocent, untried youthfulness as the area's road to salvation, 
nationalism had instead turned into the disease of the age. To 
attempt to reorganize the area after the war as it had existed after 
1919 would simply be to insist on marching down the same suicidal 
road, leading again to a weakened and isolated Austria, another 
Anschluss by an aggressive Germany, and renewed German penetra-
tion into and control of the weak states of the Danubian region. A 
second Austrian Anschlnss, the inevitable First step in this evil 
process, had to be avoided. Hungarian national resentment, too, 
had to be moderated. 
Consequently, the British planning paper under discussion rec-
ommended it was time to realize that before 1914, "a more practical 
alternative appeared to be not the maintenance of the unities of 
Austria and Hungary, but the application within them of national 
and cultural autonomy."32 This inclination to historical revisionism 
led the planners to the seemingly inevitable conclusion that the 
postwar interests of Europe and the Danubian states — not 
excluding Austria and Hungary — would best be served by 
following the historic path set by pre-1914 Austria-Hungary, only 
without the Habsburgs this time. The substance of the planners' 
major recommendation, the creation of a Danubian federation 
supported economically and diplomatically by the West, was mod-
elled on the old Empire. Federal institutions, along with local and 
cultural autonomy, should combine to create a large, tolerant 
Danubian state able to form and maintain a large internal market 
and to defend itself against any renewed German aggression. "It 
needed the cataclysm of this war to open the eyes of European public 
opinion to the need of Danubian unity." The paper took it for 
granted that not only the British, but also the various peoples of 
"Danubia" would have reached this same enlightened view by the 
end of the war. Churchill favoured it in general, and there appeared 
to be no other possible solution.33 
In mid-1943, Toynbee and some FRPS staff were taken directly 
into the Foreign Office, and their federative Danubian recommen-
dation became official policy. The Foreign Office appointed the 
FRPS staff as temporary civil servants within its growing Research 
Department — FORD — and there they remained for the duration 
of the war. The FRPS's multinational and federative Danubian 
concept was recommended by the Foreign Office to the War Cabinet 
as by far the "most attractive solution to the region's problems," and 
was adopted as government policy. This notion was to serve as an 
end in itself rather than as a public policy, as there still existed too 
many variables in the equation. For the moment, such a "confedera-
tion" had to hover in a fairly "nebulous" state, as it was not yet 
apparent whether Poles, Czechs, and Russians were attracted to the 
plan. However, as the Foreign Office noted, it represented a solid 
goal to be pursued. It was "desirable to work for ... a Central (or 
southeastern) European confederation," although matters did not 
need to be ru shed / 5 In accepting the federative concept in June 
1943, the War Cabinet agreed with both the goal and this loose 
schedule for realization.3 ' 
This Second World War rehabilitation of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire by official and academic postwar planners later led to 
interesting repercussions concerning the direction of scholarly 
activity in the postwar era. Many FRPS and FORD experts returned 
at the conclusion of hostilities to academic posts and continued to 
write in the same vein about southeastern Europe. Toynbee's first 
postwar RIIA Survey of International Affairs sounded like an echo of 
the 1941 FRPS Austrian paper and the 1943 Cabinet decision. It 
again blamed the 1938-39 collapse of southeastern Europe on 
mistakes by the 1919 victors.31' "The history of the Versailles system 
in eastern Europe," the Survey judged, "showed in microcosm what 
the League of Nations showed in the world at large, that sovereign 
states are incapable of disciplined co-operation for a long period in 
defence of a static international order."3 ' 
True to these same wartime insights, Toynbee's FRPS colleague, 
historian C.A. Macartney (whose first university scholarship had 
been decided by a college board on which Toynbee sat), was still 
warning, in 1962, about the dangers of national independence in 
southeastern Europe. In effect, the Soviets had imposed by force a 
type of multinational structure on the region. Should Soviet control 
over the area one day disappear, Macartney questioned whether 
independent states in "Danubia" could offer a viable alternative: 
To put back the fourteen national states of the interwar period, 
with their interwar f rontiers, would be to invite a repetition of the 
former failure. ... The solution of the East European problem lies 
in the creation of some larger multinational state with special 
institutions appropriate to the special conditions of the area.38 
The question is still raised today. 
In this way, the revised standard historical version of the 
multinational Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and the adverse role of 
nationalism devised during World War II continued after 1945 to 
influence historical studies. The negative side of nationalism was 
now heavily stressed, and as eastern Europe fell under Soviet 
domination, national archives there remained closed to westerners. 
A remarkable revival of interest in, and nostalgia for, the old 
Austro-Hungarian Empire as a field of study and possible model for 
the political, economic, and cultural problems of southeastern 
Europe was witnessed. This trend became transatlantic, for, at about 
the same time, the Americans arrived at similar conclusions based on 
their own wartime study of Austria-Hungary and "Danubia." 
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Fifteen Years of Official 
Multiculturalism in Canada: 
Its Impact on Heritage Languages 
and Cultures 
Victor O. Buyniak 
The policy of Multiculturalism, as declared by the federal 
government in 1971, gave ethnic groups in Canada greater impetus 
and desire to pursue their linguistic and cultural development. 
Multiculturalism, as such, existed before and continues to exist in 
Canadian society because of the efforts and willingness of the 
members of these groups to preserve their own cultural traditions. 
Its official implementation was a political response to this prevailing 
social phenomenon. Right now, about one-third of the Canadian 
population is of origins other than Anglo-Celtic or French. 
The initial euphoria was dispelled long ago when the declaration 
of the policy was not translated into pragmatic and tangible form. 
And it has been the view of many leaders that the official declaration 
of Canada as a multicultural society has in fact led to more 
divisiveness within various cultural groups than may have been the 
case before 1971. Since that time many new groups have come to the 
fore both because of numbers, recent immigration, and their 
obtaining a certain economic status wherein their members could 
devote more time to their cultural pursuits. Yet the perception is 
that the administration of the multiculturalism programs has 
tended to favour not only particular groups, but also certain cultural 
organizations and groups within those bodies — which has led in 
some cases to a distrust of the government, as well as of those who 
seem favoured by government largesse. It is commonly perceived 
that this is not entirely an inadvertent result of the administration of 
the policy, but rather an attempt by those who administer the 
programs to prevent some form of common action and political 
unification of the various cultural groups. There seems to be an 
endemic fear within the government of a strong third political force. 
Whereas in the 1970s the purpose of the Policy of Multicultural-
ism was to support, foster and encourage the cultural development 
of the various ethnic groups in our society, in the 1980s it has 
become a social tool to effect change and affect perceptions. It is 
seen as an instrument of social change. I he bureaucrats no longer 
appear to respond to demands and initiatives for support, but have 
chosen instead to become the initiators, attempting to mould these 
groups, especially the young, to their perception of what a multicul-
tural society should look like. 
For a while, there was a lack of certainty among the ethnic groups 
that Canada was officially multicultural. This notion was not 
dispelled when, during the course of the negotiations on repatriat-
ing the Constitution, the concept of multiculturalism was virtually 
ignored. An official policy of the Canadian government seemed to 
have no place in the document that was to set the legal parameters 
for this society. Only after numerous groups made vigorous 
submissions on the necessity of including reference to the Policy of 
Multiculturalism was anything added. It was essential that the 
preamble make reference to the fact of multiculturalism. Perhaps 
the best that could be hoped for was achieved by the insertion of 
Paragraph 27, which states: "This charter shall be interpreted in a 
manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the 
multicultural heritage of Canadians." This was far short of declaring 
Canada officially multicultural, but it certainly allowed room for the 
courts to build on that idea. 
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the new Canadian 
Constitution did entrench linguistic and cultural dualism at the 
heart of Canadian Confederation. While the spokesmen or advo-
cates for multiculturalism in education are right to take official 
bilingualism for granted, what they forget is that English and 
French are not just languages of communication, but languages of 
culture as well, and that the charter is therefore a powerful weight in 
favour of biculturalism. No one would maintain that German, 
Italian or Spanish can be official languages of communication in 
Canada. However, they and others are languages of culture, or at 
least of cultural identity, and access in the state school systems to 
courses in minority languages — where numbers warrant — must be 
on the same basis as access to English and French if multiculturalism 
is to have a living base and some guarantee against degenerating into 
superficial folk cultures. Within a multicultural framework, there is 
room for everybody's "identity agenda." Within a multicultural 
framework, it is fairly easy to accommodate everyone interested in 
acquiring the skills associated with official bilingualism. But in 
order to safeguard the minority language educational rights, some 
amendment must be added to Paragraph 23 in the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms allowing primary and secondary school instruction in 
a language other than English or French, where the number of 
students justifies it. In a multicultural society, each individual must 
have the opportunity to acquire such languages as will meet not only 
his communication needs, but his cultural needs as well. 
Since matters of education lie predominantly within provincial 
jurisdiction, it is imperative that there be contact between provincial 
and federal officials. Where language policies and programs in 
multicultural education are concerned, what is needed most are 
annual federal-provincial conferences, involving ministers of cul-
ture and education, to consider fundamental issues with the explicit 
understanding that bicultural individuals who are bilingual or 
trilingual are among the country's most valuable assets. Thanks to 
the financial support for multicultural programs, it has been 
possible to establish and operate a number of bilingual or even 
trilingual schools or classrooms in Canada. 
Federal support for heritage language instruction is rooted in the 
recommendations of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and 
Biculturalism (1969). The Commission concluded that: 
because of the interdependence of language and culture, we must 
consider the teaching of languages other than English and French 
in the educational system as an important aspect of any program 
to preserve the cultures of those of non-British, non-French 
origin. 
It was further resolved that, "because the survival of a language is 
greatly affected by the support it receives in the 0-14 age bracket, the 
most extensive effort should be made at the elementary school 
level." Specifically, the commission recommended that the teaching 
of languages, other than English and French, and cultural subjects 
related to them be incorporated as options in the public elementary 
school program where there is sufficient demand for such classes. 
Where demand and resources permit, it may also prove feasible that 
some instruction in the related cultural subjects can be offered using 
the appropriate language as the language of instruction. 
After the proclamation of the Policy of Multiculturalism, this 
recommendation was translated into the following: support for the 
development of teaching materials, subsidies to supplementary 
language schools, provisions for the hiring of cultural and language 
advisers, the sponsorship of heritage language conferences and the 
establishment of a National Heritage Language Centre at the 
University of Toronto in 1984. Specific functions of the centre were 
in the areas of materials production, teacher training and research. 
Because education in Canada is a provincial responsibility, direct 
federal support for heritage language instruction is confined to 
schools and programs that exist outside the formal educational 
system. However, substantial grants have been awarded to groups 
and individuals engaged in the development of teaching and 
resource materials for core and bilingual programs. 
The Trudeau government had announced it would transfer $600 
million to the provinces for minority language education for 1984 
through 1987. All provinces offer minority language education 
through their school systems as well as teaching English or French as 
a second language. Since 1970, Ottawa has contributed almost $2 
billion to the provinces to help pay for those services. The payments 
are based on a complex formula that takes into account student 
enrolments and the education cost per student in each province. 
The agreement signed at that time was to transfer more than $190 
million to the provinces in 1983-84, representing a $15 million 
increase over the previous year's assistance. The budget was to grow 
by 5 per cent in each of the following years. Of course, a very high 
percentage of these sums went to official language programs. 
Nevertheless, in the 1983-84 budget year, $4.26 million went to 
minority-language programs, a very substantial increase from 
previous years. By comparison, in the same year, the total annual 
budget of the Ministry of Multiculturalism was $24 million. In 
addition to the various heritage-language bilingual schools in 
larger centres, schools that have been incorporated into regular 
educational systems, and federal and provincial grant structures, 
support supplementary language schools conducted by various 
ethnocultural community organizations. It is estimated that close to 
100,000 students are enrolled in such institutions in Canada. 
The present federal government is committed to the policy of 
multiculturalism, but budgetary restraints make it mandatory to 
eliminate or decrease a number of existing programs. Thus the 
approach of the government has changed. Today, multiculturalism 
is, to a great extent, identified with the idea of visible minority 
groups. There appears to be a perception that among those of 
Anglo-Celtic and French origin there is little knowledge of or 
interest in the multicultural policy. It is perceived in the eyes of 
many that the government has diverted the aims of the multicultural 
policy from that of fostering, encouraging and supporting develop-
ment of culture to that of combating discrimination and prejudice, a 
role that appears to be more fitting for the Ministry of Justice. That 
goal is certainly laudable, but it is not something that should be the 
primary focus of a multicultural policy. 
In implementing multiculturalism the government is seen to be 
moving towards the absorption of all cultural groups. Many groups 
are being assimilated rapidly. There are notable exceptions, espe-
cially among those whose country of origin is under totalitarian rule 
or is in some way endangered as a political entity. But other than its 
recognition of multiculturalism, the government has never given 
much substance to the policy. It is more the proverbial greasing of 
the squeaky wheel. Many groups appear to have been bought 
cheaply through handshakes, photographs and letters. This has led 
to cynicism, especially among the young. 
However, despite the criticism levelled at the government, prog-
ress has been made. In addition to the already mentioned aid from 
government agencies for ethnic schools and cultural organizations, 
several chairs of ethnic studies have been founded at Canadian 
universities. Visiting professorships, scholarships, institutes and 
learned societies for the individual ethnic groups have been 
Financed, and funds have been allocated for scholarly conferences, 
research and publications. All this has been made available through 
federal and provincial bodies. Much more can be done in the field of 
interchange within cultural groups themselves. A multicultural 
policy should exist to encourage the various groups to pool their 
resources. 
Some criticism has also been expressed regarding the composition 
of the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism, which 
has been set up to advise the government on matters of multi-
culturalism. It has led to a genuine belief among younger communi-
ty leaders that the council is an "ethnic senate" where appointments 
are made to reward loyalty. The suggestions and recommendations 
of the various ethnic groups have been made in order to identify 
individuals "in touch" with their community. Under the new 
government, the Consultative Council has been reduced from its 
previous 100 members to 30. However a Standing Committee of the 
House of Commons on Multiculturalism, consisting of fifteen 
parliamentarians, was established in June 1985.1 The new Minister 
of Multiculturalism, the Honourable Otto Jelinek, was appointed on 
20 August 1985. Of Czech origin, Jelinek came to Canada as a young 
boy. The expectation of the "ethnic" public has been only partially 
fulfilled, though, since the upgrading of the federal Ministry of 
Multiculturalism to a more senior position did not occur — the 
portfolio has been transferred to a minister who already holds 
another ministerial responsibility. 
But on 15 November 1985, Jelinek told the annual general 
meeting of the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism 
that Prime Minister Mulroney had agreed to double the number of 
ethnocultural appointees on various government boards and com-
missions, an increase from 10 per cent to 20 per cent. There are now 
some 1,500 such positions. The minister added that he personally 
would not be satisfied until the proportion reached 30 per cent to 
approximate the percentage of Canada's population that is not 
Anglo-Celtic, French or native.2 He also stated that despite a 
threefold increase in funds, there was not nearly enough money 
available for support in the development of heritage-language 
supplementary schools. 
All in all, there is still hope for multiculturalism, even in these 
times of monetary constraints. Although the government's concept 
of multiculturalism may differ from that of the individual ethnic 
groups directly affected by it, the introduction of the policy was a 
definite, positive step. It gave the ethnic communities additional 
stimulus and encouragement to continue, more rigorously and with 
greater enthusiasm, in their efforts for their own linguistic and 
cultural preservation. And the fiinancial support of the government 
is a very important component of this policy because it allows them 
to realize, if only partially, these aspirations.3 
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Primordial Hungarian Beliefs and 
Modern Literature 
Martin L. Kovacs 
In the opinion of historians of religion, the adoption and practice 
of monotheism, over time, does not exclude the possibility of 
reversion to some of the beliefs and rites of a much earlier level of 
development. In fact, it has been maintained as an axiom that a 
"dialectic of the sacred" has been at work in religious experiences all 
the time, predicating the possibility of "spontaneous reversal of any 
religious position."1 
It may be possible that the unusually great interest in primaeval 
beliefs, on the part of Hungarians, in the last 100 years or so, as well 
as today, derives from the above tenet. The pagan Hungarians did 
not have shamanism alone as their religion. There were adherents to 
several religions among them, including probably Jews and Moham-
medans. Nevertheless, there are only small fragments of these 
religions hidden in the beliefs, customs, and folklore of the common 
people of Hungary.2 
Undoubtedly, it is the tdltos, a shamanlike figure among the 
primordial Hungarians, who has attracted most attention from 
scholars and the general public alike. It is not our purpose to discuss, 
in this paper, the multifarious descriptions of this priestly figure, but 
rather, to present its many images created in the minds of modern 
poets, writers, dramatists and scholars. 
First of all, it must be stated that in certain regions of Hungary, 
people believe that some members of their communities deserve the 
name tdltos; not in the old sense of controlling the weather, or 
fighting another tdltos, but by being unusually clever or prof icient in 
some area of life.3 
Nowadays, the tdltos has transferred himself, to a large extent, into 
the realm of fairy-tales, as shown by several recent scholarly 
investigations. Thus, one author has been able to trace 468 versions 
of the fairy-tale about the tree that reaches up into the sky. The same 
author points out that the tdltos person often has his tdltos horse in 
the fairy-tale because the two of them can carry out superhuman 
and supernatural feats only if they are together. A further interest-
ing finding is that "the horse of the tdltos hero in the fairy-tale is 
identical with the shaman's drum; through the agency of the latter, 
the shaman can fly as fast as thought, and overcome or escape the 
harmful powers."4 
Agnes Kovacs provides documentary evidence in support of the 
existence of female taltoses f rom the sixteenth to the eighteenth 
centuries, as seen in the records of local witchcraft trials.0 These 
female taltoses are born with teeth and acquire their tudas (magic) in 
trances. They are known to fight, in animal form, male taltoses, even 
suspended in mid-air.b Nevertheless, it is the tdltos boy who has a 
horse, never the tdltos girl/ As folklore figures, both the tdltos man 
and the tdltos horse possess superhuman knowledge, they are seers 
who are able to recognize promptly the malice of witches and other 
superhuman beings.8 Yet the tdltos is not malicious, because he helps 
his relatives, his friends, or even strangers against the wicked.9 This 
is only possible for him, since he can foresee the future. During 
witchcraft trials, the claim was also made that the tdltos is the elect of 
God, and his task is to fight devils and witches.10 
Consequently, there evolved a peaceful coexistence of Christian 
ideology and tdltos beliefs. Agnes Kovacs concludes that Christianity 
has absorbed not only pagan elements, but also the tdltos tradition; 
that is why the latter has survived.11 
It seems to be a well-established finding that the qualities of the 
tdltos may derive from those of the herosz.12 The descent of the heros is 
partly or completely mythical because it is the triumphant instinct of 
life that creates for man a new friend in the tdltos whose magical 
power is heroic, yet he lives among people. Thus, the tdltos, still alive 
until recently, is a "culture herosz" of the folk-tales. The tdltos may 
become a herosz as a successful practitioner of an art or plyer of a 
trade in folk tradition: 
He who'd play the bagpipes well, 
First must needs descend to hell. 
There he may acquire the skill 
To play the bride's dance with a will.13 
We cannot review heroic poetry as such in this paper, but some 
reference should be made at least to "Zagon, the High Priest of 
Haddur, the Protector God of the Scythians," who produces a ball of 
flame in the sky as a sign, found in one of the earlier examples of 
heroic poetry in Hungary.11 
In some literature there is only an indication of the influence 
derived from ancient tradition. Thus, Mihaly Gal, the young 
farmer's hand, was taken advantage of by the farmer and the local 
dealer. With the help of his two small oxen, Mihaly turned against 
his adversaries and outwitted them. He called his oxen taltos-okrok 
without actually producing any evidence that they could be regard-
ed as taltoses. Nevertheless, the reader senses the presence of a 
magical power.1" 
Some researchers have come to the conclusion that animals as well 
have a rank order and that birds of the eagle family, like the turul, 
constitute totems of the royal progeny. One of the myths of the 
Buryats explains that the eagle was chosen by the benevolent spirits 
to become the shaman of man. Dezso Dummerth explains that the 
term "shaman" refers to the figure who acts as a priest and magician, 
as well as an intermediary between the gods and man." ' 
The king sent from heaven tends to be the same kind of 
intermediary and exceptional individual as the shaman is with his 
people, curing illnesses, foretelling the future, and ridding his tribe 
of maleficent spirits. Also in respect of animallike ancestors, the 
ordinary people cannot but utilize the power of the shaman and the 
magus.17 
The animal form of the animal forbear has the function of 
drawing attention to certain characteristic attributes: "he is as strong 
as a bear" or "he comes from heaven like a bird." In other words, the 
ancestors assume animal forms because they accept a mission of 
higher standing, either to undertake the healing of their people, or 
an even higher task. At a later stage of development, the totemic 
notions change into symbols. In the present case, as part of religious 
progress, the turul grows into a winged messenger not unlike the 
visions of the prophet Isaiah that at times refer to animals, often 
winged, that deliver various tidings. If this reasoning is applied, it is 
more understandable why shamans would put on wings or animal 
skins when performing their rites: to indicate that the nature of their 
effort is of the highest order, as is the case with healing or serving his 
people's well-being.18 
Dummerth assumes that Emese, owing to inherited beliefs and 
her imagination, not only underwent the birth process, but also 
prior fertilization by the turul bird; consequently, she could have 
been capable of communicating with the spirits. The boy she 
carried, Almos, was in any case the son of the chieftain, Ugek, who 
was also of the clan Turul. Thus the bird in Emese's dream also seems 
to have continued Almos's descent from the powerful clan. Further-
more, the dream served as evidence that Almos was superior to his 
father, because he resembled the familial ancestor, and therefore 
Almos would become a powerful leader.19 
Perhaps some kinds of totem animals provided Karoly Bari with 
inspiration in certain aspects of his poetry. Maybe he is the "Tdltos 
Boy" in his poem of the same title: 
I play smoke on the flutes of chimneys. 
Furious wind pounds my drums. 
The knives of fates dance before me. 
A skull snarls under the threshold.20 
It is thus possible that the "Shaman's Cry" represents his own 
lamenting: 
What country is your country, King Dul, 
If it trusts f uture to disguise? 
Famous tatters guard her crown. 
I am a shaman; fire barks f rom my throat.21 
In this context, a strange occurrence may be mentioned wherein 
the impact of primaeval beliefs was so great that the individuals 
affected were overwhelmed by it, with dire consequences. Pal 
Demeny, in his reminiscences, describes one of his fellow-prisoners 
in 1939. The man liked to call himself "Virraszto Koppany" 
(Koppany the watchful), in reference to Koppany, the uncle of (St.) 
Stephen I, the first Christian King of Hungary, who represented not 
only the principle of seniority in succession, but also the old pagan 
religion of the Magyars against Stephen. He had returned to the 
primaeval religion and not only adopted the turul, the totem bird of 
the Arpadian rulers, but also some of the pagan customs, such as the 
periodic sacrificing of the white horse. The latter act was merely 
symbolic; a few pounds of horse meat consumed in the open air in 
the company of a friend and believer. He would go out to the 
farmers in the Tisza region and offer medicinal water and ointments 
for illnesses. He believed in his own powers and had several dozen 
followers. The "pagan tdltos" was imprisoned for "stirring up 
disaffection" among the people in an unspecified way.22 
In connection with rejtozes (ritual seclusion), Karoly Viski23 refers 
to Janos Arany's Toldi: 
But he does not die, only in the manner 
In which the person goes into a deep trance, 
And when he comes out of it after a while, 
One can hear wondrous accounts from him.24 
Arany's lines may imply that Miklos Toldi had become either a 
"regos" or, more likely, a certain type of tdltos. But Arany's choice of 
elrejtezik (deep trance) seems to refer to shamanic concealment 
connected with the inhaling of smoke or vapour in order to induce a 
trance.25 
It is interesting that some of the greatest Hungarian poets should 
have come from the same area: the Sarret and the Ermellek. Janos 
Arany from the westernmost region, Nagyszalonta; Ady from 
Ermellek in the northeast; and as to the Sarret proper, one can refer 
to Imre Nagy, a folk poet of more recent years than the other two. 
Another important difference that characterizes Nagy is the fact 
that he was a truly "peasant" poet. Living from 1896-1942, a good 
portion of his life coincided with that of Endre Ady, of whom Nagy 
was not only very fond, but whose poetry was a great influence on 
him. 
Nagy was a significant person in the village society of Sarretudvari 
and was invariably invited to weddings in order to toast the young 
couples with wedding rhymes, often of his own devising. Imre Nagy 
is now a recognized poet in Hungary, and a representative volume 
of his poetry was in its third edition in 1986.2<> Nagy is not only a poet 
of the Sarret areas, but is also deeply affected by their traditions, 
which includes his "Storm-Steeds that kick up sparks/In wine, in 
song, in flower, and in hearts." His "storm-steeds" have "flaming 
manes" and when the poet cracks his "flame whip," the Duna and 
Tisza "leap over their banks."27 
Perhaps his most explicit poem, in the present context, is 
"Locsontvaz a pusztan" (Horse Skeleton on the Puszta): 
Asia puffs its winds now, 
And this is, perhaps, a dream of the Orient: 
The skeleton of a horse, its skull, 
Glows on the incline of the Orhalom. 
As if my fate were dreamt up by the Orient: 
An anthill disintegrates under my feet. 
The Sun rises like a fiery wasp, 
And my fingers d rum in the dusk. 
On the horse-skull, which 
Now is the storm-shelter for worms and crickets. 
Its two eye-pits, still containing 
The magic of the taltoses, stare at the sky. 
As if I were calling the Sun to account 
For its nippers, for its snickers, 
For its stone-hardened hoofprints in the puszta, 
For its saddle embroidered with flowers. 
Asia puffs its winds now; 
Our horse stumbles with Hunger and thirst; 
His mane and tail fall in the wind, 
For we do not pray to the Sun. 
The fate of horses is the sorrowful Magyar fate. 
The grass burns out; the well dries up; 
And instead of the horse, the sweep of the well neighs — 
And the Orient rebels in dreams.2 8 
Not everyone views the Hungarian plain and its cultivators in the 
same vein as does Imre Nagy. Indeed, even the tillers of the land 
seem not quite natural in the poetry of Dezso Kosztolanyi; he refers 
to the Magyar farmer as "an enigmatic Oriental tdltos," or "an 
emissary of proto-Hungarians who had survived all tribulations." 
Some of his actual lines: 
He walks, leaving his wistful, sleepy 
Horse alone to do the ploughing, 
At times flinging out his arms like a tdltos. 
The snow-white frills of his shirt shine, glistening.2'' 
Bela Pomogats affirms that Kosztolanyi (unlike Ady) was interpre-
ting popular life in the style of the Szecesszio (Art Nouveau) of the 
early 1900s. His observations of village life were characterized by a 
distant unfamiliarity; he saw peasants only through the windows of 
so 
passing trains. 
A novel has been written by Laszlo Gasparovich on the life and 
customs of the people of Hungary during the reign of Prince Geyza, 
the father of Vajk, later Stephen, the first King of Hungary.31 The 
author does his best to provide a sense of the social and cultural 
conditions in the country at the time. Taltoses of different kinds 
appear, including a Greek one (a conditional one, should his wife 
want to have one); also carvers and regoses turn up, working on 
"magic poles." Besides, reference is made to Emese's dream about 
the turul. 
Stage acting, as well as primaeval beliefs, are discussed by Tekla 
Domotor in one of her studies.32 She praises Ferenc Hont's volume 
for the particular attention with which he treats monodrama, which 
he calls tdltos szinjatszas (tdltos acting).33 Then Domotor goes on to 
point out that foreign researchers, like Mircea Eliade and Carl 
Niessen, have identified the theatrical ingredients in the work of the 
shaman when he acts out his journey upwards (or downwards) to 
meet with spirits. Domotor suggests that the shamanic rites of the 
early Magyars, too, included similarly theatrical elements.34 In any 
case, she reminds us that the shaman of the primaeval Hungarians 
was only an "Actor," as with other pastoral peoples, and not the 
"stage manager at their communal festivities." His primary task was 
to maintain contact with the spirits, as well as to perform such other 
duties as healing. His reviiles was awe-inspiring, but otherwise it did 
not affect the viewers with any degree of ecstasis. Domotor draws our 
attention to a significant folk-cultural change — persons assumed to 
have supernatural powers have ceased to have any function in such 
folk activities as the jeles napok (the marked days of the year). The 
specific figures affected are the tdltos, halottldto (seer of the dead), 
nezo (seer), javas (healer) and so on. 
Historical plays that include aspects of primaeval beliefs have 
always been fashionable in Hungary. The following two plays were 
described to the present writer and referred to as most popular. 
First, Assist the King! by Jozsef Ratko: the three main figures — King 
(St.) Stephen I, the Old Man and the High Priest — are presented in 
the situation of casting an account. Their self-examination is 
marked by the approach of death. The High Priest is threatened 
owing to the untimely and fatal accident sustained by his pupil, 
Stephen's only son and heir, Prince Imre. The Old Man (a tdltos and 
regos), who represents the past, senses his own early end. 
The long dialogues between the High Priest and the Old Man — 
that is, the new and the old outlooks — dominate the play. Thus the 
High Priest acknowledgingly remarks, "He is, it is true, a pagan, yet 
he acknowledges God. He is wise. Whatever he says is no dull prattle. 
His words are most profitable to his listeners." With these words, he 
expresses his opinion that it was an error to apply force against the 
Old Man's notions. In the end King Stephen states: "I have robbed 
my kin. I have turned them out of their nature and taken away their 
past. I have deprived them of their songs." T h e tdltos presented in 
the play, "the pagan devil," in other words, the Old Man, would like 
to appear as an ally of the Christians. For, according to the play-
wright's sources, shamans would refer to themselves as "baptized." 
They raised their voices in regos songs: "We are not devils, but St. 
Stephen's servants." Of the writer's friendly feelings towards the 
Old Man — indeed, he has an important role in the play, at the 
beginning and at the end — a portion are given to Vaszoly, who is 
much different from Ady's Vazul, which is also indicated by the 
Magyarization of his Byzantine Bulgarian name.3 , 
Magda Szabo's Bela Kiraly deals with a later era, in which German 
cultural and other influence is revealed. It was during Lent 1241 
that a threatening message was received from Batu Khan, prompt-
ing the king, Bela IV of Hungary, to give it serious deliberation in his 
council. Indeed, Hungary was on the eve of the devastating invasion 
by the Mongol armies led by Batu. Szabo dramatizes the period and 
underlines one potential weakness of Hungary in the continuing 
clash between Christians and the remnants of the primaeval 
religion, known to us even today.36 
In the second scene, Father Paul, Inquisitor-General of Hungary 
and King's Conf essor, and John the Teuton, the papal legate, carry 
on a discussion in which Paul represents moderation against 
followers of older, pagan beliefs. John wants to know why Paul does 
not take stronger measures against the pagans, to which Paul replies 
that kindness is a more effective instrument than coercion.37 John 
states, "I am convinced you will give an explanation that is not only 
acceptable, but also adequate, to explain why the Holy Inquisition in 
Hungary, placed under your direction by the Holy See, defends 
pagans and hampers them from salvaging their salvation, at least 
through receiving worldly punishment." Paul counters, "Father 
Legate, these are not pagans; these are Christians, just like you 
or I"38: 
JOHN: Take the village of Kald. A shaman denuded a body, closed 
it into a chamber among heated bricks, and thrashed it red with 
switches of birch. It was immoral sorcery. 
PAUL: But the person was healed, Father Legate. 
JOHN: And the songs at the water of the fountain? The bone-setter 
at Sumeg? And the godless one who was cutting cataracts and giving 
his blessings to the falcons? 
PAUL: It is a folk-custom. It is as old as history. And besides, the 
patient recovered.39 
The case of Laszlo Waszlavik — "Gazi" — may be regarded, in the 
present context, as the latest symptom in the process of intellectual-
ization of the tdltos heritage in Hungary. Young Gazi is representa-
tive of the rock-and-roll generation, a phenomenon that has come to 
that country somewhat belatedly. A student of languages, including 
English, he has acquired a deep interest in rock music. What is 
surprising for us, however, is a large sign found in his garden 
with the English inscription, "East and Global European Rock-
Shaman."40 This was revealed in an interview, in part to show how 
Laszlo came to organize a rock competition of shamans and to adopt 
his present stage name and shamanic office. According to Gazi, 
shamans in their day were actual sources of knowledge. They were 
at once physicians, biologists, diviners, meteorologists, advisers and 
clairvoyants. By acquiring the formal vocabulary of shamanism, 
Gazi thought to pay tribute to this primaeval concept of en-
cyclopaedic learning. The shaman's job in his society was to collect 
observations, societal and purely physical, and then hand them 
down. It could be said that the shaman was the forerunner of the 
library and the modern computer centre. Gazi's shaman staff 
displays a number of symbols that are in themselves unimportant, 
but which take on a deeper meaning when regarded as symbols. 
Along with the feather, the velvet ribbon, cables and carved signs, 
there is also a computer service part. 
"One of my musical routines is called 'medvetor (bear feast) in 
Atlantis'," Gazi says. "Medvetor is meant to be a shamanistic intellec-
tual ceremony in which individual pieces deal with Hungarian 
studies in a visionary manner from pagan Magyar symbolism to the 
era of the East-West conflict."41 
A new period is about to begin in fine arts, Gazi says, which he 
supports. He sees an eventual return to established values, their 
reassessment, and he hopes to see new life infused into old ideas. 
"The essential thing is that the fundamental method of art is 
irrationality. There is a trend to get the world to use scientific 
method in obtaining knowledge, but this has its own limits. Where 
there is no go with rationality, the magic, irrational approach will 
help." Gazi sees shamanship as a "game of irony" in which images 
are important. He has chosen, through the ritual of rock music, a 
typically eastern European "mask." Working with several media — 
pictures, music, tones, movement, sight, lecturing, action, movies 
and other elements — Gazi feels he can compete within the context 
of contemporary communicational expectations. According to him, 
television offers such heavy competition that subtlety is the only way 
to deal with it. And so he favours innovation in Bartok's manner as 
well, by building upon Hungarian roots and traditions.42 Perhaps 
there is more to it than impishness when he declares, "A shaman 
corner is mine in life.... And anyone I point my shaman shaft at may 
have a good time, or maybe an evil one."43 
It has been the intention of this essay to provide a sample of a 
larger study on some wider aspects of primordial Hungarian beliefs 
and their influence upon select regions on this side of the ocean and 
in Europe. 
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